Demography Resources

Rice Data

2008-05-02T16:07:00.004+02:00

Rapid Ageing in Korea

2008-04-27T20:49:00.002+02:00

From - Facing the Future: Korea's Family, Pension and Health Policy Challenges
OECD Working paper.

Extraordinarily rapid ageing of the Korean population

The increase in the maternal age in first childbirth has contributed to the sharp decline in the fertility rate in Korea. The birth rate was 6 children per women in 1960, about half that in 1975, and is now at about 1.2 children per women; among the lowest levels recorded in OECD countries (Chart 1.5). Socio-economic changes, including industrialisation, urbanisation, changes in family values, gender roles, attitudes towards paid employment and pursuing careers have all contributed to changes in family formation and the decline in the birth-rate.

In addition to changes in fertility behaviour, there have been sharp reductions in infant mortality rates, from 45 infants per 1000 live births in 1970 to 5.3 in 2002; the infant mortality rate is now below the OECD average of 5.7 infants per 1000 live births (OECD, 2005c). There has also been a dramatic increase in life expectancy in Korea

Compared to other OECD countries, except perhaps Turkey and to a lesser extent Mexico, the gains in life expectancy in Korea have been spectacular over the last 45 years: for women from 53.7 years on average in 1960 to 80.8 in 2003; and from 51.1 to 73.9 for men over the same period. Compared to most other OECD countries, the proportion of the foreigners residing in Korea is low: only 0.9% of the population is foreign born (OECD, 2006b). In the absence of important migration flows, the sharply reduced birth rates and the huge gains in life expectancy at birth will lead to an extraordinarily rapid ageing of the Korean population.

By 2050, the number of people not yet 30 years of age relative to the working age population will have fallen to 29% from 46% in 2000. This will have a profound effect on, for example, the demand for education services, which is likely to lead to dramatic changes in the number and structure of schools and universities. At the same time, the number of senior citizens relative to the working age population will increase from just below 10% in 2000 to almost 70% in 2050 (Chart 1.7); and only Italy, Japan and Spain will have similarly 'old' populations in 2050. These dynamics will impose a considerable burden on future working age populations and challenge the innovative capacity of Korean policy-makers.

Socio-economic factors contributing to low fertility rates

The traditional Confucian based family-support-system has long been an important cornerstone of Korean society. In this concept the 'extended family' (often living together in one household) plays a key role in providing support, either through direct provision of care, or otherwise through the provision of transfers. However, the nature of Korean society has started to change. The prevalence of extended households is diminishing: the incidence of three-generation households fell from 22.1% in 1970 to 9.9% in 2000 (KNSO, 2005). There number of households with children is rapidly declining in rural areas while there growing number of married couples without children, and the number of households. These factors suggest that there is an increasing proportion of elder couples who are living on their own (especially in rural areas), while in urban areas there are also likely to be more younger couples without children.

The trend to smaller households coincides with a decline in birth rates more generally. The decline in birth rates mainly involves increased childlessness among women and a decline in larger families. Table 2.2 shows that the number of first-born children in 2004 is about two-thirds the number of first-born children in 1981 which point to a decline in the number of women who have children. Once Korean women have become mothers it is very likely that they will have a second child, but not more. The number of larger families has dwindled; the proportion of babies who are borne into families with two children already present is only 20% of what it was 25 years ago.

Koreans are getting married at a later age. The median age at first marriage for women increased from 24.4 years in 1990 to 27.5 in 2004 (OECD, 2007b). In theory, later marriage could merely lead to a postponement of fertility (and a temporary dip in birth rates), but, in Korea it seems to have led to a more permanent decline in family-size. The change in the fertility rate is also related to an increase in the acceptance and the number of people who are not marrying (KNSO, 2005). At every age, unmarried people have much lower fertility than married people, but this is particularly true for Korea, where births out-of-wedlock hardly ever occur. In contrast to many European countries, and Nordic countries in particular, cohabitation generally does not extend to parents with children. It is difficult to quantify the relative importance of these different factors on fertility trends, but much more than in other OECD countries, changes in fertility trends in Korea are related to changes in marriage behaviour.

The change in fertility behaviour is also related to changing attitudes within Korean society. The male-breadwinner
model involves a clear allocation of responsibilities, with men providing family income, and women providing care
at home. Female employment was incompatible with caring for children, and as long as most women accepted this
gender division of responsibilities, fertility rates remained stable and high. However, changing female aspirations,
as, for example, reflected in increased educational attainment and increased labour force participation, diminished
the relevance of the male-breadwinner model and contributed to the desired decline in fertility rates. Indeed, unlike
most OECD countries, birth-rates in Korea were above desired fertility levels in 1981. By 2000 that had changed.

Education and housing costs, and the perception thereof, are often referred to as important factors which affect
fertility behaviour. Good housing is hard to get in Korea - about a quarter of households live in accommodation
that does not meet the minimum standard and housing costs are substantial and increasing rapidly in recent years
(OECD, 2005a). The high cost of housing poses the greatest difficulty to first time buyers, and although this group
is relatively small, many of those are either young people who wish to start a family or young families with children.
Housing constraints thus co-determine the timing of leaving the parental home and, in turn, marriage and first birth.
The high costs of childrearing in general, and high education costs in particular are perceived as a major problem
by many parents in Korea. Spending on primary and secondary schools is largely public in Korea; public spending
amounted to 3.5% of GDP in 2003 while private spending amounted to 0.9% (OECD, 2005d). However, in order
for their children to gain entrance to the most prestigious universities, many parents organise for their children,
if they can in any way afford it, to attend very expensive education, such as tutoring or the after-school learning
institutes, and this can cost up to about USD 25,000 annually per annum. The cost of university education is largely
borne by parents: in 2003, spending on university education amounted to 2.6% of GDP of which approximately
80% concerned private spending, compared to average spending on tertiary education across the OECD of about
1.1% of GDP, of which close to 40% was privately financed.

Increasing the incidence of (non-regular) part-time employment opportunities (see below) and changing the duration
and generosity of income support during parental leave, are likely to have little effect on fertility behaviour in Korea.
On the other hand, greater investment in childcare and pre-school services, and introducing public transfers to families
which relieve the cost of raising children are among the factors that potentially could have a large impact on the The estimation technique underlying the projected impact on fertility behaviour as in Chart 2.3 does assume, however,
that Korea were to develop spending on its family benefits up to the level of the third-ranked country in
the OECD area. In reality, this is unlikely to happen in the near or distant future, as spending on family benefits
is relatively low in international comparison. In 2003, it amounted to about 0.12% of GDP; by contrast, this was
close to 4% of GDP in Denmark. The system of public family support is under construction in Korea, and includes:
support for family welfare services, community centres, orphans, childcare services and pre-school education. Since
2001, Korea has a system of income support during maternity and parental leave. In 2008, an in-work benefit will
be introduced that will support low-income families, and there is debate on extending childcare support and/or introducing
an (income-tested) child allowance (see below and OECD, 2007c, forthcoming).

Childcare and pre-school education is just one of the areas where limited public support has contributed to access
issues. Compared to other countries participation in formal care arrangements by under 3s is not high in Korea.
Participation in preschool services by 3, 4 and 5 years old is higher at almost 70% (Chart 2.5). In the case of
childcare and pre-school participation parental fees do not appear to be excessive on average (Immervoll and Barber,
2005). Rather it seems there is a lack of access to good quality services for very young children, and while traditional
attitudes on maternal caring roles may curtail demand for formal care services the latter are nevertheless to fall
well short of demand (see, for example, Kim and Kim, 2004). The constraints to childcare and pre-school capacity
are likely to contribute to mothers often providing personal care for very young children on a full-time basis.
Among OECD countries, policy makers in Japan (OECD, 2003b) and Korea are arguably most explicit in their
aims to foster an environment conducive to parents having as many children as they want. However, compared to
the prominent role of fertility concerns in the Korean social policy debate, budgetary allocations to support such
initiatives have been limited.
Moreover, rather than introducing a single measure, it is increasingly realised in Korea that a comprehensive policy
package is needed to reverse existing fertility trends. Steps undertaken in this process include the introduction of
the "The Low Fertility and Ageing Society Policy Act" in September 2005 and the signing of a 'convention' or
'master plan' towards higher fertility rates by different social partners in July 2006 (Box 2.1).

Box 2.1: The 'Master Plan' for increasing fertility in Korea
The 'master plan' for increasing fertility rates reflects increased awareness of fertility concerns and involves a convention
signed by social partners including the government, employers associations, trade unions, and civic groups
(Government of Korea, 2006). The "master plan" encompasses a wide array of different measures that increase family
resources and facilitate the reconciliation of work and family life:
• Increase the coverage of income-tested childcare support to serve about 80% of all children aged 0-5 in 2009.
At present only families on social assistance or with earnings below 70% (there are exceptions) of average monthly
urban worker household earnings (about KRW 3,350,000 or about USD 3,500 for a 4-person household) are eligible
for fee support. By 2009 this will cover all families with children whose earnings are below 130% of average
urban worker household earnings.
• To help parents combine their family and work commitments when children get older, the planned provision of
out-of-school-hours care in all primary schools by 2010; in 2006, about 20% of primary schools provided such
a service.
• To increase investment in public childcare facilities to cover 30% of children under that age in centre-based care
(in 2005 this proportion was 11%), the government also subsidises private care centres which provide services
to 0-2 olds. To enhance the quality of services of such services, an accreditation system will be introduced with
quality assessment being carried out every three years, from 2008 onwards. Flexible child care services will be
expanded so that more night-care services and hour-based care services will be available in the near future.
• The tax system will be made more favourable for larger families. Also, a child-birth credit will be introduced
to the National Pension Scheme (NPS), worth one year of pension contributions in case of a second child and
worth 18 months contribution from the third child onwards, up to a maximum of 50 months. The credit is given
to one adult in couple families, but equally divided among spouses if they so wish. The introduction for a child
allowance is also being considered, but subject to a review of possible financing mechanisms
• Provision of maternity leave is being expanded. From 2006, the unemployment insurance scheme pays maternity
leave benefits up to a maximum of KRW 4,050,000 (about USD 4,240) for 90 days, (also to female workers
in small and medium-sized enterprises and female workers who have a miscarriage). From 2008, 3 days' paternity
leave will be introduced. Parental leave benefits will become more generous: for children born from 2008 onwards,
parents will be entitled to 1 years leave to care for children up to 3 years old (at present all leave has to be
taken prior to the first birthday), and payment will increase from KRW 400,000 per month (about USD 420)
to KRW 500,000 in 2007. It is also intended to introduce a flexible working hours' system for working mothers
with care responsibilities for young children in 2008. The government will also introduce a bonus-payment for
employers who hire mothers with young children who wish to return to paid employment.
Other measures in the "master plan" include an accreditation system for family-friendly enterprises, increase awareness
of the value of family-friendly policies and gender equitable practices, improve child-safety measures, establish
systematic monitoring (check-ups) of pregnant women, mothers, babies and infants within the public health system.
In 2007, the eligibility criteria in the existing system of income-tested financial support towards IVF-treatment for
couples who are not able to conceive will be loosened so as to increase coverage.

Across OECD-countries the relationship between female employment and fertility appears to have changed over
the last 35 years or so (OECD, 2005f). In the 1970s, there was a clear negative correlation between female employment
and fertility rates, but, in 2005, OECD countries with higher rates of female employment also had relatively
high fertility rates (Chart 2.6). Clearly, the degree of incompatibility between paid work and providing care has
diminished, but there aresubstantial cross-country differences: combining childrearing and being in employment is
most incompatible in the Mediterranean countries and Japan and Korea and least incompatible in Nordic countries,
New Zealand and the US (for example, Engelhardt, et al, 2001 and Kögel, 2001).

Female labour market aspirations and behaviour have clearly changed, and this change in behaviour has led to
policy reform. Policy tries to reduce barriers to employment and increasing "choice for parents" in making their
work and care decisions is the overriding policy objective across the OECD, even though the underlying emphasis on wider policy issues varies. For example, while fertility concerns are a key concern in the Korean social policy
discussion, this issue hardly features in the British or Dutch debate. Similarly, while gender equity objectives feature
prominently in Swedish policy design, this is far less so in many other OECD countries, including Korea. The underlying
differences in emphases in policy objectives are important for the understanding of differences in policy design
(as well as outcomes) across the OECD area (Box 2.2).

Box 2.2: The OECD Babies and Bosses reviews of work and family reconciliation
The OECD Babies and Bosses series considered how policies can help balance work and care responsibilities, and
covered 13 countries in 4 volumes: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Ireland, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK (OECD, 2002; 2003b 2004a and, 2005e). A synthesis report
including indicators on countries not reviewed is being prepared for release in 2007; the reviews have also led to
the establishment of an on-line OECD database on family outcomes and family policies (www.oecd.org/els/social/familyfriendly/
database).

The Babies and Bosses reviews favour systems which provide a continuum of support - support for full-time
personal care at home when the child is very young, leading on to a childcare place, pre-school, school and
out-of-school-hours care activities, as in Denmark, for example. Such support systems are expensive, but public
outlays could be reduced through targeting.

Population replacement, social mobility and development in Italy in the twentieth century

2008-04-14T10:43:00.002+02:00

Population replacement, social mobility and development in Italy in the twentieth century

Gianpiero Dalla Zuanna
Journal of Modern Italian Studies, Volume 11, Number 2, June 2006 , pp. 188-208(21)
(link here)

Abstract:

Many scholars have expressed alarm at the low fertility and sustained immigration that have characterized Italy in the last decade (1.3 children per woman and an increase of more than 200,000 immigrants per year). This article takes a different approach, showing how low fertility and strong migratory balances (involving migration both between Italian regions and from abroad) have enhanced the formation of human capital, facilitating family strategies of upward social mobility, the construction of a more balanced labor market, increases in income and a decline in the graying of the population. The combination of low fertility and sustained immigration, therefore, has been and still is a fundamental resource for development of the population and of Italian society, especially in central and northern Italy. The article also discusses modifications in family and immigration policies suggested by these findings.

Towards Long Term Population Decline

2008-04-14T10:00:00.003+02:00

TOWARDS LONG TERM POPULATION DECLINE: VIEWS AT A
CRITICAL JUNCTURE OF WORLD POPULATION HISTORY

David S. Reher
(Universidad Complutense de Madrid)

This is a shortened and revised version of the paper that was published originally as: Reher, David S. “Towards long-term population decline: a discussion of relevant issues,” European Journal of Population 23 (2007): 189-207. The present paper was deliverd as a keynote lecture at the Joint Eurostat – UNECE Work Session on Demographic Projections, Bucharest, 10-12October 2007.

1. Towards long-term population decline

There are indications that a large part of the world is about to commence a prolonged period of population decline. This will bring to a close three centuries of unfettered and extremely rapid population growth, itself a unique experience in human history. For a number of decades during the second half of the twentieth century, world population growth rates surpassed 1.75 percent per year, exceeding 2 percent between 1970 and 1975, and were considerably higher in many world regions. Not only is this period of growth ending, there are also real perspectives for prolonged population decline in many of the world’s regions during the twenty-first century. There can be little doubt that this process has started in Europe and in other developed nations. It may just be getting under way in many of the lesser developed countries of the world as well. Only in the least developed regions of the world is it still a matter of serious doubt, though there too population growth rates have declined substantially in recent years.

The mechanics of decline can be traced to a prolonged reduction in fertility nearly everywhere in the world. In many of the developed regions of the world, fertility began to fall over a century ago. Since then, this slide has been unchecked, with the brief interlude of the baby boom of the 1950s and 1960s. In other parts of the world, fertility decline started much later (1960s-1980s), though the pace of decline has been far faster than it was in the developed world. The result of this is that inter-regional disparities in fertility at the beginning of the twenty-first century are far smaller than they were only 50 years ago. In large parts of the world, below-replacement fertility has been common for some time now, and in others there is a good chance that fertility, at present just above replacement levels, may be headed in the same direction. This process will be stimulated by the a decline in the number of women of reproductive age, itself the resul of earlier declines in the number of births. The process of declining numbers of births began in Europe some decades ago, and is already under way in a number of developing countries.

The very idea of decline and of population shortage is largely foreign to our society, mostly because for several centuries there has been no experience of shrinking population at a societal level. Even in developed regions, where the process is well-advanced, the idea of population decline and its implications is having difficulty being assimilated by large sectors of society (Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 2003: 257). In most of the developing countries, the problems of population abundance continue to dominate scientific, social and political agendas. Despite these signs of incipient decline, world population is likely to continue increasing over the coming decades, reaching a total of perhaps 8-9 billion persons by 2050 (current levels are 6.4 billion). By mid-century, however, the structural changes discussed here will be well on their way to turning growth into decline for the entire world.

2. Population decline and the demographic transition

It is our contention here that the persistent extremely low fertility in developed countries cannot be satisfactorily attributed to economic stress, unemployment, public policies or lack thereof, or to passing trends such as the postponement of reproduction, though all may contribute. Extremely low fertility has been around for too long for it to portend anything other than major long-term social change. It gives every indication of having become a structural aspect of the developed world.

There is reason to believe that the low fertility in European populations is the outcome of the demographic transition that started well over a century ago. This hallmark event of human history unleashed powerful forces of social change, leading to modernization in many parts of the world. Much as the demographic transition theory argues, the transition itself may have been triggered or at least been accompanied by more general societal changes. The process itself of reproductive change, however, tended to generate social and economic synergies of its own. The links between the demographic transition and social change can be seen in age structures, migration patterns, the distribution of family labor, education and the quality of children, and adult health. All of these were powerful agents of change in themselves and have done much to accelerate patterns of economic growth and social and political modernization during the twentieth century in Europe, America and in areas of East Asia. In order to understand this process more thoroughly, it is helpful to look briefly at how the demographic transition contributed to social change generally, and especially to how it contributed to the transformation in the role of women in society. This is the key issue, one that is present in all historic demographic transitions and likely in the more recent ones as well.

Women were the central figures for the initial demographic transition in Europe. They were the ones who contributed most to reproductive outcomes and were likely also the ones initiating fertility control within marriage. They also held the key to the health improvements of their children, especially before the aftermath of World War II when medicine and public health assumed greater relative importance. The demographic transition was, in its very origins, a key event in the empowerment of women. It also initiated a series of social, political and cultural changes affecting their role that mark social change during the twentieth century. By implication, the demographic transition led to greater reproductive efficiency: reaching the desired family size took less time and less individual effort than ever before, though it may well have cost considerably more. Ronald Lee has estimated that women went from spending 70 percent of their adult lives bearing and rearing children before the demographic transition, to spending only about 14 percent of it in more recent times. It meant a massive liberation of women’s time, minimizing their ‘wasted investments’ on children who eventually died.

At first mortality declined faster than fertility and, despite diminishing numbers of children ever-born, completed family size tended to increase. Eventually, however, completed family size decreased; a process that implied important ideational changes because it meant that people –omen- were aiming at –nd achieving- smaller families. It led to an emphasis on children of ‘quality’: surviving children began to receive more parental attention. This included increasing investments in education, for boys as well as for girls, in both public and private spheres. By implication, the economic costs related to childbearing and childrearing also increased.

Ultimately, this process of increasing reproductive efficiency with its ideational and economic implications can be seen as a prerequisite for the entry of women into the labor force. The increases in the labor force participation rates of woman have their own set of economic, social, and cultural causes. One of them, however, was the revolution in reproductive efficiency and the way it affected women and families: it made labor force participation possible in terms of time, helped create the economic need to do so and paved the way for the increases in education necessary to make this sort of activity a part of the life expectations for women. Taking a job and keeping a job after marriage became standard fare for the great majority of women in these countries.

All of this has led to a substantial rearrangement of women’s position in society and, by implication, that of men as well, providing an overall reduction in the gender differentiation of public and private life. This is one of the most important social changes of the entire twentieth century, one whose implications should not be underestimated. Women are now as highly educated as men, have activity rates that are every bit as high, and make an important contribution to family economies. All of this has led to sharply declining fertility coupled with profound changes in certain dimensions of family forms, the meaning of the family, and family life generally.

Having children no longer has the type of overriding importance that it once did for women (and for men) only half a century ago. Historically, by implication a successful life for a young woman meant having children and a family. With some exceptions, if you didn’t have a family you were not successful in life, either in the eyes of society or in your own. In situations such as these, sacrifices were made to be successful, no matter what the cost.

Today, having a family is still an important part of success for most women in the developed world, but it has a much lower priority than it did before. In a somewhat arbitrary way, we might say that in the past having children and a family was 80 percent of what could be considered success in life, and now it is closer to 30 percent. As this happens, the opportunity costs for reproductive success necessarily become higher and people are more willing to negotiate, especially when circumstances are not ideal.

It is not difficult to see how problems can abound in these sorts of situations. They can include problems with a person’s career expectations, with finding the right partner, with the housing or the job market, with the willingness of men to share fully in home and family responsibilities, with gender equity, with the reality of having to lower one’s expected living standards in order to have a child, or with the difficulties inherent in raising children in modern societies where there is little social, private or public support for families raising children. The importance of these factors may vary across societies, thus helping to explain existing differences in fertility. Even so, these concerns are common to young couples everywhere in the developed world and figure mightily in their reproductive decisions. Having a family is an expensive, long-term investment. Since it is no longer an overwhelming priority for women (or for men), as it once was, they are much more willing to negotiate these expectations. For men, being successful in life tended to be based mainly on professional success, more than on having a family. It was women who made families function and held them together, not men. This is why these changes we have described in women’s values and expectations have had such a profound effect on reproduction and the family. The persistently low fertility over the past half century in much of the developed world is impossible to explain without this sort of ideational change. Should the current levels of fertility in developed societies continue to be linked to the role of women in society, by implication, then, below-replacement fertility will be with us for a long time to come. Contrary to what had been expected in classical demographic transition literature, fertility did not decline to replacement levels. Replacement fertility proved to be only a road sign en route to significantly lower levels of reproduction and, eventually, to falling numbers of births. This occurred in different parts of Europe some time between the mid 1960s and the early 1980s. The demographic result of this is very clear as the process of aging and eventually of population decline accelerated and became common fare for most of these societies.

3. Perspectives for the developing world

What about the rest of the world? There continues to be a general feeling that for the most part fertility will remain above replacement and so the prospects for the coming years point to a slow down in growth, but not to a reversal of growth. Is this supposition reasonable? The existence of a hypothetical ‘floor’ to fertility decline was a widespread belief in Europe during much of the twentieth century, and the upturn in fertility in the postwar years seemed to confirm this belief. Yet historical reality showed how unrealistic that expectation was. Is it realistic for much of the developing world? The relative lack of economic development, low levels of education and strong family cultures suggest that it may well be. Yet there are also signs to the contrary. At present, fertility is already below replacement in nearly 60 of the world’s nations, and many of them are not developed countries. We can understand the processes at work better if we look at the demographic transition in these nations. Very generally, its specifically demographic characteristics can be summed up in the following points:

1) Fertility decline began for most of the world’s populations some time between 1955 and 1980; and mortality decline began much earlier.

2) The long lag between mortality decline and fertility decline led to accelerating rates of population growth that have only recently begun to slow.

3) The pace of decline, both of fertility and of mortality, has been far faster than in the historic demographic transitions; possibly twice as fast or more. This disparity in pace is due to a large extent to the technological context within which these transitions took place.

4) Population aging in these countries is also proceeding at a far more rapid pace than it ever did in the historic transitions. In many countries, the number of births has already begun to shrink and promises to continue to do so in the future.

5) Completed family size is now declining rapidly as the reduction in fertility outpaces improvements in mortality. This is exactly the opposite of the process taking place during the central decades of the twentieth century when over the course of a generation completed family size nearly doubled with respect to pre-transitional levels due to rapid mortality decline coupled with high and sometimes rising levels of fertility.

Should present trends continue, ultimately they will lead to significant decreases in the population of reproductive age. At that stage, the negative population momentum so visible in many developed regions of the world will make itself felt elsewhere as well. Long-term population decline will set in, only three to four decades after it commences in the developed regions of the world. The gap between the onset of fertility decline and the onset of population decline, which spanned more than a century in historic Europe, promises to be far shorter in the developing world.

4. Some conjecture regarding the future

The trend towards population decline has been building for many years now. In some areas where this process is further advanced population will decline by as much as 20 percent in the next 50 years. Should present trends in fertility continue, decline by the end of the century will be much greater. Since this upcoming period of decline will hinge on low fertility, populations will tend to be loaded with elderly persons, and children and working age populations will be shrinking.

From the standpoint of natural resources and the environment, over the long run this will be good news indeed. Eventually the twenty-first century will be seen as one in which the excesses of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were corrected. This is not to say that over the coming decades there may not be vast struggles for control of certain shrinking natural resources. In the long run, human demand has had a dramatic effect on the environmental balance throughout the world, and the upcoming period first of slow growth and then of decline, will be a powerful correction for this process.

As for the society of the future, expectations are not nearly so optimistic. Severely skewed age structures, an unavoidable by-product of the process underway, will have important consequences for all aspects of social welfare that depend on the redistribution of resources. It is important to remember here that the present state of affairs in the developed world with declining numbers of births has been reached despite ever-greater numbers of women of childbearing age. In most of the developed world in the very near future, the number of women of childbearing age will begin a process of reduction that even in optimistic circumstances is likely to last for many decades. In other words, we are entering into a world of below-replacement fertility and shrinking numbers of women of childbearing age. This means that the pace of reduction of births should begin to accelerate, even in the face of moderately rising fertility.

Economists are well-acquainted with the issue of aging and grapple with potential solutions ranging from later retirement to increasing women’s labor force participation, large-scale immigration, or reducing pensions and dismantling what is left of the welfare state. While certain doubts exist as to the economic expediency of many of these mechanisms or whether or not they will bring with them unwanted side effects, especially in the case of international migration, it is unquestionable that they represent a safety valve for rapidly aging societies. If current trends persist, however, over the long run none of them may prove to be more than partial remedies. International migration itself, the focus of much current attention and concern, is unlikely to represent more than a temporary and rather inadequate solution for skewed age structures and population decline for two reasons.

1) Fertility among migrants, while initially higher than among the native populations, very quickly tends to decline to levels holding in the host society.

2) More important, perhaps, is the fact that many sending regions will be experiencing labor shortages of their own within two or three decades. It is unquestionable that these countries currently have abundant supplies of surplus labor that can be funneled fairly directly to receiving countries, normally developed ones, suffering from labor shortages.

This situation, however, cannot be sustained indefinitely because of the dramatic fertility decline taken place among those sending countries. This is not to say that the developed world of low fertility will not continue to be able to attract immigrants. It will thanks to higher wages and living standards, though this process may become far more conflictive than it is at present where problems basically only really affect the social integration and adaptation of migrants in the host societies. The point here is that in a few short decades there is a good chance that labor shortages will become a problem affecting most of the world and not just one of the developed nations.

A shortage of labor and the abundance of tax revenues it must generate that are increasingly diverted from productive assets towards more pressing social needs will eventually be harmful for living standards and welfare systems. Economic growth itself may also be adversely affected by general population decline, as demand for goods and services and levels of investment shrink accordingly. The relative importance for living standards and economic growth of these two issues (age structures and population decline) is not entirely clear. Even so, it is difficult to argue with the idea that together their effects will far surpass either of them taken alone. More than any other, the key issue here is the number of children born into society. With a moderately balanced age structure, all the challenges posed by increasing longevity can be met successfully, at least at a societal level. If age structures are severely skewed, however, it is much more difficult to be optimistic about the future.

As Massimo Livi Bacci (2001) said, children are not just a matter of personal consumption and preference, but also one of social investment. It is difficult to argue with this sort of reasoning. The key issue is just how this bottom line –having children- can be met. Many influential authors suggest that public policy can make a difference. Indeed it can, but just how much of a difference can it make? In Northern European societies, where aggressive pronatal public policies are in effect, fertility is also considerably below replacement and has been so for more than three decades now. Can policy convince women (couples) to have children? Recent experience in Europe suggests that policy alone cannot be successful.

This leads us to the pivotal issue of how to reconcile the commonweal and self-interest, at leastin terms of reproduction. Self-interest, as Adam Smith reminded us, has always been a key part of human life, past and present. How were the two of them brought into line in the past? The historical record is filled with examples of how slow population growth was guaranteed by means of economic limitations to population growth within a context of high pressure demographic regimes and close-knit cultural structures.

All of this changed with the demographic transition. Living standards rose and compensating for high mortality ceased to be an important part of people’s reproductive strategies. More important, perhaps, from a cultural standpoint, selfinterest was no longer bound by such strict norms. The ability of the family and traditional culture to govern reproductive decisions lost much of its traditional relevance with modernization. As a result, fertility decisions became conscious and individual, more influenced by social networks and by secular consumer society than by tradition. In so doing, the developmental idealism defined by Thornton became a guiding principle of modern life and an instrument itself of social change.

In addition, by the mid-twentieth-century the revolution in contraceptive technologies enabled women to control their reproductive outcomes with considerable precision. Unexpected by all, the great historical achievement of increasing reproductive efficiency –he centerpiece of the demographic transition- turned into dangerously low fertility. This process began many years ago in developed societies and appears to be well under way in the developing world. Ultimately, sustainable human reproduction may not be easily compatible with liberal economies that reward careers for women outside the home immersed in an increasingly pervasive consumer society with considerable amounts of individual economic insecurity.

Has the genie really been let inadvertently out of the bottle? Having children is ultimately an expression of confidence in the future; in the security of the life you can expect your children to be able to lead. At one level, this sort of confidence is subject to economic and political constraints. At another, deeper one, it is related to social and cultural stability. There is an immense cultural change under way in much of the West and it is related, at least in part, to the role of women in society. It is also related, of course, to the triumph of secularization, individualism and consumer society, long considered hallmarks of modernization processes. Despite what can be very legitimately viewed as the achievements of recent history, it is also true that this is a time of insecurity for both men and women as to their roles in society, the nature of their gendered relationships and the future. It is also a time of deepening concern about the sustainability of society as we know it. We are witnessing the demise of the ideological foundations upon which society has been built for the past two centuries. Times of flux are not times that are conducive to optimism about the future.

In Europe and in other world regions we do not know the ending date of the process underway, but it may well not be soon in coming. When it does, it will be at significantly lower population levels than those existing today or perhaps at any time during the twentieth century. It is unclear just how these adjustment mechanisms will come about or how effective they might be. In any case, the second half of the 21st century may be the b eginning of a long downward spiral of world population. From our vantage point at the turn of the millennium, we can envisage a great trend change with potentially enormous consequences. In that respect, we are fortunate indeed, at least from a scientific and historical standpoint. For our children, and especially our grandchildren, persistent population decline –nd possibly lower living standards- will likely be the only reality they will ever experience and the times of runaway population growth so prevalent in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries will be but a distant memory of the past.

Are other scenarios possible? Yes they are, but, at least at this stage, they are less likely than the one I have described. Some of these scenarios may be more benign (a return to replacement fertility everywhere aided by policies and changes in values), others may imply a complete turnaround in our attitude towards the family (the advent, for example, of certain technological innovations rendering personal reproductive decisions irrelevant), while others may be much less benign, implying aggressive public policies, social and political conflict, and the progressive abandonment of the social, economic and political achievements of the past two centuries. Even though the future is not really ours to know, demographers have an important role to play in bringing such crucial issues to the front and stimulating much needed debate.

5. References and related reading

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Coleman, David. 2006a. “Immigration and ethnic change in low-fertility countries: A third demographic transition,” Population and Development Review, 32(3): 401-446.

Coleman, David. 2006b. “Europe’s demographic future: Determinants, dimensions and challenges,” in Paul Demeny and Geoffrey McNicoll (eds.) The Political Economy of Global Population Change, 1950-2050, a supplement to Vol. 32, 2006 of Population and Development Review, New York: Population Council, 52-95.

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Demeny, Paul. 2003. “Population policy dilemmas in Europe at the dawn of the twenty-first century,” Population and Development Review, 29(1): 1-28.

Demeny, Paul. 2004. “Population futures for the next three hundred years: Soft landing or surprises to come?,” in UN, World Population to 2300, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, New York, 137-144.

Demeny, Paul and Geoffrey McNicoll. 2006a. “World population 1950-2050: Perception and Response,” in Paul Demeny and Geoffrey McNicoll (eds.) The Political Economy of Global Population Change, 1950-2050, a supplement to Vol. 32, 2006 of Population and Development Review, New York: Population Council, 1-51.

Demeny, Paul and Geoffrey McNicoll. 2006b. “The Political Demography of the World System, 2000-2050,” in Paul Demeny and Geoffrey McNicoll (eds.) The Political Economy of Global Population Change, 1950 2050, a supplement to Vol. 32, 2006 of Population and Development Review, New York: Population Council, 254 287.

Dyson, Tim. 2001. “A partial theory of world development: The neglected role of the Demographic transition in the shaping of modern society,” International Journal of Population Geography, 7: 67-90.

Dyson, Tim. 2004. “Why the world’s population will probably be less than 9 billion in 2300,” in UN, World Population to 2300, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, New York, 145-150.

Easterlin, Richard. 1996. Growth triumphant : the twenty-first century in historical perspective, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press

Frejka, Tomas. 2004. “The ‘curiously high’ fertility of the USA,” in ≪Discussion of paper ‘Explanations of the fertility crisis in modern societies: A search for commonalities’, Population Studies 57(3): 241-263, by John Caldwell and Thomas Schindlmayr≫ Population Studies, 58 (1), 77-92 [88-92].

Frejka, Tomas and Jean-Paul Sardon. 2004. Childbearing Trends and Prospects in Low-Fertility Countries: A Cohort Analysis. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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Hansen, Alivin H. 1939. “Economic progress and declining population growth,” The American Economic Review, vol. XXIX, pp. 1-15.

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Keynes, John Maynard. 1937. “Some economic consequences of a declining population,” Eugenics Review, vol. XXIX: 13-

Kirk, Dudley. 1996. “Demographic transition theory,” Population Studies, 50 (3): 361-387.

Kohler, Hans-Peter, Francesco C. Billari and Jose Antonio Ortega. 2002. “The emergence of lowest-low fertility in Europe during the 1990s,” Population and Development Review 28, 641-680.

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Lee, Ronald. 2003. “The Demographic Transition: three centuries of fundamental change,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17 (4), pp. 167-190.

Lesthaeghe, Ron J. 1980. “On the social control of human production,” Population and Development Review, 6 (4): 527- 548.

Lesthaeghe, Ron J. 1983. “A century of demographic and cultural change in Western Europe. An exploration of underlying dimensions,” Population and Development Review, 9 (3): 411-435.

Lesthaeghe, Ron J. and Lisa Neidert. 2006. The second demographic transition in the United States: Exception or textbook example?,” Population and Development Review, 23 (4), 669-698.

Livi Bacci, Massimo. 2001. “Too few children and too much family,” Daedalus, 130, 3: 139-156.

Longman, Phillip. 2004. The Empty Cradle: How Falling Birthrates Threaten World Prosperity and [What to do About It], New York: Basic Books: New America Books.

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Lutz, Wolfgang, Brian O’Neill and Sergei Scherbov. 2003. “Europe’s population at a turning point,” Science, vol. 299 [March], 1191-1192.

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The role of the developed West in this process is central to the way the demographic transition took place in much of the rest of the world. The initial decreases in mortality were, to a large extent, more the product of the application of Western technologies with respect to health than they were to social development or maternal education as occurred in Europe. With respect to fertility, the role of family planning and efficient contraception, both strongly promoted by the developed world, were important for the onset and for the pace of decline (Demeny and McNicoll, 2006a: 12-39). These countries were both passive and eager recipients of European technology and ideals, with the consequence, at least in demographic terms, that there was an extended delay between mortality decline and the onset of fertility decline and, once started, the pace of fertility decline was extremely fast.

Will fertility stay above replacement and will the number of births continue to increase or at least remain at levels near where they are at present? Should current trends continue, many developing countries will have below replacement fertility in the very near future. This pace of reduction of fertility would seem nearly unstoppable, unless a baby boom takes hold in these regions, as it did for historic transitions during the 1950s and 1960s. The baby boom delayed the onset of belowreplacement fertility by nearly 20 years in the developed world, though it did not stop it. Fertility decline became a two stage process: an original decline, followed by a pause or even an increase in fertility during the baby boom, followed in turn by another period of intense decline. In the developing world, that same baby boom may have been a factor leading to the persistence of high fertility despite rapidly declining mortality.

Will there be a second baby boom in the developing world? Our guess is that there will not, mostly because the conditions of the baby boom were world-wide at the time and appear unlikely to be repeated, especially in light of the existence of efficient contraceptive technologies. For this reason, there is a chance that many developing regions will pass straight from the first period of fertility decline into the second one with little or no pause.

A more pertinent question, however, is whether the role of women in society is also being dramatically altered. Increasing reproductive efficiency, so vital for Europe’s social and economic transformation, is unquestionably affecting women the world over. Will this lead to increasing investments in the quality of children? We believe it will, especially as completed family size continues to decrease. It is unquestionable that the role of women in society is changing, though there continue to be enormous disparities. In some areas, there are already indications that woman no longer see their future as simply getting married and having children. Women’s education has been increasing dramatically the world over. Despite problems in estimating female labor force participation in different societies over time, it too appears to be on the increase.

One of the characteristics of historic transition processes is that they commenced in a wide variety of contexts, though in the end the effects tended to converge everywhere. This also appears to be true in much of the developing world: social, economic and cultural disparities amid demographic similarities. Everywhere the value of children and the costs of raising them will increase, and so will the pressures on women to take advantage of new-found time available to them to generate further income for their families. There may be disparities in timing, but the process appears to be widespread.

The implications of the demographic transition in much of the developing world are becoming clear. The process of aging will be far more rapid and more intense than it was in historic populations. In this way, similar changes will take place in as little as half the time that it took in European nations. Throughout the developing world, aging and its attendant economic and social challenges will become an acute social issue relatively soon after it becomes a central concern for societies in the developed world. The intensity of change will leave these nations with but a brief window of the opportunity for modernization within which to take full advantage of the “demographic dividend” derived from their own transitions(Bloom, et. al, 2003).

Labor shortages will be one aspect of the issue of aging. In some countries, this shortage of working age population is easy to predict because numbers of births have already been declining for several years. We believe that it is only a matter of time (perhaps 2-3 decades) before they begin to affect many or most societies in the developing world. The availability of surplus labor (potential migrants) to compensate the dearth of labor in the developed world may eventually be called into question, as the sending countries begin to suffer labor strictures of their own.

The Path to Lowest-low Fertility in Ukraine

2008-02-18T09:31:00.002+01:00

The Path to Lowest-low Fertility in Ukraine
Brienna Perelli-Harris

Abstract

The phenomenon of lowest-low fertility, defined as total fertility below 1.3, is now emerging throughout Europe and is attributed by many to postponement of the initiation of childbearing. Here an investigation of the case of Ukraine, where total fertility--1.1 in 2001--is one of the world’s lowest, shows that there is more than one pathway to lowest-low fertility. Although Ukraine has undergone immense political and economic transformations in the past decade, it has maintained a young age at first birth and nearly universal childbearing. Analyses of official national statistics and the Ukrainian Reproductive Health Survey show that fertility declined to very low levels without a transition to a later pattern of childbearing. Findings from focus-group interviews are used to suggest explanations of the early fertility pattern. These include the persistence of traditional norms for childbearing and the roles of men and women, concerns about medical complications and infertility at a later age, and the link between early fertility and early marriage.

Italian Fertility

2008-02-18T09:10:00.002+01:00

Lowest-Low Fertility. Signs of a recovery in Italy?
M. Caltabiano, M. Castiglioni, A. Rosina
Italy is a country characterized by persistent very low fertility levels. A country’s fertility level is considered to be “very low” if it falls below 1.5 children per woman (Lesthaeghe and Willems, 1999). “Lowest low fertility,” on the other hand, was introduced by Kohler et al. (2002), in order to describe those cases in which the total period fertility rate (TFR) drops below 1.3. Lowest low fertility levels were recorded at a national level for the first time in Italy (and Spain) in 1992. Italy has now had a fertility level below 1.5 for over twenty years, and the last 15 years have seen levels near or below 1.3.

More specifically, Italy’s TFR dropped dramatically in the early 1990s and since then has not risen above 1.3 children per woman. In fact, the country reached a record low in the mid 1990s, recording a TFR of less than 1.2. Fertility rates since then have gradually increased (for the first time since the baby boom), up to today’s current fertility level of 1.33 children per woman (Istat, 2006).

The moderate yet significant increase in fertility in the last 10 years is further specified by diverse regional patterns. In the northern regions of Italy, period fertility has returned to the levels observed in the early 1980s, in large part due to an increasing number of babies born to immigrants, whose fertility is higher than native Italians. Overall, however, there has probably occurred a slight increase in native fertility as well, related to both new forms of family formation among the younger cohorts and to a recovery of postponed births among the older cohorts (today about 15% of births occur outside of wedlock, while about 10% of births are from immigrant parents).

In a number of southern regions, on the other hand, period fertility has continued to decline to very low levels (e.g. in 2005, TFR in Sardinia was at around 1.0). In other southern regions, period fertility levels have recently stabilized, although at levels much lower than those observed in early 1980s. Even if one considers cohort fertility, rather than looking at period measures, Italian fertility levels still result particularly low. According to the Council of Europe’s 2005 Demographic Yearbook, Italy has the lowest total cohort fertility rate (CTFR) in Europe (1.5 for the birth cohort 1965), and there is no indication that the decline in cohort fertility has come to a halt.

Analyses which take into account diverse trends in fertility levels across regions and social groups can reveal more detailed information. For example, recent studies indicate that the negative impact of level of education on fertility levels has begun to decrease. (Rosina 2004; Dalla Zuanna, Tanturri, in press). In the first part of our paper we present and discuss current developments with regard to fertility in Italy, both at the national and regional levels, using data recently published by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat, 2006).

We apply a cohort approach, showing changes both in CTFR and in the timing of births for the 1950-1980 cohorts. In the second part of our paper, we focus on “late first-birth fertility” (entry into motherhood after the age of 35), using individual level data from the 2003 Istat multipurpose survey on the family “Famiglia e soggetti sociali”. We investigate both the determinants of postponement (or the propensity to reach age 35 without having had a child) as well as the determinants of recovery (or the propensity to subsequently have a child for those women who reach age 35 with parity zero).

Italy’s path to very low fertility. The adequacy of economic and second demographic transition theories
David Kertzer, Michael White, Laura Bernardi, Giuseppe Gabrielli

The deep drop of the fertility rate in Italy to among the lowest in the world challenges contemporary theories of childbearing and family building. Among high income countries, Italy was presumed to have characteristics of family values and female labor force participation that would favor higher fertility than its European neighbors to the north. We test competing economic and cultural explanations, drawing on new nationally representative, longitudinal data to examine first union, first birth, and second birth. Our event history analysis finds some support for economic determinants of family formation and fertility, but the clear importance of regional differences and of secularization suggests that such an explanation is at best incomplete and that cultural and ideational factors must be considered.

Trends In Partnership Behaviour in Japan

2008-02-18T09:03:00.002+01:00

Trends In Partnership Behaviour in Japan From The Cohort Perspective
Conference Paper from the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Japan

Assumptions about the future age-specific fertility rates required for population projections can be obtained using the cohort fertility method. With this method, we predict the average completed family size of younger cohorts, based on the actual birth process of preceding cohorts. Since childbearing behaviour is affected by family formation and dissolution, it is essential to examine these processes for constructing and assessing the future fertility assumptions. Results we will show in this paper are based on the preliminary analyses for producing official population projections for Japan conducted by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR).

In this paper, we describe patterns of partnership formation and dissolution from the birth cohort perspective. Recognizing that declining exposure to marriage may place a strong structural restriction on childbearing, we then examine the extent to which these behavioural changes contribute to a fertility decline by cohort. In addition to marriage, divorce, bereavement and remarriage may also be significant factors for fertility.

Fertility assumptions for new population projections for Japan based on the 2005 census extremely low – in 2030, the medium variant TFR for Japanese women is assumed to be These prospects were led by drastic changes in the patterns of family formation and dissolution. Among the 1990 birth cohort, the mean age at first marriage is 28.2, the proportion never-married women at age 50 extends to 23.5%, and 36% of first-married women eventually experience divorce.

Counterfactual CTFRs with variant patterns of family formation and dissolution have allowed us to understand that over 70% of the CTFR decline is attributed to a decline in marriage rates, and if divorce behaviour has not changed since the 1955 birth cohort, CTFR will by 3% in the 1990 birth cohort.

Developed countries with relatively high fertility rates show relatively high levels of unmarried couples cohabiting and bearing children among the youth. The visibility of cohabitation and childbearing of unmarried couples is still low in Japan, but among the 1980s later birth cohorts, these new patterns of family formation have been increasing. Since these changes could lead to a rise in fertility rates for women in their 20s in the near future, we need to attention to these trends.

From the First to the Second Demographic Transition

2008-02-18T08:58:00.002+01:00

From the First to the Second Demographic Transition: An Interpretation of the Spatial Continuity of Demographic Innovation in France, Belgium and Switzerland.
R. LESTHAEGHE AND K. NEELS

Abstract

This article links spatial indicators of two demographic innovation waves to historical and contemporary covariates of both a socio-economic and a cultural nature. The two waves of innovation correspond respectively to the so called “first” and “second” demographic transitions (FDT, SDT). A connection is made between the emergence of spatial demographic patterns and A.J. Coale’s three preconditions for innovation, i.e. “readiness”, “willingness” and “ability” (RWA-model) and to the influence of networks in shaping relatively stable regional subcultures. Since the RWA-model is of the “bottleneck” type, it is expected that the slowest moving or most resistant condition will largely determine the spatial outcome of the two demographic transitions. In the instances of French départements, Belgian arrondissements and Swiss cantons clear statistical associations emerge between indicators of both FDT and SDT and cultural indicators. This suggests that the “willingness” condition, as reflected in regional subcultures, has been the dominant bottleneck in both waves of demographic innovation. The Swiss evidence is, however, weaker than that for France and Belgium despite the fact that, here too, associations are in the expected direction.

Third Birth Developments by Language in Turkey

2008-02-09T22:02:00.000+01:00

Completing the fertility transition:Third birth developments by language
groups in TurkeySutay Yavuz

Abstract

The purpose of the present study is to examine third birth dynamics by mother tongue group in Turkey, a country that has reached the advanced stage of its fertility transition. Third-birth intensities of Turkish speaking mothers are lower than Kurdish speaking mothers and the decline in fertility started much later for the latter group. Kurdish speaking women who cannot read and who live in more customary marriages have the highest third birth risk. We demonstrate that to understand contemporary fertility change in Turkey, it is necessary to consider a combination of individual socioeconomic and cultural factors.

Progression to third birth in Morocco in the context of fertility transition

2008-02-09T21:57:00.000+01:00

Progression to third birth in Morocco in the context of fertility transition
Agata V. D’Addato

Abstract

Progression from second to third birth is a critical reproductive decision in contemporary Morocco. The study thus aims at analyzing the main determinants of third-birth intensities, applying an event-history analysis to the most recent Moroccan survey data. Differences among social groups still persist in the country. Nevertheless, in the background of current modernization and geared to promote women’s status, all segments of the population are rapidly changing their fertility behavior. This applies even to the most laggard group, such as illiterate women. The analysis also shows no significant or clear evidence of sex preference among Moroccan mothers in the progression to the third child.

Intergenerational family ties and the diffusion of cohabitation in Italy

2008-02-09T21:39:00.000+01:00

Intergenerational family ties and the diffusion of cohabitation in Italy
Paola Di Giulio and Alessandro Rosina

Abstract

Cohabitation has been spreading in the population during the last thirty years, and this is one of the most striking aspects of wider social changes that have taken place throughout the industrialized world. However, this change did not take place uniformly across Europe. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the current debate around the compatibility of cohabitation experiences with the Italian cultural context. Using an individuallevel diffusion approach we obtain results that are consistent with the crucial role that family ties play in the choice of cohabitation in place of (or before) marriage.

Eastern Europe between emigration and immigration

2008-02-09T21:03:00.000+01:00

Eastern Europe between emigration and immigration:causes, obstacles and implications of simultaneous migration flows

Artjoms Ivlevs

Abstract

Despite relatively high emigration rates from countries that joined the EU in 2004, immigration pressures in Central and Eastern Europe are rising. This paper discusses the factors that influence simultaneous migration flows in the region, highlighting economic, demographic, transit and ethnic determinants. In particular, the “new” EU States are likely to receive increasing numbers of immigrants because of the rapid economic development resulting in labour shortages in such sectors as construction and services, rapidly aging populations and the attractiveness of the region for transit migrants from ex-Soviet Union countries. Using the case of Latvia, we also show that individual’s ethnicity may be an important determinant of both emigration intentions and immigration preferences. Ethnic minorities in Latvia who themselves are Russian speaking second and third generation immigrants, one the one hand, have higher probability of emigration and, on the other, are more pro-immigrant compared to ethnic Latvians.

The 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU) has resulted in considerable outflows of labour from poorer regions of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in search of higher earnings in Western Europe. The issue is increasingly preoccupying both in migration receiving and sending countries. The populations of the former - “old” EU States - are worried about a possible negative impact of immigration on labour markets and welfare states, as well as problems related to the social and cultural integration of the new-comers. At the same time, immigrants in developed countries help coping with labour market shortages, thereby contributing to economic growth, and may alleviate population aging problems. On the contrary, in the “new” EU States, emigration of labour may hinder long-term economic growth and aggravate demographic situation, undermining the convergence to the living standards of the wealthy European economies. However, instantaneous benefits from higher earning possibilities for those who migrate and their families staying behind are substantial. Besides the traditional migration flows from the “new” to the “old” EU States, immigration pressures in Central and Eastern Europe are increasing. Almost all countries in the region are confronted with acute labour shortages in several sectors (in particular, services and construction). Shrinking labour force, both due to high emigration rates and natural decrease of the population, raises the question of how the sustainability of economic growth and pension.

High fertility Gambians in low fertility Spain

2008-02-09T20:03:00.000+01:00

High fertility Gambians in low fertility Spain:The dynamics of child accumulation across transnational space
Caroline Bledsoe, René Houle and Papa Sow

Abstract

Based on an analysis of the Spanish census and the January 1, 2005 municipal register and on exploratory fieldwork in Catalonia, this paper combines ethnography and demography, in conjunction with current Spanish reunification law, to examine the dynamics of what appears to be high fertility among Gambian immigrants living in Spain. We suggest that this high fertility rate reflects several things. One is the high costs of living in Spain for an unskilled, often-undocumented, but also relativelylongstanding SubSaharan group from a homeland with high rates of fertility: a homeland with which close ties remain vital for migrants in highly marginal conditions. Another is the replacement, in some cases, of older wives by younger ones from Africa, resulting in high rates of reproduction for short slices of time by a circulating pool of young women. We focus, however, on the role of Spanish and European policies themselves in shaping these numbers, particularly those policies that place restrictions on the free movement of people. We conclude that the most interesting demographic facet of this population may not be high fertility but rather the paradoxical dynamics of child accumulation in particular geographic regions as an artifact of Spanish law itself.

Meanings and attitudes attached to cohabitation in Poland

2008-02-09T19:59:00.000+01:00

Meanings and attitudes attached to cohabitation in Poland:Qualitative analyses of the slow diffusion of cohabitation among the young generation
by Monika Mynarska and Laura Bernardi

Abstract

This study contributes to the understanding of the low level of non-marital cohabitation in Poland at the beginning of the XXI century. We employ an interpretative analysis of semi-structured interviews in order to capture the meanings and attitudes associated to non-marital cohabitation by a selected sample of young Poles. The results indicate that although cohabitation has begun to be interpreted as a testing period leading to marriage, attitudes towards it are still very ambiguous. The idealization of marital commitment hinders the spread of informal unions. Understanding the determinants of low cohabitation in Poland enables us to advance grounded hypotheses on its evolution in the near future and, more generally, to illustrate the ways in which local culturesinfluence the diffusion of behaviors.

First union formation in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

2008-02-09T19:34:00.000+01:00

First union formation in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: Patterns across countries and gender
Kalev Katus, Allan Puur, Asta Põldma and Luule Sakkeus

Abstract

This article examines the changes in first union formation in the Baltic countries between the late 1960s and early 1990s, in the context of societal and family-level gender relations. The analyses are conducted using microdata from the European Family and Fertility Surveys program. Our results indicate that in Estonia and Latvia the shift from direct marriage to cohabitation started well before the fall of socialist regime. Event-history models provide support for a hypothesised association between union formation and gender systems, with Lithuania showing more traditional features in both respects, possibly due to long-standing cultural differences between the countries.

The Effects of Education and Family Formation on Fertility in Ukraine

2008-02-09T18:49:00.001+01:00

The Changing Effects of Education on Family Formation during a Period of Rapid Social Change

Brienna Perelli-Harris

Abstract

This study demonstrates how broad societal-level change not only alters the composition of individual-level characteristics in a population, but also affects the relationship between mechanisms and behavior. Focusing on post-Soviet Ukraine, this paper examines how massive economic, political, and social transformations changed individual-level childbearing decision-making. Specifically, I investigate how social change in Ukraine altered the effects of one institution – education - on the timing of first and second births and marriage. I find that whereas previously more highly educated women would have had higher first birth rates once school enrollment and marriage were controlled, after Independence women with higher education delayed childbearing. The rates of second births and marriage also declined after Independence. Explanations for the changing effects of education on family formation include the restructuring of theeducational system, shifting opportunity costs, and exposure to new ideas and values.

Migration and Union Dissolution in Russia

2008-02-09T18:26:00.000+01:00

Migration and union dissolution in changing socio-economic context: The case of Russia
Magdalena Muszynska1 and Hill Kulu

Abstract

Previous studies show that family migration is usually to the benefit of the man’s professional career and that it has a negative impact on the woman’s economic wellbeing and employment. This study extends previous research by examining the effect of family migration on union dissolution. We use the event-history data of two retrospective surveys from Russia and apply hazard regression. The analysis shows that couples who move frequently over long distances have a significantly higher risk of union dissolution than couples who do not move or move only once. Our further analysis reveals that the risk of disruption for frequent movers is high when the migrant woman has a job. Frequent migrants had a high risk of union dissolution during the Soviet period but they faced no such risk during the post-Soviet socio-economic transition. We argue that frequent moving increases union instability through a variety of mechanisms, the effect of which may vary across socio-economic contexts.

Migration and Fertility in Kyrgyzstan

2008-02-09T17:57:00.000+01:00

Migration and first-time parenthood: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan
Lesia Nedoluzhko and Gunnar Andersson

Abstract

This article investigates the reproductive behavior of young women and men in the post-Soviet Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan, focusing on the link between migration and fertility. We employ event-history techniques to retrospective data from the ‘Marriage, Fertility, and Migration’ survey conducted in Northern Kyrgyzstan in 2005 to study patterns in first-time parenthood. We demonstrate the extent to which internal migration is related to family formation and to the patterns of becoming a parent after resettlement. We gain deeper insights into demographic behavior by considering information on factors such as the geographical destination of migration and retrospectively stated motives for reported moves. In addition, our study reveals clear ethno-cultural differences in the timing of entry into parenthood in Kyrgyzstan.

In Kyrgyzstan, between 1990 and 2005 total fertility decreased by some thirty percent. Nevertheless, together with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, it still remains a pronounced high-fertility country, with a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in 2005 of around 2.6 children per woman, a feature that rather makes it belong to a group of countries that are in their very first demographic transition. There are differences in fertility among population subgroups, however. While the native Kyrgyz generally have a high fertility, the population of European origin has a fertility that is below replacement level. Significant differences in fertility also exist across regions and different types of settlements. The TFR is higher in rural areas than it is in urban areas: 2.9 versus 2.2.

Model 3 of Table 2 reveals that migration caused by marriage increases the first birth propensity past migration (which should come as no surprise) and that thi tendency entirely explains the elevated fertility that is observed during the first twoyears following migration (see Model 2).

Our analysis indicates that the ‘russified’ group of Asians is significantly different from the other two ethno-cultural groups of our study as concerns their first-birth behavior, thus the group does not occupy an intermediate position between the other two (see Table 2). They have the lowest risk of entry into parenthood: about 30 percent lower than among the ‘Europeans’ and 50 percent lower than among the ‘non-russified Asians’, i.e., they tend to exhibit a reproductive strategy that often entails postponed parenthood. An interaction between age and ethnicity (not shown; p-value = 0.009) reveals that the first-birth risks of Europeans peak at lower ages than for Asians. This finding contradicts the assumption (based on observed differences in total fertility) that early family formation dominates among Asians in general in Kyrgyzstan. However, the finding is supported by census data, these show that Russian women indeed have a lower age at first birth than the aggregated group of Kyrgyz women (23.4 versus 23.7 years). A similar pattern of persistently early entry into parenthood in a population with very low fertility has been observed for Ukraine (cf. Perelli-Harris 2005).

Similar general duration-specific effects of migration on first-birth fertility have been observed for many different types of migrants (cf. Andersson 2004, Toulemon and Mazuy 2004, Kulu 2006, Kulu and Vikat 2007). This suggests that there indeed are strong behavioral regularities in how people tend to locate their family-demographic vital events relative to that of a migration, with childbearing being much more common shortly after a migration than at preparation of such activity. It also calls for a critical stand to various accounts of high fertility of different groups of migrants: Crude statistics on elevated migrant fertility may be more likely to reflect the interrelation between migration and family formation than any real high-fertility behavior.

Geert Hofestede and Intercultural Communication

2008-01-28T10:43:00.000+01:00

Gerard Hendrik Hofstede (born 2 October 1928, Haarlem) is an influential Dutch writer on the interactions between national cultures and organizational cultures, and is an author of several books including Culture's Consequences (2nd, fully revised edition, 2001) and Cultures and Organizations, Software of the Mind (2nd, revised edition 2005, with his son Gert Jan Hofstede).

Hofstede's study demonstrated that there are national and regional cultural groupings that affect the behaviour of societies and organizations, and that are very persistent across time.

The Power Distance Index (PDI) is one of the five intercultural dimensions developed by Hofstede. In short this cultural dimension looks at how much a culture does or does not value hierarchical relationships and respect for authority.

Examples of cultures with high PDI scores include Arabic speaking countries, Russia, India and China. Those with low scores include Japan, Australia and Canada. See a world map of power distance index scores.

So how does this manifest in a culture or country?

In a high power distance cultures the following may be observed:

. Those in authority openly demonstrate their rank.
. Subordinates are not given important work and expect clear guidance from above.
. Subordinates are expected to take the blame for things going wrong.
. The relationship between boss and subordinate is rarely close/personal.
. Politics is prone to totalitarianism.
. Class divisions within society are accepted.

In a low power distance culture:

. Superiors treat subordinates with respect and do not pull rank.
. Subordinates are entrusted with important assignments.
. Blame is either shared or very often accepted by the superior due to it being their responsibility to manage.
. Managers may often socialise with subordinates.
. Liberal democracies are the norm.
. Societies lean more towards egalitarianism

Hofstede's four dimensions are:

Power Distance

This dimension relates to the degree of equality/inequality between people in a particular society.

A country with a high Power Distance score both accepts and perpetuates inequalities between people. An example of such a society would be one that follows a caste system and in which upward mobility is very limited.

A low Power Distance indicates that a society does not emphasise differences in people?s status, power or wealth. Equality is seen as the collective aim of society and upward mobility is common.

Read more on Power Distance or Have a look at the world map of power distance scores.

Individualism

This dimension focuses on the degree to which a society reinforces individual or collective achievement and interpersonal relationships.

If a country has a high Individualism score, this indicates that individuality and individual rights are dominant. Individuals in these societies tend to form relationships with larger numbers of people, but with the relationships being weak.

A low Individualism score points to a society that is more collectivist in nature. In such countries the ties between individuals are very strong and the family is given much more weight. In such societies members lean towards collective responsibility.

Read more on Individualism or Have a look at the world map of individualism scores.

Uncertainty Avoidance

This dimension concerns the level of acceptance for uncertainty and ambiguity within a society.

A country with a high Uncertainty Avoidance score will have a low tolerance towards uncertainty and ambiguity. As a result it is usually a very rule-orientated society and follows well defined and established laws, regulations and controls.

A low Uncertainty Avoidance score points to a society that is less concerned about ambiguity and uncertainty and has more tolerance towards variety and experimentation. Such a society is less rule-orientated, readily accepts change and is willing to take risks.

Read more on Uncertainty Avoidance or Have a look at the world map of uncertainty avoidance scores.

Masculinity

This dimension pertains to the degree societies reinforce, or do not reinforce, the traditional masculine work role model of male achievement, control, and power.

A high Masculinity score indicates that a country experiences a higher degree of gender differentiation. In such cultures, males tend to dominate a significant portion of the society and power structure.

A low Masculinity score means a society has a lower level of differentiation and inequity between genders. In these cultures, females are treated equally to males in all aspects of the society.

Read more on Masculinity or Have a look at the world map of masculinity scores

The Hajnal Line

2008-01-26T22:41:00.000+01:00

The Hajnal line links Saint Petersburg, Russia and Trieste, Italy. In 1965, John Hajnal discovered it divides Europe into two areas characterized by a different levels of nuptiality.

West of this line, the average age of women at first marriage was 24 or more, men 26, spouses were relatively close in age, and 10% or more of adults never married. East of the line, the mean age of both sexes at marriage was earlier, spousal age disparity was greater and marriage more nearly universal. Subsequent research has amply confirmed Hajnal's continental divide, and what has come to be known as the 'Western European marriage pattern', although historical demographers have also noted that there are significant variations within the region.

The Western European pattern of late and non-universal marriage restricted fertility massively, especially when it was coupled with very low levels of childbirth out of wedlock. Birth control took place by delaying marriage more than suppressing fertility within it. Women's life-phase from menarche to first birth was unusually long, averaging ten to twelve years.

The region's late marriage pattern has received considerable scholarly attention in part because it appears to be unique; it has not been found in any other part of the world prior to the Twentieth Century. The origins of the late marriage system are a matter of conjecture prior to the 16th Century when the demographic evidence from family reconstitution studies makes the prevalence of the pattern clear. Many historians have wondered whether this unique conjugal regime might explain, in part, why capitalism first took root in Northwestern Europe, contributing to the region's relatively low mortality rates, hastening the fragmentation of the peasantry and the precocious formation of a mobile class of landless wage-earners. Others have highlighted the significance of the late marriage pattern for gender relations, for the relative strength of women's position within marriage, the centrality of widows in village land inheritance, and the vitality of women's community networks.

Unemployment and 15 to 24 Participation in Italy

2008-01-25T12:59:00.000+01:00

Well lets start by looking at the story so far, at least as far as Italy goes. Fortunately we do have a number of key stylised facts at our disposal. First off, unemployment has been steadily - I could say relentlessly - dropping in Italy over the last two or three years:

But then if we take a look at one of the younger age groups for a minute, the 15 to 24 one, we can see some important changes.. As is well known this group is now in historic decline as a proportion of the total Italian population. The decline has been very rapid, with a drop of around one third (from 15% to 10% of the population) since 1990.

What this means, logically enough, is that there are steadily less and less people in this age group to fill places in the labour market. To this numerical decline we need to add theongoing secular decline in economic activity rates among this group, as more and more of Italy's - now scarce resource - young people delay entry and seek to improve their education, their human capital rating and hence their future earning capacity.

Thus the proportion of this group which is economically active has been declining steadily, as have the absolute numbers of those who are active, and the numbers of those who are actually employed. It is perhaps worth noting that the absolute size of this age group has been virtually stationary over the last 3 or 4 years (a statistical effect), but it is now set to fall steadily.

So if new employees will be hard to come by in this age group as we move forward, where can employment growth come from? Well basically there are two evident potential sources of labour, immigration and older workers. It is hard to envisage any large increase in employment in the 25 to 34 or the 35 to 54 age groups since - as can be seen from the chart below - activity rates among these groups are already fairly high, and even the slight fall-off which can be seen to have taken place recently in the 25 to 34 age group seems to be the result of a decline in female activity rates, and this is almost to be hoped for if Italy is to do one thing which is very important for its long term future, and that is have more children. Squeezing this particular lemon too hard at this point in time is only likely to obtain short term benefit in return for substantial negative long term outcomes.

Fertility in France the US Germany and Italy Compared

2007-12-15T13:15:00.001+01:00

Europe's Porous Borders?

2007-08-01T19:30:00.000+02:00

EU migration policy seem to be in a bit of a muddle right now. While some member states are positively "raining immigrants" like never before (Spain, the UK, Ireland, Greece) others are losing population at a more or less similar rate (Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania) while yet others have more or less moderate flows (Italy, Portugal, Sweden, the Czech Republic) and others (France, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Estonia) are waking up to the fact that they might be missing out on something.

Over in Brussels EU justice and security commissioner Franco Frattini is aware that something is amiss, but the real issue is how to put together a policy which is acceptable to the differing needs and perspectives of 27 different member states (including, of course, Malta). When you have diversity and division on your hands, there is no simpler solution I suppose, then to look for the problem which unites everyone:

People smugglers are turning the European Union’s south-east frontiers into a hotspot for illegal migration, the EU’s security chief has warned. The Mediterranean is the most visible route for unlawful entry to the union, with thousands of Africans undertaking risky sea crossings each year in an attempt to reach southern Europe. But Mr Frattini warned that undocumented entry through the east was a further worry. “The illegal migrants coming from the east are very often victims of sexual exploitation, trafficking and forced labour,” he told the Financial Times. His comments highlight the challenge confronting the EU over migration, with a fractious debate about whether it can manage entry while also filling labour market gaps. About 500,000 undocumented migrants are thought to arrive each year.

Well, nearly everyone, there is, of course, as I have said, also Malta to think about:

The EU’s fledgling border control agency, Frontex, is running operations in southern coastal waters this summer as part of efforts to control migration from Africa. Mr Frattini said the patrols were having an effect, despite some member states failing to meet commitments to provide equipment. The operations were likely to become permanent there, he added. Since Frontex missions began in the Mediterranean in June, flows of illegal migrants had dropped by 40 per cent. People smugglers were worried about the agency’s patrols, he said. But critics question whether the operations simply push would-be entrants to try other routes. They also say that on the patrol near Malta, anyone rescued by Frontex would be taken to Europe for humanitarian reasons in any case.

And of course, what the FT fails to mention is that the part of Europe which Frontex would most likely have to take them would be Spain, since some other people seem to be so reluctant to accept their humanitarian responsibilities.

But as I say, this issue is reasonably easy to unite people on. All good people and true want to reduce the volume of migrant trafficing, and reduce to a minimum the human tragedy which is currently taking place almost daily off Europe's southernmost shores.

Yes, but how, that is the problem.

Two measures have been proposed. Firstly the Portuguese Presidency is proposing to hold an Africa-EU summit. This would be an initiative somewhat similar the the already existing EuroMed process (Although just one more time Nicolas Sarkozy seems to have his own idea about how to move this latter one forward).

Under the German presidency, efforts from 2006 were continued to strengthen economic development aid to African nations. By increasing the standard of living in Africa, most migrants will find incentive to remain. Many have stated that they do not particularly wish to come to Europe, but they see few other options.

Additionally, agreements have been made, with more on the way, between the European Union, individual EU nations and several African countries on a number of points. Portuguese Prime Minister, José Sócrates, who took over the rotating EU council presidency from Germany, inherits a number of these agreements and now must make further progress.

Fundamentally, in exchange for economic development aid, schools, security training, increased attention toward legal migration routes and job centers, African nations must agree to accept back their nationals who are deported from Europe, increase their own border security to reduce illegal travel, and take on the crime and corruption that is aiding the illegal migration trade.

A very significant step was made toward these goals last month by a delegation of Spanish business executives, with the cooperation and blessing of the Spanish government. They traveled to Senegal in a recruitment drive to establish training centers and to provide job contracts and visas for African nationals to work in Spain.

Babies Booming in Dusseldorf?

2007-08-01T18:07:00.000+02:00

A couple of weeks back Bertrand Benoit of the Financial Times Frankfurt Office had an article on what appeared to be a resurgence in natality in Germany:

A pregnant woman is a rare sight on German city streets. But sit at a café terrace on Düsseldorf’s Königsallee, the city’s main shopping artery, and you will probably spot several swollen bellies. Statisticians in this prosperous city have been scratching their heads lately over figures that suggest Germans, among the most barren of western Europeans, are rediscovering the joys of procreation. In the first quarter of 2007, nearly 15 per cent more babies were born in Düsseldorf than in the same period last year. The Kaiserwerther Diakonie, one of the city’s three large hospitals, reported a rise of more than 16 per cent in births in the first half of the year. This and increases seen in other large cities from affluent Munich to down-at-heel Berlin have triggered ecstatic reports, with newspaper Die Welt predicting “a new baby boom”.

I see. Well I'm not sure what exactly has been happening in Dusseldorf, but I think it is pretty clear that Die Welt (and by implication Bertrand Benoit) have been rather too quick of the mark here. So much so that the German Federal Statistics office had to explicity deny the press account when it recently published its Q1 2007 birth data:

WIESBADEN – As reported by the Federal Statistical Office on the basis of provisional results, the number of live births in the first quarter of 2007 (149,300 children) rose just slightly (+0.4%) on the same quarter of 2006 (148,700). The number of boys born was 76,700, that of girls 72,600. The high rates of increase as reported by some media were hence not achieved.

So the press pumped it up, and the statistical office then had to pump it down. In fairmess of course Benoit only talks about Dusseldorf (and there may of course have been, for reasons yet to be determined, a lot of extra births in Dusseldorf early this year. And, indeed, Benoit was not alone here, nor was Die Welt, this news even made it out to Australia.

What is strange about all this is how our thinking is so asymmetrical on the topic, we cast all kind and manner of doubt on assertions from demographers when they suggest that something new, and more or less unprecedented is happening (and if you don't believe this, just take a look at the data I put together earlier in the week on what has been going on in Ukraine in the last decade or so), but then, at the first sight of a little piece of what seems to be good news (even if in fact the news in question is based on misinformation) we quickly let ourselves come to the "there, I told you so" conclusion.

Even with or without an 0.4% increase in live births at the start of this year, what stands out about the German birth numbers is how they are enormously down on the volume of children being born even as recently as the mid 1990s.

Here's the Federal Statistics Office release for 2006 births:

In 2006, 673,000 live births were registered, that was 13,000 or 1.9% less than in 2005. The number of births has been declining since 1991, with the exception of 1996 and 1997. The number of deaths had fallen continuously from 1994 to 2001, before it increased in 2002, 2003 and 2005. In 2006, there were 822,000 deaths, which was a decrease by 8,000 or 1% on the previous year. This means that in 2006, there was an excess of deaths over births of about 149,000. In the previous year, the deficit of births was by about 5,000 persons smaller. On 31 December 2006, Germany had about 82,315,000 inhabitants. That was 123,000 or 0.1% less than at the end of 2005 (82,438,000)

The thing is, none of this is exactly a new phenomenon, as the graph for the Old East and West German fertility shown below makes clear:

But this doesn't seem to hold our Bertrand back:

"Demography experts warn that it could take months, even years, to determine whether the current uptick in childbirth is a statistical anomaly or if something more fundamental is happening. Yet this has not prevented them from speculating about the factors behind the surge."

In truth it would not seem to be the demographers who need to be prevented about speculating - since by and large they are pretty accustomed to this kind of phenomenon, and are normally by nature cautious people - but rather Benoit himself.

To give you some idea in 1990 - and remember that Germany was already on aggregate below replacement fertility already at that point, 904,930 children were born, so the 630,000 odd last year is about a 30% drop in roughly a decade and a half. At this rate by 2020 Germany would be having about 450,000 childen annually, that would be a drop of 50% in 30 years, or one current generation. Now this isn't bad if you think that German is overpopulated, people need more space, Germans consume too much energy etc. But you do need to start to think about where is the money is going to come from to keep all those older people in pensions. Where it won't be coming from is from the honest sweat of Ukranian migrants, since quite simply there won't be sufficient Ukranians left to come. What is it they say already in Serbia, will the last one out turn the lights off :).

And then I have to ask myself, are the only two possible responses to all of this either superficial haymaking, or dreadful gloom and doom. Well Bertrand Benoit, at least, seems to think so:

"Germany’s demographics have spawned their own branch of non-fiction literature specialising in doomsday predictions about the collapse of the country’s welfare state and medical system. Opinion polls show few young people think they can survive in old age on the basic state pension."

Now all of this is a pity, since in the second part of the article Benoit does take the trouble to give us a run around of a lot of the most interesting and influential ideas which are knocking around in the area of low fertility and its attendant problems. Low fertility trap theorist Wolfgang Lutz gets a look in:

“German-speaking countries are unique in having a full generation that has come of age seeing childbearing as abnormal,” says Wolfgang Lutz, the director of the Vienna Institute of Demography. “This has affected the psychology, with a third of young men now saying they never want to have children.”

As does US cohort driven fertility theorist Richard Easterlin:

One popular explanation lies in the country’s powerful economic recovery. The link between income expectation and fertility has been generally accepted since the 1980s, when Richard Easterlin, an economist at the University of Southern California, first highlighted the correlation.

Now much as Easterlin cohort work is of some interest in explaining what you could call the "proximate causes" of fertility outcomes (like bad economic conditions in the 1930s producing the first signs of below replacement fertility while improved prospects post-WWII saw the arrival of the baby booms) it is hard pressed to explain the long term structural drivers of the enduring low fertility we are now seeing increasingly spreading across the globe.

We also get a mention of Elterngelt, which may of course have been a factor in some timing decisions in the urban areas:

"Then there is Elterngeld, a new parental allowance. Introduced nationwide in January and modelled on Scandinavian policies, the benefit entitles every new parent to a state allowance worth 67 per cent of their salary if they stop working for a year after having a child."

So my beef here, yet one more time, is not that there aren't some sensible and interesting points in the article, it is that, just as in the case of the Economist, one or two unjustifiable statements are thrown out which then condition the context of everything else which follows. Yet when you look through the piece carefully, it is often hard to see what exactly is being said, or what conclusions we are actually left to draw. Like:

“Ask young mothers now and most will tell you they want to work part-time,” he says. “The ideology has gone now and we have a consensus that mothers – and fathers – should be given the choice as to how best to raise their children.

Doubtless again there is some truth in this, although it would be nice to see some evidence for the assertion. However, whether part time (or temporary Zeitarbeit) is what they want, it is increasingly what they are likely to find. As we will see in my next installment of the great Bertrand Benoit searching for a solid idea wild goose chase.

German Births Q1 2007

2007-07-25T19:59:00.000+02:00

From the German Statistical Office:

1st quarter of 2007: Births rising just slightly

WIESBADEN – As reported by the Federal Statistical Office on the basis of provisional results, the number of live births in the first quarter of 2007 (149,300 children) rose just slightly (+0.4%) on the same quarter of 2006 (148,700). The number of boys born was 76,700, that of girls 72,600. The high rates of increase as reported by some media were hence not achieved.

Is There a Deadline for Parenthood?

2007-07-15T14:01:00.000+02:00

Is There a Deadline for Parenthood?
An Example from Poland

Monika Mynarska

Abstract
The postponement of childbearing is occurring across Europe and the USA, but the paths of this trend differ profoundly from country to country. In Poland, as in other Central and Eastern European countries, most women have their first child at a relatively young age. This paper asks about the role of age norms in sustaining the pattern of early motherhood. We investigate young adults’ perceptions of age in relation to their fertility choices. We find that age is indeed a salient dimension that structures and regulates individual childbearing plans. The qualitative approach of our study allows for gaining insights into how age norms are explained, argued about and sanctioned. We also reconstruct the mechanisms of the normative influence of age limits (deadlines) on fertility behavior. Thus, the study not only improves our understanding of the timing of childbearing but also contributes to the general discussion on age norms.

Family Benefits in Germany

2007-07-14T15:17:00.000+02:00

This file is useful.

The family allowance is paid for all children up to the age of eighteen. From 1st January, 2007, the period during which the family allowance is paid has been prolonged up to the age of 25 for children undergoing training, and up to age 21 for children without a job. For children undergoing training, who reach the age of 26 and 27 years (birth years 1980-1981), the period during which the family allowance is paid will be continued up to the age of 27; for children undergoing training, who turn 25 in 2007 (birth year 1982), it will be paid until the age of 26 years. Should military or civilian service (which suspend the payment of family allowance) be undertaken by the child during this period, the maximum age-limit is adjusted correspondingly. There is no age-limit for handicapped children who are unable to earn their living.

As is this whole thread.

Polish Migrants and the Scottish Birth Rate

2007-07-11T14:39:00.000+02:00

From the Scotsman:

Polish immigrants swell Scotland's new baby boom

IMMIGRANTS from eastern Europe have helped trigger a baby boom in Scotland this year, new official figures have revealed.

There were 646 more babies born in the first quarter of 2007. Of that number, one in five were born to mothers from Eastern Europe.

It is the first time the General Register Office for Scotland has broken down its statistics to uncover the extent of the impact on Scotland's population of mass immigration from Eastern Europe.

A spokesman said: "Births in Scotland went up by 646 as a whole compared with the first quarter of 2006.

"One in five of those babies were born to parents from the EU accession states.

"Of that number, the majority of babies were born to Polish parents, followed by parents from Latvia."

In the past four years, about 600,000 eastern European immigrants have arrived in the UK from the eight nations that have recently joined the EU, including Poland, which joined in 2004, and Romania and Bulgaria, which joined this year.

The Executive believes there are about 40,000 Poles living in Scotland, while the Polish Council believes there are about 50,000. The true figure could be as high as 100,000.

The figures released yesterday showed that while the birth rate in Scotland has continued to grow this year, it was outweighed by the number of deaths.

The first three months of 2007 saw 14,214 babies born, an increase of 4.8 per cent on the same period the previous year.

It continues a five-year trend and is the highest number during the first quarter of the year since 1997.

However, deaths increased by 6.3 per cent from 14,876 to 15,818, the highest total since the same period in 2000.

While the number of deaths from cancer fell by 0.6 per cent, deaths from coronary heart disease increased by 2.4 per cent and deaths from stroke by 1.9 per cent.

The figures give Scotland an estimated population of 5,116,900.

The Registrar General for Scotland, Duncan Macniven, said: "The increase in the number of deaths was disappointing, though it was partly a reflection of the unprecedentedly small number of deaths in the first quarter of 2006.

"The increase was relatively small and it is too early to suggest a change in the trend of a falling death rate."

The figures also showed that the number of marriages dropped, by 4.6 per cent from 3,493 to 3,333, and - as had been expected - the number of same-sex civil partnerships also fell.

Robert Whelan, of the Civitas think tank, said: "We have to bear in mind with immigration that we are not just looking at the numbers of adults coming into the country, but at large numbers of children being born.

"It will make a growing difference to the balance of the population because birth rates among the existing population are low. Immigrant groups have higher birth rates than the existing population."

• THE most popular names for Polish children are quite different from Jack and Sophie - the names most often chosen by parents of Scottish children.

The most popular name for a Polish baby boy is Jan, with Anna being the favourite name for a girl.

Following Jan, the names most commonly picked by Polish parents for boys are: Andrzej, Piotr, Krzysztof, Stanislaw, Tomasz, Pawel, Józef, Marcin and Marek.

For girls, the next most popular after Anna are: Maria, Katarzyna, Malgorzata, Agnieszka, Krystyna, Barbara, Ewa, Elzbieta and Zofia.

Latvians Abroad

2007-07-08T22:16:00.000+02:00

EU Business has this:

Outgoing Latvian leader hopes migrants will return to boost homeland

RIGA) - In a farewell address to Latvians Saturday, outgoing President Vaira Vike-Freiberga said she hoped the thousands of citizens who now work in Ireland would someday return home to boost the Baltic country.

Vike-Freiberga, who is stepping down after two four-year terms as head of state of the former Soviet-ruled republic, helped steer Latvia into the European Union and NATO in 2004.

In a televised speech, Vike-Freiberga recalled that she had forecast how freedom of movement within the EU would "lure the most energetic and able of our people abroad."

"Latvia misses their absence painfully," she said.

"Every single person is needed by this country. We expect them back dearly. They will return with the capital of knowledge, wealth, experience."

Latvian authorities estimate that about 50,000 people from the Baltic country work in other EU countries, mainly in Britain and Ireland, which is now home to some 22,000 Latvians.

The departures have dented the labour force in Latvia, which has a population of just 2.3 million people.

However, Vike-Freiberga recalled a remark by her Irish counterpart, President Mary McAleese, that migration was "the opportunity for both sides to benefit."

"Ireland has not always been as affluent and successful as it is now," said Vike-Freiberga, adding that it "had to go through some very tough times."

Emigration from Latvia is driven in part by the fact that the minimum wage here -- 90 lats a month (129 euros, 176 dollars) -- is one of the lowest in the 27-nation EU.

In addition, breakneck growth is going hand in hand with rampant inflation, and there are increasing jitters about a "hard landing" for the Latvian economy.

"We will also get through these difficult times, maybe even faster than the Irish whom we so admire," said Vike-Freiberga.

Studies have shown that the gap in wealth between the richest and poorest Latvians is among the greatest in the EU, with the income of the top 20 percent a full 6.7 times higher than that of the bottom 20 percent in recent years.

"We have proportionally more millionaires than in some other more developed countries. Meanwhile, we have many people who live under the poverty line," said Vike-Freiberga.

"The task of the future is to narrow this gap, so that the rich sustain the country, given all the resources that a democracy provides them, and the less fortunate can move forward in society, so that we can create a stable middle class which is a guarantee of democracy," she added.

The highly popular Vike-Freiberga was first elected president in 1999 and won a second term in 2003.

Her successor, Valdis Zatlers, is due to be sworn in on Sunday.

EU 8 Health Worker Migrant Intentions

2007-07-01T18:02:00.000+02:00

From:

Labour Mobility in the Enlarged European Union: International Migration from the EU8 countries it is possible to speculate that Polish emigrants substituted other destination countries for Germany with the new possibilities that arose upon accession to the EU (Fihel, 2006).

Migration in South Korea

2007-06-29T22:29:00.000+02:00

This piece from the Japanese paper Asahi on migration in Asia caught my eye:

Asia: S. Korea, Singapore turn birthrate tide with immigration

BY TAKESHI KAMIYA, THE ASAHI SHIMBUN

SEOUL--Declining birthrates are a problem that Japan shares with South Korea and Singapore.

But unlike Japan, which has yet to open its doors widely to immigration, these two countries are welcoming people from elsewhere in Asia to fill the gap.

In South Korea, the main struggle has been felt in depopulated farm and fishing villages.

Now, brides from China and Southeast Asian countries are settling down with local bachelors hoping to raise the next crop of farmers.

In Singapore, the government plans to bring in about 2 million immigrants--or nearly half of the current population--to maintain growth.

The squalling of babies is a welcome sound these days among the roughly 40 households in Guzi village in Jeollabuk-do province in southwestern South Korea.

Rice farmer Paek In Ki, 37, and his Vietnamese wife, Tran Thi Thanh Thuy, 25, welcomed their first child--a girl--in 2004. Their son was born late last year. The couple wed in 2003.

In this traditional farming village, Confucianism still exerts a strong influence. Thanh Thuy cooks up local delicacies to celebrate Confucian events, and she works in the rice paddies and strawberry fields alongside her husband.

"She is now a crucial member of this village," Paek said.

Thanh Thuy says she feels right at home. "The farming and Confucian events are similar to the way I grew up in Vietnam. I don't feel any difference here," she said.

International marriages are on the rise in rural South Korea. According to the Korea National Statistical Office, of about 8,600 farmers, forestry workers and fishermen who got married in 2006, 41 percent got hitched to women from other countries.

Of all South Korean men who married foreign women in 2006, about 11,000 took Vietnamese brides, a 74 percent rise from the previous year. Many marriages were made through brokers.

Not all those matches were love at first sight, but appearance did play a factor.

Paek cited a pragmatic reason for choosing Thanh Thuy. "She looks South Korean, so I thought our children would not face discrimination," he said.

In 2005, the South Korean birthrate--the number of children a woman has in her lifetime--fell to 1.08 children on average. That figure was even lower than Japan's birthrate of 1.26 and ranks among the world's lowest.

Moreover, in rural villages, the gender imbalance is growing wider, in part because of fetal sex selection techniques, similar to those that have led to serious population problems in China and India.

According to Yang Soon Mi, an official of the National Rural Development Institute, illegal prenatal sex selection is rising because of the declining birthrate and a traditional preference for male children.

Some estimates show that, within three years, the male-to-female imbalance will widen to 120 to 100.

The shortage of brides in rural areas has led male villagers to head to cities. That has reduced the work force, and in turn, led to fewer young families and fewer children in the countryside.

However, it is often difficult for women from other cultures to fit in with Korean farm families, leading some to give up and return home in defeat.

The biggest troubles are communicating with their husbands or their mothers-in-law.

According to a support group for foreign women, one woman was rejected by her husband when he discovered that she was sterile. Another woman said that her husband physically abused her when she disobeyed her mother-in-law's dictates.

South Korea's Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry now regards immigrant women as important "human resources for farm villages." It is working to make things easier on these Asian brides.

This year, the ministry is training 300 counselors who will teach immigrant women the Korean language or offer advice on common problems. The counselors are being dispatched throughout South Korea's farming villages.

The government is also offering financial assistance to enable the foreign brides to afford trips to their home countries to see the families they left behind.

Most of these marriages were arranged through brokers, which has led some international human rights organizations in the United States and Europe to label them "marriages close to human trafficking."

However, according to Yang, "Foreign women are now indispensable to South Korea's farming villages. They can really improve things, so we should not view them negatively. We need to create ways to help them soon."

In Singapore, meanwhile, a ceremony was held in mid-April at a public hall in the eastern part of the city-state to welcome 91 people who had just been granted Singaporean citizenship. The immigrants were mostly from India, China and Malaysia.

After receiving a citizenship certificate from Deputy Prime Minister Shunmugam Jayakumar, each newcomer placed his or her right hand on their heart and swore, "We, Singaporean citizens, pledge to build a democratic society irrespective of race, language or religion."

Jayakumar congratulated the group, and said that both Singapore's native citizens and its adopted brethren must make efforts to get along.

In March, the Singaporean government said it plans to raise the population from the current 4.5 million to 6.5 million through immigration.

Singapore's birthrate fell to 1.25 per woman in 2006.

Pauline Straughan, an associate professor of medical sociology at the National University of Singapore, cited these reasons for the decline:

・Married couples with higher education have increased, and they spend much money for the education of their children. Thus, they are having fewer children.

・Temporary employment contracts of one to two years are on the rise, leaving would-be mothers unable to afford to become pregnant. That is because maternity leaves could obstruct their promotion.

Straughan noted that, as long as young people have uncertain job prospects, the birthrate will never rebound.

Singapore's increased immigration policy is a desperate measure to retain its prosperity and battle the declining birthrate.

However, hurdles for obtaining permanent residency or citizenship are high, as the main reason for accepting immigrants is economic growth. Preference is given to immigrants who bring with them skills and wealth to contribute to Singapore's future.

Unskilled workers, meanwhile, are unwelcome, in part because of fears of social unrest.

In 2003, the government began granting permanent residence status to individuals who had invested at least S$2 million (about 160 million yen) in the country per person through real estate or stock purchases, among other investments.

Researchers in fields such as information technology or biotechnology are also welcome to apply for permanent residency. This year, the government began issuing working visas that make it easier for highly skilled workers to find employment in Singapore.

But Singapore also imposed strict restrictions on its about 500,000 unskilled immigrant workers, which include maids and construction workers. Such workers can only live in certain areas and are prohibited from marrying people with Singaporean citizenship or permanent residency.

Female temporary workers face deportation if they become pregnant.

In addition, many Singaporean citizens fear competition for jobs could intensify with a rise in immigrants.

"We have to work harder not to lose our jobs. We are too busy working to raise our own children, which is why the birthrate is falling," said a 38-year-old Singaporean man who runs a consulting firm. His wife, 34, is a national library employee.

Each year, 10,000 to 13,000 people become citizens, and about 50,000 people receive permanent residency.

However, Singapore's Ministry of Home Affairs does not reveal details on their origins, fearing a backlash could worsen diplomatic relations with their home countries, officials said.

Latvian PPI and CPI

2007-06-28T15:58:00.000+02:00

Latvian and Irish Population Pyramids

2007-06-28T15:36:00.000+02:00

Latvian Population Pyramids 2006 and 2025

Ireland Population Pyramids 1986 and 2000

Migration's Flip Side

2007-06-26T18:58:00.000+02:00

From the IHT:

In this poor but proud farming region, where many of the small wooden houses have no electricity and people still read by candlelight, nearly every third home sits empty. Their occupants have gone to pick mushrooms in Ireland.

When Laima Muktupavela left more than three years ago, she moved into a dusty three-room house near Dublin with 11 other Latvians and picked mushrooms from 6 a.m. to sundown. The farm's owner forbade the Latvians to wear gloves and the mushrooms quickly turned her fingers black. She sautéed mushrooms for breakfast, lunch and dinner. She earned about 215, or $250, a week - more than one and a half times the monthly minimum wage back home - and splurged on a new gray wool coat.

Back in Latvia, her four children felt abandoned. Her 16-year-old daughter, Anna, sent angry letters in envelopes filled with her baby pictures. Her partner, who is now her husband, met someone else.

Tormented by the prospect of permanent exile, Muktupavela returned to Latvia. She wrote a book about her experiences, "The Mushroom Covenant," which tapped into the national fear about the growing exodus of Latvians to Ireland. It became a best seller.

"There is hardly a family left in this country who hasn't lost a son or daughter or mother or father to the mushroom farms of Ireland," said Muktupavela, an ebullient 43-year-old.

She pointed to a vast field peppered with abandoned houses, their occupants departed to the handful of European Union countries - Ireland, Sweden, Britain - that opened their borders to the bloc's newest members when they joined in May 2004.

Freedom to cross the EU's borders unhindered was a reward of membership that natives in this Baltic country of 2.3 million people aspired to after 50 years of Soviet occupation.

But as other EU countries grapple with whether to admit inexpensive laborers from Eastern and Central Europe, fearful that it will undermine their social standards, the case of Latvia shows how migration can exact a heavy toll on the country they leave behind.

While there are no official statistics, Latvian officials estimate that 50,000 to 100,000 people have emigrated over the last 18 months, as many as 25,000 of them to Ireland. In the latest high-profile departure, Latvians watched with horror last month when the Olympic biathlete Jekabs Nakums announced on television that he was leaving to go wash cars in Ireland.

The exodus of economic migrants from Eastern Europe to their wealthier neighbors in the West has been a growing phenomenon since EU expansion last year. But the trend has been particularly pronounced in Latvia because the country's average monthly minimum wage of 90 lats, or 130, is the lowest in the 25-member bloc, while price increases since accession have been highest here.

Mediterranean Fertility

2007-06-26T08:42:00.000+02:00

This early paper by Chris Wilson is interesting.

Latvia and Kaliningrad

2007-06-24T15:49:00.000+02:00

This, from the Itar-Tass News Agency:

Latvia encourages ethnic Russians to move to Kaliningrad

21.06.2007, 16.05

KALININGRAD, June 21 (Itar-Tass) - Latvian companies are prepared to build housing in the Kaliningrad region for people resettled from Latvia, a meeting of Vice- premier of the Kaliningrad government Yuri Shalimov with President of the Russo-Latvian Association for Cooperation Boris Katkov and representatives of Latvian construction companies was told, the press service of the Kaliningrad government told Tass.

Many people in Latvia would like to move to the Kaliningrad region, Katkov said. Young educated people who want to open their own business account for the biggest share of potential residents. As many as 109 families have been preparing documents in the framework of a state Program of Resettlement of Compatriots, and around 500 are on waiting list. The number of those who wish to move to the Kaliningrad region might grow given a better opportunity of housing in the Kaliningrad region, Katkov said.

Latvian businessmen suggested that every family moving to Russia might lease their houses in Latvia and used the money raised to pay off credits borrowed at Latvian banks for purchase of housing. Latvian construction companies want to build several compounds in the Kaliningrad region, employing construction workers from Kaliningrad construction companies.

A first group of people resettled from Latvia arrived in the Kaliningrad region last week. The Kaliningrad region is planning to accommodate around 300,000 compatriots in the following five years.

Nikkeijin in Japan

2007-06-24T07:39:00.000+02:00

There is this recent study from the World Bank:

What do we know about the Japan-Brazil migration and remittance corridor?
Junichi Goto, Kobe University, Japan

Since the revision of the Japanese immigration law in 1990, there has been a dramatic influx of Latin Americans, mostly Brazilians, of Japanese origin (Nikkeijin) working in Japan. The immigration of more than 250,000 Nikkeijin in Japan is likely to have a significant impact on both the Brazilian and the Japanese economies, given the substantial amount of remittances they send to Brazil. The impact is likely to be felt especially in the Nikkeijin community in Brazil. In spite of their importance, the detailed characteristics of Nikkei migrants and the prospect for future migration and remittances are under-researched. The purpose of WPS4203 is therefore to provide a more comprehensive account of the migration of Nikkeijin workers to Japan. The paper contains a brief review of the history of Japanese emigration to Latin America (mostly Brazil), a study of the characteristics of Nikkeijin workers in Japan and their current living conditions, and a discussion on trends and issues regarding immigration in Japan and migration policy. The final part of the paper briefly notes the limitation of existing studies and describes the Brazil Nikkei Household Survey, which is being conducted by the World Bank's Development Research Group at the time of writing this paper. The availability of the survey data will contribute to a better understanding of the Japan-Brazil migration and remittance corridor.

Demographic Benefits of Migration

2007-06-24T07:29:00.000+02:00

A recent working paper from the World Bank:

Summary: The view that international migration has no impact on the size of world population is a sensible one. But the author argues, migration from developing to more industrial countries during the past decades may have resulted in a smaller world population than the one which would have been attained had no international migration taken place for two reasons: most of recent migration has been from high to low birth-rate countries, and migrants typically adopt and send back to their home countries models and ideas that prevail in host countries. Thus, migrants are potential agents of the diffusion of demographic modernity, that is, the reduction of birth rates among nonmigrant communities left behind in origin countries. This hypothesis is tested with data from Morocco and Turkey where most emigrants are bound for the West, and Egypt where they are bound for the Gulf. The demographic differentials encountered through migration in these three countries offer contrasted situations-host countries are either more (the West) or less (the Gulf) advanced in their demographic transition than the home country. Assuming migration changes the course of demographic transition in origin countries, the author posits that it should work in two opposite directions-speeding it up in Morocco and Turkey and slowing it down in Egypt. Empirical evidence confirms this hypothesis. Time series of birth rates and migrant remittances (reflecting the intensity of the relationship kept by emigrants with their home country) are strongly correlated with each other. Correlation is negative for Morocco and Turkey, and positive for Egypt. This suggests that Moroccan and Turkish emigration to Europe has been accompanied by a fundamental change of attitudes regarding marriage and birth, while Egyptian migration to the Gulf has not brought home innovative attitudes in this domain, but rather material resources for the achievement of traditional family goals. Other data suggest that emigration has fostered education in Morocco and Turkey but not in Egypt. And as has been found in the literature, education is the single most important determinant of demographic transition among nonmigrant populations in migrants' regions of origin. Two broader conclusions are drawn. First, the acceleration of the demographic transition in Morocco and Turkey is correlated with migration to Europe, a region where low birth-rates is the dominant pattern. This suggests that international migration may have produced a global demographic benefit under the form of a relaxation of demographic pressures for the world as a whole. Second, if it turns out that emigrants are conveyors of new ideas in matters related with family and education, then the same may apply to a wider range of civil behavior.

Latvia Births

2007-06-21T12:33:00.000+02:00

Over 50s: The Inbuilt Majority

2007-06-19T11:12:00.000+02:00

The following chart, which comes from the IMF World Economic Outlook, September 2004, shows the years in which a majority of voters are projected to be over 50 for a variety of countries.

(Please click over image for a better view)

German Births 2006

2007-06-18T13:01:00.000+02:00

On June 5 the Federal Statistical Office published the following:

As previously reported by the Federal Statistical Office, provisional results for 2006 show decreasing numbers of births and deaths in Germany. The population, too, decreased slightly in that period.
In 2006, 673,000 live births were registered, that was 13,000 or 1.9% less than in 2005. The number of births has been declining since 1991, with the exception of 1996 and 1997. The number of deaths had fallen continuously from 1994 to 2001, before it increased in 2002, 2003 and 2005. In 2006, there were 822,000 deaths, which was a decrease by 8,000 or 1% on the previous year. This means that in 2006, there was an excess of deaths over births of about 149,000. In the previous year, the deficit of births was by about 5,000 persons smaller. On 31 December 2006, Germany had about 82,315,000 inhabitants. That was 123,000 or 0.1% less than at the end of 2005 (82,438,000).

Perhaps the most striking feature here is the decline in the absolute number of live births, this is known as the population momentum effect which operates as generations become smaller. Such is this effect now in Germany that the sheer wait of the numbers decline is likely to completely overwhelm any small increase we may see in the level of the TFR as birth recovery takes place among older women.

and remember, migration is roughly 0% now in Germany, with people leaving as fast as they are arriving.

Low Fertility in Europe

2007-06-17T14:20:00.000+02:00

Just how extended the lowest-low fertility issue is in Europe at the present time(although please note the problem is by no means simply a European one, since several Asian countries - including possibly China - may well already be affected) can be seen from the following charts:

Number of European countries with the period TFR below 1.7, 1.5 and 1.3
(out of 39 countries with population above 100,000 in 2006)

(Please click over image for better viewing)

Proportion of Europeans living in countries with the period TFR below 1.7, 1.5 and 1.3 (2006)

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Migrants In Spain 2007

2007-06-17T14:02:00.000+02:00

Below you can find the latest data from the Padron Municipal in Spain (provisional data, valid as from 1 January 2007). Amongst other points of interest the fact that migration from Morocco has now reduced to a trickle, that Romanians are arriving rapidly and now constitute the second largest group, that Ecuadorians seem to be moving on (maybe to Italy), and that some Argentinians may now be returning home, reflecting that countries relatively more rapid recent economic growth.

The first column represents the number of non Spanish nationals resident in Spain (by country) as of 1 January 2007, and the second column the % that each country represent of the total. Columns 3 and 4 show the same data for 1 January 2006, and columns 5 and 6 show the difference in absolute numbers and on a % basis.

(Please click over image for better viewing)

Women Who Don't Want Children

2007-06-17T13:29:00.000+02:00

Another of the significant trends underlying low fertility in Europe is the increasing childlessness that can now be found in many parts of Europe. Motherhood is still nearly universal among the women in most Central and East European countries, where the proportion of women who reach age 50 childless is well below 10 percent and where relatively little change has been observed across cohorts.

In the rest of Europe, however, the proportion has now generally risen above 10 percent and is increasing. According to some estimates childlessness among women born after 1970 might approach 25 percent in countries like Austria, Germany (and specifically in the western parts), as well as in England and Wales. Unexpectedly for many observers, there has been increasing evidence that in some West European countries (specifically Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands), childlessness has emerged as an ideal life style among some groups. Data from the 2002 EuroBarometer survey indicate that over one in ten young women (aged 18 to 34) in these countries declared “none” as the ideal number of children (see chart below).

(Please click over image for better viewing)

Of course it needs to be borne in mind here that there is also considerable evidence accumulating that involuntary childlessness is on the rise. Some of this increase is driven by factors related to union formation (i.e. the inability to find a suitable partner); another part, by biological factors (infertility). The levels and trends in infertility are difficult to ascertain because of definitional and measurement issues, however, there is evidence that as postponement has pushed births towards the end of a woman’s reproductive years, where fecundability is reduced, sterility is higher, and the risk of miscarriage increases, and in general more and more women report problems becoming pregnant. In some countries of Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, two other factors are often quoted as contributing to increasing infertility - the high incidence of repeat abortion, and the spread of sexually transmitted infections (STIs).

Quantum or Tempo?

2007-06-17T12:57:00.000+02:00

This is the fundamental question that the experts have been asking themselves when it comes to interpreting the decline in birth rates. This question arises because the levels and trends in period fertility indicators, like the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), could be driven by either one of two mechanisms: changes in the number of children that women have, and changes in the timing of births. The TFR measures the average number of births a woman would have by the time she reaches the end of her reproductive years, if she experiences the age-specific fertility rates observed in a given period. This measure “transposes” a momentary experience across the lifetime of a cohort. The postponement of fertility introduces distortions into this transposition. The completed fertility rate (CFR), on the other hand, presents the actual average number of children that women of a real cohort do have by the end of their childbearing years. The changes in completed fertility are often referred to as “quantum” effects, while the changes in timing of childbearing are often called “tempo” effects. The bottom line is that because of the postponement of births, TFRs underestimate somewhat the completed fertility that will be reached by the cohorts currently in childbearing ages.

A brief examination of how this works in practice - based on the Swedish case - can be found here.

The classic exposition of the tempo and quantum issues as put forward by John Bongaarts and Griffith Feeney can be found here in presentation form, and here in paper form.

Total fertillity rate (TFR) in Europe around 2003

2007-06-17T12:29:00.000+02:00

Birth rates throughout Europe have declined to very low levels – currently the majority of countries have total fertility rates (TFR) which are registering below 1.5 children per woman. Several recent studies have suggested that this level might be a threshold that triggers self-reinforcing mechanisms, which tend to further suppress fertility. Hence, once TFR falls below 1.5, bringing it back up will be more dif- ficult. The Austrian Demographer Wolfgang Lutz has termed this situation a "low fertility trap". Most countries in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe - including the European parts of the former Soviet Union - seem to have fallen in this "trap". In addition, in a number of these countries the registered TFR is even below 1.3, a level that Kohler, Billari and Ortega refer to as "lowest low fertility". For a cross-section picture as of 2003 see the chart below.

(Please click over image for better viewing)

Very low fertility levels are no longer simply a European phenomenon. Several Asian countries have also fallen into the “low fertility trap” zone – Hong Kong was the first to do so in 1985, and has now been joined by Macao (with a TFR of below 1), Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore. In North America, Canada has been hovering just above the “trap” zone for a number of years now. In Latin America, Cuba registered a TFR of below 1.5 during the mid 1990s, but is now considered to be one of the few examples of a country where the Tfr seems to have returned above the 1.5 threshold (although, of course, whether there is much that is generalizable from this specific case seems to be rather doubtful).

TFRs in East and West Germany 1980 - 1999

2007-06-17T10:36:00.000+02:00

Like other Eastern European countries, East Germany experienced a sharp and rapid decline in period fertility rates after the fall of communism. While there were still 180,000 births in 1990, there were only 110,000 a year later - a drop in the number of births by about 40 percent over the period of a single year. During this time, migration from East to West Germany had reduced the population size in the East considerably. In the period 1989 to 1991 alone, about one million East Germans had migrated to the West. In this sense the massive East to West migration has clearly distorted the usefulness of the annual number of births as a fertility indicator since the potential number of mothers has been considerably reduced.

However the total fertility rate (TFR), which standardizes for population size and age structure, does shows a drastic reduction in fertility. As can be seen from the graph below, the East German TFR dropped from 1.5 in 1990 to 1.0 in 1991, reaching its lowest level of 0.8 in the years 1992 to 1995. Since that time the East German TFR has steadily increased, but has still not reached West German fertility levels.

(Please click over image for better viewing)

Although, there is a general consensus that in the years immediately subsequent to unification East Germany underwent a fertility crisis, there has been some dispute about the general course of East German fertility. In particular it is possible to contrast two rival hypotheses: a crisis and an adaptation one. Advocates of the ‘crisis hypothesis’ argue that unfavorable economic constraints have kept East Germany’s fertility below West German levels and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Supporters of the ‘adaptation hypothesis’ are more optimistic in that they argue that even though the East Germany economic environment has significantly fallen behind the West German one, individuals in the neue Länder (new federal states) are now subject to very similar institutional constraints as their counterparts in the alte Länder (old federal states). Assuming that family policies, tax regulations and ultimately the entire welfare system are important parameters in fertility decisions, one might expect East German fertility to converge towards West German levels were the economic environment, and in particular the labour market conditions, to imporove. Advocates of the ‘crisis hypothesis’ have taken the drop in annual birth rates as an unmistakable sign of an East German fertility crisis, and have even honed down the crisis view to ask whether East Germany (and possibly even the whole of Germany) might not now be caught in a fertility trap.

Other have suggested that while this interpretation might have been correct for the years around unification, it has now become increasingly inapplicable. It is well known that period fertility indicators are questionable in their reliability as indicators of longer term fertility trends, and in particular when there are rapid changes in childbirth timing. A decline in period fertility rates can indicate a decline in lifetime fertility, but it might also be a reflection of the postponement of motherhood to higher ages. This aspect seems to be of particular importance in the case of East Germany. Like most other former Eastern Bloc countries the mean age of women at childbirth was very low in East Germany - when compared with Western Europe - at the end of the 1980s.

In 1989, the mean age at childbirth was just 24.7. On the other hand,the mean age at childbirth in West Germany was 28.3 in the same year.

This considerable difference in the age at childbirth between East and West Germans is crucial for understanding the depth of the ‘East German fertility decline’. Even if East German women, who were childless in 1990, temporarily gave up on childbearing during the upheavals of unification, they were generally young enough to postpone childbearing to later periods in their lives without hitting the biological limits to fertility. In other words, what looks like a fertility crisis from the point of period fertility indicators could in fact be a postponement of childbirth to West German age levels.

This being said, the ongoing level of fertility in West Germany is itself well below replacement, so that even a modest recovery in East German tfrs would hardly be a resolution of the German "fertility issue".

Percentage of out-of-wedlock births in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, 1960–1995

2007-06-17T10:22:00.000+02:00

A close look at the data suggests reveals no clearcut correlation between family formation/dissolution patterns and fertility levels. The percentage of “illegitimate” births in Mediterranean Europe was minimal before the 1980s and in Italy and Spain even only reached a rate of about 1 out of 10 births by the mid 1990s.

In contrast this proportion reaches approximately one-third of all births in France and the United Kingdom and over one-half of those in Sweden by the 1990s. This percentage tends to rise steadily from year to year in spite of sizable short-term fertility fluctuations, especially in Sweden and France. In the case of Germany, however, it is noticeable that the percentage of children born out of wedlock had stabilized by the 1990s (around one-sixth): this is an interesting result since marriage and the family are protected by the German Constitution and since unification the number of births has been halved in the east, where “illegitimacy” was previously massive (See table below). Countries with so-called traditional family structures (high marriage rate, low divorce rate, low illegitimacy rate, etc.) like Italy and Spain were totally “detraditionalized” in terms of fertility in less than two decades. The level of births in these two countries has plummeted to previously wholly unpredicted levels. No official population forecast, either national or international, had anticipated a total fertility rate of 1.2 for any country, and least of all for the Mediterranean countries, which are still commonly viewed as “laggards” and often as being family-oriented. This outcome is probably the biggest surprise in European demographics as it entered the present century.

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Number of women with 3 or more children for the birth cohorts 1935 to 1960 in 6 EU Countries

2007-06-17T09:55:00.000+02:00

One factor influencing the birth rate level of a country is the number of women who have children, and in particular the proportion of women having children in what are called the "higher order parities" - ie more than three children. The number of German women giving birth to three or more children is lower than in other European countries. Using data from Eurostat, it can be seen from the graph below that the percentage of families with three and more children already stopped declining with the cohort of women born in 1945. Around one of five German women born between 1945 and 1960 decided to have three children or more, while in France every third woman did.

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It is often assumed that the high rate of childlessness in Germany is the principal reason for Germany's continuiong low birth rate of below 1.5 children per woman. However, breaking down birth rate in terms of first, second, third and fourth children shows that replacement level fertility in France is sustained both by the higher proportion of women who have a child, by very second child fertility rates and by comparatively high fertility rates for birth orders of three and above (see chart below). In Finland and Great Britain there are proportionally as many third and higher order births as in France, but there are fewer first and second order births. As a result, the total fertility rate is 0.2 children per women below replacement. In Germany, birth rates of all orders are low, but while the difference between Germany and France is just 18 children per 100 women due to a higher rate of childlessness, the differences due to lower second, third and forth order births amount to 35 children per 100 women taken collectively. In short, the gap between France and Germany is severely aggravated by the fact that fewer women decide to have two or more children, and is not simply the result of a higher rate of German childlessness.

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Mean Age of Women At First Childbirth, Europe 2003

2007-06-17T09:42:00.000+02:00

The map in below presents the mean ages of mothers at first birth in Europe around 2003, and shows the extent of postponement in the timing of parenthood. To put these data in perspective -- in 1975 the highest mean age at first birth registered in Europe was 25.7 (in Switzerland), and in the majority of countries the indicator was between 22 and 24 years. Most researchers interpret this as part of the general trend towards postponement of choices that are irreversible or hardly reversible, usually associated with the ideational and other changes linked to the so-called “second demographic transition”. Again in line with the predictions of the second demographic transition theory about the importance of individual autonomy and self-expression, the differences between individuals within a population in the timing of parenthood are also increasing.

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Low Fertility Hypothesis

2007-06-17T09:33:00.000+02:00

In a recent post on Demography Matters Claus offered a nice summary of the latest revision of the low fertility trap hypothesis as advanced by Wolfgang Lutz et al. As summarized below, there are three basic components to this hypothesis:

As Lutz says the key idea is that once fertility falls below a certain level (and even in the event that the hypothesis proved to be well founded this level could only be determined empirically, on the basis of actual experience) a self-reinforcing demographic regime may be established from which it is hard to escape, in the sense of raising fertility back up towards replacement levels. The cut-off point which Lutz et al start from is 1.5 (and in this they take their lead from a proposal by Peter Macdonald in this paper ). This figure does seem to have some coherence in terms of actual experience to date, since with the exception of Denmark - which did briefly fall under 1.5 tfr in the 1990s - no country seems to have gone below it and come back up again.
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Net reproduction rate in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, 1900–1995

2007-06-16T19:19:00.000+02:00

Another characteristic of the Swedish pattern is that Sweden, along with France and the United Kingdom, was one of the few EU countries where the total fertility rate never fell below the level of 1.6 children per woman. A historian of the welfare state might be tempted to remind us that public officials in these three countries feared a population decline in the 1930s and that the creators of the social security systems (William Henry Beveridge in England, Pierre Laroque in France, and the Nobel Prize winner Alva Myrdal in Sweden) had comparable views — i. e., pronatalist —on population matters and implemented a family-oriented social policy at the time of World War II. This explicit demographic preoccupation progressively eroded or vanished in the following decades, but family support is still a non-negligible component of the welfare state. Few experts could imagine that the Italian TFR was going to go lower than the British rate in the 1950s and 1960s (See Table Below).

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Total fertility rate in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, 1960–1996

2007-06-16T19:08:00.000+02:00

To design a population policy, the decision maker has to use an index that is not biased by age structure and that reflects the sheer propensity to have children: the total fertility rate. The indicator is permanently calculated for the purpose of international comparisons, and it is widely produced to show the impact of a given plan (antinatalist or pronatalist) of action. The table below shows that the European trends are radical. In most of the “big” countries of the EU, the total fertility rate fell on average by 1.0 to 1.4 children per woman. In Spain, the decline was much sharper: 2.90 at the beginning of the 1960s but only 1.15 in 1996, 1.75 in absolute terms and hence a relative decline of 60%. There is no more Mediterranean or Catholic fertility, since Italy and Spain have experienced the lowest fertility ever seen in the history of mankind.

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A comparison between northern and southern Europe through the examples of Sweden and Italy is instructive. Until the 1970s the Swedish fertility rate was lower than the Italian rate, and it was under the EU curve (See Graph Below). Now the opposite is true; new generations of Swedish women have more children than corresponding Italian women.

Number of births in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, 1960–1995

2007-06-16T18:53:00.000+02:00

In the United Kingdom as well as in Italy, the annual number of births in the mid- 1960s was close to 1 million; it has fallen by one-quarter in the United Kingdom and by nearly one-half in Italy. In Germany, the absolute decline is still more impressive: 1.3 million in 1965 compared to about 0.8 million in 1995; the difference is 500,000 births per year (See table below). The case of France differs for two reasons: there the fertility decrease was not as steep as in neighboring countries of continental Europe, and the age structure had a protective impact; France had more baby boomers at childbearing ages. These crude data on births are important because they shape the age structure, and finally they constitute the most essential variable for political authorities at all levels (local, regional, national, and international). Under present conditions of very low mortality, they determine the number of students, the number of future inflows in the labor market, the number of consumers, of taxpayers, etc.; they have a decisive impact on long-range variations in demand, on investment (infrastructure, housing), and on corresponding sectorial labor needs (teachers, doctors, builders, etc.).

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Population of the five largest member countries of EU-15 .

2007-06-16T18:48:00.000+02:00

The movement towards population stagnation has been similar for all nations within the European Union. To simplify the presentation, we have produced population figures for the five largest member countries at the turn of the century (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom), which together comprise 80% of the total population of EU- 15. The German population has tended to stabilize around 80 million; the French, Italian, and British a bit below 60 million; and the Spanish slightly below 40 million (See table below). Leaving aside immigration, the total population of these five countries could peak at about 300 million and then, if present fertility trends persist, begin to shrink.

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Population, natural increase, and net migration in the EU-15, 1960–1995

2007-06-16T18:41:00.000+02:00

In the old EU-15, the rate of population growth has been slowing down and is now close to zero; immigration is the unique factor that has had a dampening effect on this slackening process (in many cases, it prevents straightforward depopulation.

Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1990s, the natural increase fell by more than two million, from 2.56 million in 1965 to 0.33 million in 1995. As the number of deaths was approximatively constant, this phenomenon essentially can be attributed to a substantial drop in the number of births, which declined by more than one-third in only three decades (from 6.1 million in 1965 to 4.0 million in 1995). Despite the fact that in 2000 the EU has 100 million more inhabitants than the United States (370 million versus 270 million), the number of births in the mid 1990s was similar (3.915 million in the United States in 1996). During the last few years, for the first time in the history of the European community, the contribution of immigration to population growth has becopme stronger (indeed, much stronger) than the impact of natural increase (which, in turn, is stimulated by past immigration), as the table below indicates. The lesson is clear: the EU is entering a new historical stage, the age of migratory dependency.

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Births in Europe In the Twentieth Century

2007-06-16T18:18:00.000+02:00

On the eve of World War I, the average number of annual births in Europe was 10 million for a total population of 300 million inhabitants; by the year 1995, this number had dropped to 6 million for a corresponding population of 500 million; hence, the population had increased by two-thirds while the number of births fell by 40%. Such a decline was structural and even rather linear; the following data represent the number of births (in thousands) from decade to decade throughout the twentieth century:

The post-World War II baby boom was limited in time, space, and magnitude; it occurred only among the Western allies and its duration was usually short (15 to 20 years). In 1960 as well as in 1950, the number of births in Europe was similar to its 1940 level: around 8 million; the idea of a fertility cycle had no meaning for Europe as a whole. The 1940s and 1950s marked a stagnation, not an upswing. Then the secular movement resumed steadily, but it is very difficult to predict the bottom line since we have no comparable reference in our past. In 1996 the total fertility rate for Europe, with or without the European part of the former Soviet Union, was 1.4 — the lowest in the world. For Europe alone the birth deficit — defined by the difference between the number of births required for replacement and the number observed — is now in the region of about 2 million per year.

Total Fertility Rate England and France 1750 to 2000

2007-06-16T18:12:00.000+02:00

The following chart shows the relative evolution of the Total Fertility Rate as between England and France, 1750 to 2000

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Fertility in the UK and France 1750 to 2000

2007-06-16T17:58:00.000+02:00

British and France were the first really modern nation-states and, as a consequence, were among the first (along with Sweden and the Netherlands) to enter the demographic transition. The French Revolution marked the beginning of the secular fertility decline in France, whereas the industrial revolution in England encouraged family formation (earlier marriage, higher fertility). Throughout the nineteenth century, the fertility gap between these two nations was hugely detrimental to France as can be seen from the graph.

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During the 1800–1880 period, the difference between Britain and France ranged between 1.3 and 1.8 children per woman: that is the same value as the difference between the prevailing present fertility and zero. This fertility differential evidently had tremendous implications for foreign policy and for the fate of the future European colonies. As a consequence of this relative differential France lost its position of leadership to England; the French language regressed all over Europe and, contrary to English, never acquired a world status; moreover, French emigration was very limited. By contrast, from the beginning of the nineteenth century British emigrants exported their ideas, their ideals, and their language on all continents. In “northern” America (north of the Rio Grande), only 2% of the entire population (namely,the population which is to be found in Quebec) uses the French language to communicate in daily life.

As can also be seen above, staring at the turn of the 19th century French fertility has gradually regained its relative position vis-a-vis the UK.

Regional Divergence in Germany

2007-06-16T17:16:00.000+02:00

Since reunification, approximately 1.5 million people have left the former East Germany. In the states of Thuringia, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, population numbers have reduced by between eight and twelve percent, since the time of reunification. In the western states there are also shrinking regions: in the Ruhr Basin, Saarland and along the former German-German border. Economically strong areas in the West have profited from the migration of young and qualified people. Particularly Bavaria and Baden-Wurttemberg have been able to increase their population, and both states continue to benefit from internal migration.

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Source: Berlin Institute For Population Development

Childless Women in Six EU Countries

2007-06-16T17:09:00.000+02:00

This graph shows the evolution of childlessness among women in 6 EU countries between 1935 and 1960. The countries in question are FRG (West Germany), FI (Finland), FR (France), GB (United Kingdom),IT (Italy), NR (Netherlands).

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Give Us This Day

2006-06-04T17:10:00.000+02:00

Give Us This Day our daily germs

Graham A.W. Rook and John L. Stanford

Modern vaccinations, fear of germs and obsession with hygiene are depriving the immune system of the information input upon which it is dependent. This fails to
maintain the correct cytokine balance and fine-tune T-cell regulation, and may lead to increased incidences of allergies and autoimmune diseases. If humans continue to deprive their immune systems of the input to which evolution has adapted it, it may be
necessary to devise ways of replacing it artificially.

Ovarian aging: Is there a "norm"?

2006-06-04T15:00:00.000+02:00

Ovarian aging: Is there a "norm"? Norbert Gleicher, MD

Female fertility declines with advancing age, principally because of changes in ovarian function. Ovarian aging always has been assumed to be the main culprit, but experience with human egg donation confirms that female fertility can basically be prolonged almost indefinitely, as long as "young" eggs are used in assisted reproduction.1

The decline in human fertility is predictable and can be quantified. Indeed, various authors have demonstrated that the downturn in women's fertility is the consequence of an age-dependent reduction in the number of remaining follicles, which starts during embryogenesis and continues. The initial pool of primordial follicles—at 16 to 20 weeks of fetal life—is believed to encompass approximately 6 to 7 million oocytes. At birth, the female's ovaries contain only 2 million oocytes, and by menarche, about 300,000 remain.2 That number is more than sufficient, as only about 450 monofollicular ovulations are required during a reproductive life of approximately 30 years.

Yet the number of remaining follicles does appear to matter, because when the follicular count falls to about 25,000—as it does in a physiologically normal ovary at approximately age 37.5—the decline in follicular numbers accelerates.3 Various authors, therefore, have suggested that what determines when a woman will experience menopause is not her age but how quickly her follicular count drops to approximately 1,000, the quantity at which menopause usually occurs.4 On average, that happens at age 51, or about 13 years after a woman reaches the 25,000-follicle milestone. In other words, at about age 37.5, a woman's fertility begins to accelerate, and about 13 years later, menopause sets in.

Age-Related Analysis of Inhibin A, Inhibin B

2006-06-04T12:54:00.000+02:00

Relative to the Intercycle Monotropic Follicle-Stimulating Hormone Rise in Normal Ovulatory Women
Nancy A. Klein, Brenda S. Houmard, Karl R. Hansen, Teresa K. Woodruff, Patrick M. Sluss, William J. Bremner and Michael R. Soules

Previous studies have reported that the monotropic rise in FSH in older women is associated with decreased inhibin B and/or A levels and increased levels of activin A. Whereas most investigators have found decreased follicular-phase inhibin B, the roles of inhibin A and activin A as modulators of the FSH rise are unclear. The objectives of this study were to determine whether deficiencies in circulating levels of inhibin A, inhibin B, and/or activin A exist during the intercycle interval in ovulatory older (age, 40–45 yr; n = 16), compared with younger women (age, 20–25 yr; n = 13). Blood samples were obtained daily throughout one menstrual cycle and the follicular phase of the subsequent cycle and were analyzed for LH, FSH, estradiol, inhibin A and B, and activin A. Despite significant FSH elevation, no deficiencies in inhibin A, activin A, or estradiol were detected in older subjects. In fact, inhibin A was significantly higher in older participants during the intercycle phase (P = 0.01), whereas inhibin B was significantly lower. Thus, the monotropic rise in FSH does not appear to result from changes in inhibin A or activin A, supporting the concept that inhibin B plays a critical role in mediating the FSH rise in older women.

The 13 Year Window

2006-06-04T12:27:00.000+02:00

The premise brought forth (Nicolaou and Templeton, 2003Go) is that there is a 13-year window between the beginning of the accelerated phase of atresia (38 years) and the average age of menopause (51 years).

Nikolaou, D. and Templeton, A. (2003) Early ovarian ageing: a hypothesis. Detection and clinical relevance. Hum. Reprod., 18, 1137–1139

There are two general concerns challenging this hypothesis.....

The second issue is the ‘fixed’ nature of this window of 13 years. Basically, we just do not know if this is the case. While it was originally assumed that oocyte loss occurred as a constant logarithmic function (Block, 1952Go), it is more accepted now that there is an accelerated depletion after age 38 years (Richardson et al., 1987Go; Gougeon et al., 1994Go).

Block, E. (1952) Quantitative morphological investigation of the follicular system in women. Acta Anat., 14, 108–123

Richardson, S.J., Senikas, V. and Nelson, J.F. (1987) Follicular depletion during the menopausal transition. Evidence for accelerated loss and ultimate exhaustion. J. Clin. Endocrinol. Metab., 65, 1231–1237

Gougeon, A., Ecochard, R. and Thalabard, J.C. (1994) Age-related changes of the population of human ovarian follicles: Increase in the disappearance rate of non-growing and early-growing follicles in aging women. Biol. Reprod., 50, 653–663.

However, it is not at all clear what the variability is in the slope of this line. Rate of atresia may be variable in different women, and this variability may occur before age 38, as well as in the time period after age 38. At least two conditions have been theorized to alter (increase) the rate of atresia (genetic variations in the X chromosome and thymectomy) (Singh and Carr, 1966Go; Lintern-Moore, 1977Go)

The 13-year window (which is assumed to be the average time frame for women) may not be 13 years per se and is likely to be less or more on an individual basis.

The Impact of age on Female Fertility

2006-06-04T12:18:00.000+02:00

BACKGROUND
Over the past several decades, demographic and socioeconomic trends have resulted in an increase in the absolute number of women seeking pregnancy in their late 30’s and early to mid-40’s. In addition, a significant number of women in this age group are seeking evaluation and treatment for infertility. Although there is a very well demonstrated decline in female fertility as a function of age, this phenomenon has typically has been under-recognized not only by the general population, but also by many health care providers. This is probably related to the fact that in previous decades women generally had completed childbearing by the late 30’s and in fact many of the pregnancies that occurred in the later reproductive years were unplanned. An increased awareness of the effects of aging on fertility for patients and health care providers is critical to the prevention of age-related infertility.

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Age and Infertility. The Biological Clock, fact or fiction?

With recent dramatic advances in infertility treatment, age related infertility remains as one of our most difficult challenges. Reproductive specialists have known for years that the pregnancy rate is inversely related to the female partner's age. Early explanations for this trend included decreased coital frequency, diminished desire for childbearing, decreased overall time to try for a pregnancy, and diminished ovarian reserve with advancing age.1,2 Today, we would add increased spontaneous abortion, oocyte depletion, and oocyte aging to the list.3 Coupling this issue of age with our current societal trend of increased numbers of women who delay childbearing for educational and career goals, we now have a dramatic increase in age related infertility. For those providing primary care to women, it is now much more important to carefully counsel patients regarding family planning issues, especially with regards to advancing age and diminished pregnancy rates. Patients who are in their early to mid thirties or beyond who are considering pregnancy or have been trying for any length of time without success warrant an early referral for evaluation.

Here's Another One

2006-06-04T12:03:00.001+02:00

"As expected, advancing female age was strongly associated with reduced fertility. The day-specific probabilities of pregnancy were observed to decline in women in their late 20s, slightly earlier than reported in the CECOS study of women with artificial insemination (Fédération CECOS, 1982). Nearly a 50% drop occurred between women in their early 20s and women in their late 30s. These estimates do not include the increased occurrence of spontaneous abortion that is evident in older women, but do include early, preclinical loss, which is not distinguishable from non-conception in these data."

Changes with age in the level and duration of fertility in the menstrual cycle
David B. Dunson1, Bernardo Colombo and Donna D. Baird

Here the CECOS study:

Female fecundity as a function of age: results of artificial insemination in 2193 nulliparous women with azoospermic husbands. Federation CECOS.

Schwartz D, Mayaux MJ.

PIP: Fecundity has been reported to decline in women over 30 years of age. It is not known whether the decrease in fecundity is biologic or simply the consequence of diminished sexual activity. Artificial insemination with donor semen (AID) offers an opportunity to control certain variables in the study of female fecundity over time. 2193 nulliparous women who were receiving AID from 1973-80 at the Centres d'Etude et de Conservation du Sperme Humain (CECOS) and whose husbands were totally sterile were studied. The women were divided into 4 age groups: 25 years old or younger (n=371), 26-30 (n=1079), 31-35 (n=599), and 35 or older (n=144). At the end of the study period, the women were categorized into 4 groups, depending on the outcome: success (all pregnancies occurring during the study period), lost to follow-up (if the result of the last AID cycle was unknown), open case (result of last AID cycle was known but the next insemination procedure had not yet taken place), and dropout (discontinued treatment). The cumulative success rates were calculated ater 12 cycles with the life table technique adapted to AID as if there were no dropouts (theoretical cumulative rates). The Mantel-Haenzel test was used to compare the curves obtained from the cumulative rate as a function of the number of treatment cycles for the various age groups. The 4 curves differed significantly (chi-square=15.72, with 3 degrees of freedom; p0.01). The curves for the 2 age groups under 30 were very similar. Overall, the study shows that a decrease in fecundability (conception rate per cycle) as a function of a woman's age is slight but significant after 30 years of age and marked after 35 years. The probability of success of AID for 12 cycles declined to 61% (from 73% for those under 31 years old) for the 31-35 age group (p0.03) and to 54% (from 74% for those under 31 years old) for those over 35 (p0.001). 2 major problems encountered in studying variations in fecundity as a function of a woman's age are: 1) the need to separate the effect of the woman's age from associated variables such as coital pattern and husband's age, and 2) the woman's age itself, which could result in bias, since time introduces a type of selection. AID may provide the best means of minimizing the effects of associated variables and sources of bias.

Here It Is!

2006-06-04T12:03:00.000+02:00

Follicle dynamics during ovarian ageing.
Faddy MJ
Mol Cell Endocrinol. 2000 May 25;163(1-2):43-8.

The human ovary is endowed at birth with a fixed number of primordial follicles which steadily declines throughout life as a result of atresia and recruitment towards ovulation. The pattern of this decline is not exponential, but more bi-exponential corresponding to a 'broken-stick' regression of logged total numbers of follicles against age. Such a model implies an abrupt change in the exponential rate of follicle loss at age 38 years, and is thus rather implausible biologically. A more refined model with an exponential rate of follicle loss that changes gradually throughout life also describes the data on declining follicle numbers but in addition leads to a distribution of age at menopause, corresponding to follicle numbers falling below a critical threshold, that shows quite remarkable agreement with independent data on menopausal ages of American women. When the follicles are classified into resting and growing stages, it is found that any changes in the consequent process of follicle development as the ovary ages relate mainly to the small resting follicles and not the larger growing ones.

Power point presentation:

Premature Ovarian Aging and Infertility

Fetal Growth Retardation and Ovarian Development

2006-06-04T11:26:00.000+02:00

Fetal growth retardation as a cause of impaired ovarian development

J. P. de Bruina, M. Dorlanda, H. W. Bruinsea, W. Splietb, P. G. J. Nikkelsb and E. R. Te Veldea

Abstract

Low birthweight has been associated with diseases and disorders later in life. It has been suggested that this is caused by the impaired development of abdominal organs, especially in cases of growth retardation. Besides general malnutrition of the fetus, preferential bloodflow to the heart and brain may further deprive organs, such as liver, pancreas and kidney, of nutrients. As a result these organs may not develop properly. Anatomically, the ovary is situated close to the kidney and it is very likely that, similar to the kidney, ovarian development can be negatively affected by intra-uterine growth retardation. Placental insufficiency, which is an important cause of severe intra-uterine growth retardation, was used as a model to investigate this hypothesis. In the present study, the volume percentages of primordial follicles in the ovaries of four severely growth-retarded fetuses of different gestational ages are compared to those of four age-matched controls. It is found that these volume percentages in growth-retarded fetuses were significantly lower than those observed in the age-matched controls. It can be concluded that ovarian development is impaired in intra-uterine growth-retarded fetuses. These findings further suggest that, as a result of the premature loss of follicles, females with low birthweights may encounter fertility problems later in life.

Morphometry of human ovaries in normal and growth-restricted fetuses

J. P. de BruinCorresponding Author Contact Information, E-mail The Corresponding Author, a, P. G. J. Nikkelsb, H. W. Bruinsec, M. van Haaftena, C. W. N. Loomand and E. R. te Veldec

Abstract

According to the fetal origins hypothesis, normal growth and development of abdominal organs is disturbed by intra-uterine growth restriction, leading to diseases later in life. The aims of this study were to investigate the effect of growth restriction on the ovaries of human fetuses and to investigate the dynamics of follicular growth in normal fetuses. We selected 21 normal female fetuses (controls) and seven severely intra-uterine growth-restricted female fetuses (IUGR cases) from all autopsy records over a 10-year period. Ovarian volume was calculated and from histological sections the volume-percentage of follicles in the ovarian cortex, the maximum diameters of individual follicles and the distribution of the follicle classes and oogonia were determined. The volume of the ovaries increased significantly from 0.10 to 0.36 cm3 in the second half of gestation. The mean volume-percentage of ovarian follicles and the mean follicle diameter significantly increased with 0.48% and 0.52 μm per week, respectively. Class B/C (intermediary) follicles (72%) were predominantly present. Class B (primordial) follicles decreased from over 20% to less than 10% and class C (primary) increased from 6 to 19%. Class A (oogonia) were frequently present before 30 gestational weeks, but were rare after that age. For all studied parameters we did not find differences between IUGR cases and controls. Intra-uterine growth restriction does not seem to disturb ovarian development in the human fetus. In the second half of gestation the follicle pool increases by the growth of individual follicles, the transition of follicle to larger classes, and probably by increasing follicle numbers. As most follicles at term were class B/C and C, follicles up to class C are probably part of the resting stock.

Aspects of Ovarian Follicle Development throughout Life, N.S. Macklon, B.C.J.M. Fauser

Abstract

The pool of primordial follicles present in the female ovary reaches its maximum number around 20 weeks of gestational age and then decreases in a logarithmic fashion throughout life until complete depletion occurs around the age of the menopause. Reproductive life is initiated when less than 10% (0.5 million) of primordial follicles are left. The entire growth trajectory of the follicle takes at least 3 months. Follicle growth up to the antral stage occurs during fetal life and infancy. While the role of gonadotropins in early follicular development remains controversial, the last 2 weeks of development are FSH dependent. The intercycle rise in FSH and decreasing levels thereafter are crucial for recruitment of a cohort of healthy, early antral follicles and subsequent single dominant selection. Following puberty, anovulation may persist for years and this may presage the development of adult anovulatory infertility. The menopause is preceded by a period of reduced fertility. The development of reliable and sensitive markers for ovarian ageing will be the challenge of the near future.

Lourdes Ibañez, Menarche and Low Birth Weight

2006-06-04T10:48:00.000+02:00

I am currently looking at lower age at menarche, speed of transition to the lower ages, and fertility impacts. The big conjecture would be that there should be a negative impact of this process on final achieved TFRs in the context of a systematic and continuing birth postponment process. To date I have nothing conclusive on this one way or the other.

However I have identified two secondary feedback mechanisms which do seem to influence long term fertility:

a) A correlation between obesity and lowest low menarche. Now obestity is also a fertility inhibiting correlate.

b) A relationship between reduced birth weight, lower age at menarche (due to subsequent cath-up growth) and reduced lifelong fertility.

Here the work of Lourdes Ibañez seem to be very important:

Early Puberty-Menarche After Precocious Pubarche: Relation to Prenatal Growth
Lourdes Ibáñez, MD, PhDa, Rafael Jiménez, MD, PhDa and Francis de Zegher, MD, PhDb

RESULTS. At the time of PP diagnosis, age, bone age, and BMI were similar across birth weight subgroups; circulating sex hormone–binding globulin and body height were reduced in PP girls with lower birth weight, and these remained so throughout pubertal development. Onset of puberty occurred earlier in PP girls with lower birth weight; so did menarche. Adult height differed by an average of 6.5 cm (~1 SD) between the upper and lower birth weight subgroups; this difference was essentially achieved before puberty and even before PP. Menarche before age 12.0 years was twofold more prevalent in PP girls than in control subjects. Among PP girls, age at menarche was advanced by 8 to 10 months in lower versus higher birth weight girls. Menarche before age 12.0 years was threefold more prevalent among LBW-PP girls than in control subjects (~75% vs ~25%).

CONCLUSIONS. The link between prenatal growth restraint and early menarche is herewith extended to PP girls. In particular LBW-PP girls may become a target group for interventions directed toward normalization of pubertal onset and progression.

Reduced Ovulation Rate in Adolescent Girls Born Small for Gestational Age

Lourdes Ibáñez, Neus Potau, Angela Ferrer, Francisco Rodriguez-Hierro, Maria Victoria Marcos and Francis de Zegher

Interestingly for the bigger issue Lourdes here finds a more rapid ovulation rate in post menarche children than previously reported:

"This is a first study assessing adolescent ovulation rate over 3 months, on an ambulatory basis, through weekly measurements of progesterone concentrations in capillary blood dried on filter paper. With this novel method, 23 of 24 participating AGA (appropriate for gestational age) girls were found to have at least one ovulatory cycle within 3 months. This ovulation rate (96%) is, so far, the highest reported in adolescents (16, 17), suggesting that this technique has a sensitivity superior to previous methods (17). Moreover, it is unlikely that this simple method overestimates ovulation rate because the time lag between the proposed ovulation date and the onset of the following menses was uniformly consistent with the time course of a normal ovulatory cycle."

However:

"The ovulation rate in SGA (small for gestational age) girls was found to be strikingly low; the anovulatory fraction was much larger than in the AGA girls. Moreover, in ovulatory SGA girls, the individual number of ovulations over 3 months was also reduced. Interestingly, the reduction in ovulation rate was comparable in SGA adolescents who had reached a stature within target range and in SGA girls with a postmenarcheal stature that was below target level. This observation suggests that anovulation secondary to prenatal growth restraint is a phenomenon that is essentially unrelated to completeness of spontaneous catch-up growth. Thus, in SGA girls, spontaneous recovery of linear growth during childhood does not warrant normal ovulatory function in adolescence; conversely, persistent growth failure in SGA girls will not necessarily be followed by anovulation."

"That the link between reduced prenatal growth and anovulation has apparently escaped attention for so long may in part be attributable to the fact that the majority of SGA girls normalize their stature, and hereby no longer present an obvious reminder of their early growth restraint. The copresence of obesity may have been another notoriously confounding factor in ovulation research; the absence of obesity in the described study population has presumably facilitated the disclosure of the link between prenatal growth and postmenarcheal ovulation rate."

"Prenatal growth restraint has previously been documented to be associated with relative hyperinsulinism, hyperandrogenism, and FSH hypersecretion in adolescent girls from Catalunya (5, 18, 19). These associations were confirmed in the present cohort and may each contribute to the reduced ovulation rate in SGA adolescents."

Ibáñez L, Potau N, de Zegher F 2000 Ovarian hyporesponsiveness to follicle stimulating hormone in adolescent girls born small for gestational age. J Clin Endocrinol Metab 85:2624–2626

Ibáñez L, Potau N, Marcos MV, de Zegher F 1999 Exaggerated adrenarche and hyperinsulinism in adolescent girls born small for gestational age. J Clin Endocrinol Metab 84:4739–4741

Ibáñez L, Valls C, Miró E, Marcos MV, de Zegher F Early menarche and subclinical ovarian hyperandrogenism in girls with reduced adult height after low birthweight. J Pediatr Endocrinol Metab 15:431–433

Ibáñez L, Valls C, Ferrer A, Ong K, Dunger D, de Zegher F 2002 Additive effects of insulin-sensitizing and anti-androgen treatment in young, non-obese women with hyperinsulinism, hyperandrogenism, dyslipidemia and anovulation. J Clin Endocrinol Metab 87:2870–2874

"In conclusion, the endocrine correlates of prenatal growth restraint are herewith extended to include oligo-ovulation and anovulation in adolescence. It remains to be verified whether this SGA-related phenomenon persists into the reproductive age range. If it does, then fetal growth restraint may prove to be one of the enigmatic components underpinning hitherto unexplained female subfertility."

Here's a page summarising Lourdes's work (in Catalan).

China Menarche II

2006-06-03T21:27:00.000+02:00

"Southern Chinese girls aged 11 years and 9 months to 12 years and 3
months in Hong Kong have a mean menarcheal age of 11.50 years
(standard deviation of 0.47) using the recollection method. Highly
significant differences are found when compared to the 12-year-old
girls in Hong Kong studied in the past decades. Therefore, a secular
trend of earlier menarcheal age is demonstrated.

So, LL, Yen, PK. Secular trend of menarcheal age in southern Chinese girls.
Z Morphol Anthropol. 1992 Jun;79(1):21-4.

Huen, KF, Leung, SS, Lau, JT, Cheung, AY, Leung, NK, Chiu, MC. Secular
trend in the sexual maturation of southern Chinese girls. Acta
Paediatr. 1997 Oct;86(10):1121-4.

"In 1993, a cross-sectional study of sexual maturation of normal
Chinese schoolgirls was performed in Hong Kong. The aim of the study
was to obtain an up-to-date reference for normal pubertal development
in Chinese girls. ... Menstrual status was recorded in 6467 girls over
6 y of age. ... The median age of menarche was 12.38 (95% CI
11.98-12.78) years. ... When comparison is made with similar studies
done in 1962 and 1979, a significant downward secular trend in sexual
maturation is observed (p < 0.01). Except for breast development the
downward secular trend in sexual maturation appears to be diminishing
and may be coming to a halt in the Chinese girls in Hong Kong. Their
median ages of sexual maturation are now among one of the earliest
medians recorded in the world population studied."

Growth status and menarche in urban and rural China
T. Hesketh, Qu Jian Ding, A. Tomkins

Abstract:

Objective: To examine the relationship between current age at menarche and growth status in an urban and rural area of Eastern China. Study design: Cross-sectional survey: self-completion questionnaire and anthropometry in 12 schools in urban Hangzhou and rural Chunan in Zhejiang Province. Results: The median menarcheal age calculated by probit analysis was significantly different in the two areas: 12.8 years (SD 0.9) in the urban area and 13.2 (SD 1.0) in the rural area (p < 0.001). Girls who reach menarche are significantly heavier and taller with higher BMIs than those of the same age who are pre-menarche. After adjustment for BMI and other possible confounders, urban girls were still menstruating significantly earlier than girls in rural areas (OR 3.3, 2.1-5.2). Conclusions: The age of menarche is probably still declining in China. Although BMI is an important factor in the onset of menstruation, some other unmeasured environmental variable may be implicated in this population.

Germany Menarche

2006-06-03T21:26:00.000+02:00

Changes in age at menarche in Germany: Evidence for a continuing decline
Dörte Ostersehlt, Heidi Danker-Hopfe

Abstract

Since there are no recent data on secular changes in growth and maturation of girls from West Germany, two cross-sectional studies with equal design have been carried out in Bremerhaven, North Germany, in 1979/80 and 1989. The present paper presents the results of an analysis of changes in age at menarche based on status quo data from school girls (1979/80: 2,796; 1989: 2,223) aged between 10.0 and 18.5 years. Probit analyses show a reduction over the 10-year period from 13.30 ± 1.19 to 13.01 ± 1.21 years, while logit analyses, which fit the empirical data slightly better, show a reduction from 13.29 ± 1.21 to 13.00 ± 1.24 years.

Croatia Menarche II

2006-06-03T21:24:00.000+02:00

Secular growth changes in Zagreb schoolchildren over four decades, 1951–91

Ž. Preberg, V. Jureša, M. Kujundžić

Abstract:

Secular changes in growth and development vary over past decades in intensity and in trend. The purpose of this paper is to present changes in growth patterns of Zagreb schoolchildren aged 7–19 years over the past four decades. Surveys were performed in 1951, 1964, 1973, 1982 and 1991. The mean height of boys and girls in all observed groups has increased significantly over the 40-year period. Age groups up to 9 years in 1991 were 4–7·5 cm taller than their coevals in 1951. Differences increased from the age of 10 in girls and 12 in boys, reaching 10 cm in girls of 12 years and even 14 cm in boys of 14 years. They were also highly pronounced in adult height (5 cm in girls, 7 cm in boys). The most pronounced changes appeared from 1951 to 1964, while in the period from 1964 to 1973 the increase was smaller; in girls only up to 13 years, in to 17 years. However, between 1973 and 1982 positive changes were again significantly pronounced, especially in the older age groups. In the last period, 1982–91, the trend seemed to come to an end. Changes in average weight mostly corresponded to the height changes, being somewhat greater in boys. Moreover, in the last two periods, weight gain in older girls was smaller compared to height. Menarche in the period 1964–73 shifted to a younger age by 8 months (13·34–12·67 years), retaining the same level over the next 9 years. However, since 1982 a slight reverse trend has been noticed.

Denmark menarche

2006-06-03T21:18:00.000+02:00

A continuous decline in menarcheal age in Denmark
Annette W. Olesen, Bernard Jeune, Jesper L. Boldsen

Abstract:

We report a renewed decline in mean menarcheal age in a large Danish sample after a period with a halt in the trend towards earlier age at menarche in many North European countries. In our study based on retrospective data from six different samples constituting 42784 women, we find a continuously declining mean menarcheal age in Denmark among women born in the years 1964-1973. In a sample of textile workers born in the years 1939-1968 (n = 12605) we find a 1 year higher mean menarcheal age. This indicates that menarcheal age is still delayed in certain groups in Denmark. This leaves the possibility that the menarcheal age could fall even further in the future.

Croatia Menarche

2006-06-03T21:17:00.000+02:00

Changes in menarcheal age in girls exposed to war conditions
ivka Prebeg, Irena Brali

Abstract

The purpose of this study was to assess changes in mean menarcheal age of girls in the city of ibenik in the period from mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. ibenik is a Dalmatian town which was exposed to hard war conditions in 1991-1995. Menarcheal status of ibenik girls was surveyed three times, in 1981, 1985, and 1996, and included 720, 1,207, and 1,680 girls, respectively, ages 9.5-16.5 years. Mean menarcheal age was estimated by the status quo method and application of probit analysis. Results show a slight decrease in menarcheal age from 1981 to 1985 (from 12.97 ± 0.06 years to 12.87 ± 0.05), and then a significant increase from 12.87 ± 0.05 years in 1985 to 13.13 ± 0.10 years in 1996. The increase in mean menarcheal age occurred in all socioeconomic groups based on parental occupation and number of siblings. In the group of girls whose homes were damaged during war, menarche occurred at an average of 13.53 ± 0.14 years, while those who lost a family member experienced menarche at an older mean age, 13.76 ± 0.27 years. However, when the girls who experienced personal tragedies were excluded the onset of menarche was still later than in girls surveyed in the earlier periods. The results suggest that the general reversal in the secular trend of menarcheal age in ibenik girls can be attributed to persistent psychological pressures and uncertainties associated with conditions of war. Am. J. Hum. Biol. 12:503-508, 2000.

Belgium Menarche II

2006-06-03T21:09:00.000+02:00

"The age at menarche in a national sample of 4894 Flemish schoolgirls
was surveyed in 1979-1980. The probit estimate of the mean age at
menarche was 13.20 +/- 0.02 years (SD = 1.25 years). ... Status quo
secular data for the 20th century indicate a decline in estimated mean
ages at menarche of Flemish girls from about 14.3 years before World
War II to 13.6 and 13.2 years, respectively, among girls born just
before and during the war. Subsequently, mean ages at menarche of
Flemish girls are fairly stable between 13.0 and 13.2 years. These
secular changes are of the same magnitude as those observed in other
European countries."

Wellens, R, Malina, RM, Beunen G, Lefevre J. Age at menarche in
Flemish girls: current status and secular change in the 20th century.
Ann Hum Biol. 1990 Mar-Apr;17(2):145-52.

Netherlands Menarche

2006-06-03T20:51:00.000+02:00

"Since 1858, an increase of mean stature has been observed in the
Netherlands, reflecting the improving nutritional, hygienic, and
health status of the population. In this study, stature, weight, and
pubertal development of Dutch youth, derived from four consecutive
nationwide cross-sectional growth studies during the past 42 y, are
compared to assess the size and rate of the secular growth change. ...

In girls, median age at menarche has decreased by 6 mo during the
past four decades to 13.15 y.

Fredriks AM, van Buuren S, Burgmeijer RJ, Meulmeester JF, Beuker RJ,
Brugman E, Roede MJ, Verloove-Vanhorick SP, Wit JM. Continuing
positive secular growth change in The Netherlands 1955-1997. Pediatr
Res. 2000 Mar;47(3):316-23.

Pubertal Development in The Netherlands 1965–1997
DICK MUL, A. MIRANDA FREDRIKS, STEF van BUUREN, WILMA OOSTDIJK, S. PAULINE VERLOOVE-VANHORICK, AND JAN MAARTEN WIT

We conclude that the secular change toward earlier puberty has been stabilized in the last two decades in The Netherlands. No change in the definition of precocious puberty is warranted. The occurrence of menarche is not only dependent on age, but
also on height, weight, and BMI. Beyond a weight or BMI of .0 SDS, this dependency is less apparent. The agreement between the expression of gonadal maturation and pubic hair is slightly higher in boys than in girls.

Menarche Spain

2006-06-03T20:18:00.000+02:00

Secular change in menarche in women in Madrid
C. Prado
Annals of Human Biology, Volume 11, Number 2 / March / April 1984

Abstract:

The age at menarche was estimated by recollection in 1617 women between the ages of 18 and 60 in Madrid and a nearby suburb, Pinto. The population of Pinto is working-class and the Madrid group, taken from residential neighbourhoods, belongs to the upper middle class. In both groups we found a diminution in average age at menarche, from 14·04 to 13·02 years in Madrid and from 14·55 to 13·16 years from about 1935 to about 1965 in Pinto. These changes have been more intense in the group which is less well-off economically, where living conditions have varied much more drastically.

Cambio secular en crecimiento y ciclo reproductor femenino en la población madrileña en las últimas seis décadas

El cambio secular respecto a las variables de ciclo reproductor ha sido detectado en varios estudios (Bernís, 1980; Prado, 1982; Danke-Hopfe, 1986; Eveleth y Tanner, 1990), conlleva un remarcable descenso en la edad de menarquia, tanto en ambientes rurales como urbanos, una menopausia cada vez más tardía y una mayor duración de los periodos reproductivos útiles, como consecuencia de la modificación de las dos variables anteriores.

El presente estudios, confirma un adelantamiento de la edad de menarquia, siendo la
diferencia total de 13 meses, y muestra una tendencia hacia una maduración más temprana observada anteriormente en España por Bernis (1980) y Prado (1982), entre otros autores. Al ser un carácter muy sensible a los cambios ambientales, la edad de menarquia supone un buen indicador de las condiciones socioambientales en las que han madurado las mujeres del estudio. La disminución en la edad de menarquia se observa en los grupos de menor edad, debido a las mejoras en las condiciones de vida; además se percibe un aumento en la edad de la primera menstruación en las mujeres de edades entre 60 y 69 años, mujeres que nacieron entre 1934 y 1943 lo que implica que pasaron su infancia y juventud en los años de posguerra ya que la guerra civil española transcurre entre los años 1936-1939. Esto explica también la edad de menarquia encontrada en el grupo de mayor edad (mujeres nacidas antes de 1934). Debido a que es un parámetro muy ecosensible (Bernis, 1980; Prado, 1982, 1984b) se ve afectado también por las condiciones desfavorables.

Algunos estudios detectan la persistencia de una tendencia secular respecto a esta variable en países como Turquía (Ersoy et al., 2004), Portugal (Padez y Rocha, 2003), Italia (Bona et al., 2002), etc., que estaría teniendo lugar a nivel mundial, aunque en algunos países, como en Hungría, parece evidenciarse una tendencia hacia la estabilización (Bodzsár y Zsakai, 2002).

Ersoy, B., Balkan, C., Gunay, T., Onag, A., Egemen, A., 2004, Effects of different socioeconomic conditions on menarche in Turkish female students. Early Human Development, 76, 115-125.

Padez, C., Rocha, M.A., 2003, Age at menarche in Coimbra (Portugal) school girls: a note on the secular changes. Annals of Human Biology, 5, 662-632.

Bodzsár, É.B., Zsakai, A., 2002, Some aspects of secular changes in Hungary over the twentieth century. Collegium Antropologicum, 26, 477-484.

A Life Course Study about Menarche

2006-06-03T17:21:00.000+02:00

A Life Course Study about Menarche, Made Feasible by the Health and Demographic Surveillance System in Matlab, Bangladesh

Introduction

This study is about the age at menarche (a biomarker) of adolescent girls in Matlab, Bangladesh, and the relative impact of contemporary and early childhood nutritional determinants. Application of the life course perspective requires analyses of longitudinal data. The study involves the follow-up of 707 under-five children who were enrolled in a study on persistent diarrhoea conducted in Matlab in 1988-1989 by Baqui. The follow-up survey took place in 2001. By that year the under-fives had grown up to adolescents, aged 12 to 16 years. Tracing the adolescents was feasible because of the Health and Demographic Surveillance System, which is maintained in Matlab. The results reveal that the relative high median age at menarche (15.1 years) is associated with stunting in early childhood and particularly in adolescence. The study is an example of the further integration of the life course approach to reproductive health research within the discipline of demography.

Effect Of Womens’ Nutrition Transition On Infant Survival In India

2006-06-03T16:40:00.000+02:00

Food habits are the ways in which individuals or groups of persons respond to social and cultural pressures, choose and consume and make use of available foods (Mcad, 1962).As populations becomes more westernized, dietary compositions changes to include more saturated fats and less fibre. Although this leads to dense diets, the actual energy intake may not be greater which increases womens’ susceptibility to anaemia and becoming underweight and lead to abortion and still birth etc.

continue reading

International Comparisons of Menarche

2006-06-03T16:38:00.000+02:00

Here's the Frederic Thomas comparison study.

Menarche Haiti

2006-06-03T16:31:00.000+02:00

"Trends in age at menarche of 10,563 pregnant Haitian women enrolled
in a longitudinal study of maternal mortality are examined. Mean
recalled age at menarche for adult women in the sample was 15.37
years. However, there was a clear decline in mean menarcheal ages from
the oldest to the youngest women, with a mean rate of decline for
adult women of 0.36 years per decade. ...The data suggest a secular
decline in age at menarche in Haiti"

Barnes-Josiah D; Augustin A. Secular Trend in the Age at Menarche in
Haiti. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN BIOLOGY. 1995;7(3):357-62.

Abstract

Trends in age at menarche of 10,563 pregnant Haitian women enrolled in a longitudinal study of maternal mortality are examined. Mean recalled age at menarche for adult women in the sample was 15.37 years. However, there was a clear decline in mean menarcheal ages from the oldest to the youngest women, with a mean rate of decline for adult women of 0.36 years per decade. Mean menarcheal age was higher in each age group of rural women than for women in the metropolitan Port-au-Prince area; the rate of decline for adult rural women (0.37 years per decade) was nonsignificantly higher than that for adult metropolitan women (0.30 years per decade). The data suggest a secular decline in age at menarche in Haiti, as well as a continuing disparity between metropolitan and rural women. A declining age at menarche has important implications for fertility and reproductive health in Haiti, and may reflect a gradual improvement in health and nutritional status.

Menarche Brazil

2006-06-03T14:55:00.000+02:00

Secular trend in age at menarche for women born between 1920 and 1979 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
G. Kac, M. Auxiliadora De Santa Cruz Coelho, G. Velasquez-Melendez

Abstract:

Primary objective: This article presents data on the secular trend in age at menarche for 1955 women from 16 to 76 years of age born between 1920 and 1979 and studied under the Nutrition and Health Survey conducted in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1996.

Methods and procedures: Age at menarche was defined by the retrospective method. Women were grouped according to decade of birth, and the trend was estimated using simple linear regression between age at menarche and year of birth for the following specific periods: 1920-1940, 1920-1960, 1960-1979 and 1920-1979.
Main outcomes and results: Mean age at menarche decreased from 13.07 to 12.40 years when comparing the group of women born in the 1920s with the 1970s birth cohort, corresponding to a mean rate of -0.0123 years per year (p < 0.001). The downward trend was -0.0120 years per year (p > 0.05) for the 1920s, 30s and 40s, -0.0093 years per year (p < 0.05) for the period from 1920 to 1960, and -0.0224 years per year (p < 0.01) for the 1960s/70s.

Conclusions: The results suggest a secular trend in age at menarche. The literature points to such environmental variables as improved living conditions and expanded access to health services. Within this context, age at menarche could be used as a marker for social development.

Menarche China

2006-06-03T14:46:00.000+02:00

Analysis pertains to 5-year birth cohorts during 1949-78 compared to
all cohorts born before 1949. MAM [mean age at menarche] declined from
16.5 years to 13.7 years over a 40-year period. The trend was linear.
... Findings suggest a similar MAM for Anhui province as for China as
a whole."

Graham MJ, Larsen U, Xu X.Secular trend in age at menarche in China: a
case study of two rural counties in Anhui Province.J Biosoc Sci. 1999
Apr;31(2):257-67.

There is increasing evidence that age at menarche has decreased in Europe and the United States during the last century and in Japan over the last several decades. Data from a community-based survey conducted in two rural counties of Anhui Province in China indicate a similar, downward secular trend in age at menarche for Chinese women. The present study shows the mean age at menarche decreased by 2.8 years, from 16.5 to 13.7, over an approximate 40-year time interval. This rapid decrease in age at menarche may partly be due to better nutrition and living standards reflected by the improved socioeconomic standards experienced in China over the past few decades. To test this hypothesis, a number of determinants of age at menarche were assessed; year of birth, literacy status, county of residence, amount of physical labour, general health status, pesticide exposure before age at menarche, and drinking water source were all found to be associated with age at menarche.

PIP: This study examined determinants of the mean age at menarche (MAM) in 2 rural counties (Zongyang and Huaining) of Anhui province, China. Data were obtained from a 1993 household community survey among about 12,727 Han women. Years of age were adjusted to account for the Chinese lunar calendar. Analysis pertains to 5-year birth cohorts during 1949-78 compared to all cohorts born before 1949. MAM declined from 16.5 years to 13.7 years over a 40-year period. The trend was linear. Year of birth and level of education were strongly related to a decrease in MAM. MAM was also significantly associated with county, physical labor, general health status, exposure to pesticides before age at menarche, and water source. Year of birth explained most of the difference in MAM. There were no significant interactions between birth year and literacy, water source, or pesticide exposure, or between county and amount of physical labor. Women from Zongyang county had a later MAM than women from Huaining. Illiterate women had a higher MAM than literate women. The decline in MAM is attributed to improved nutritional status and living standards since World War II. 788 women reported a MAM that was older than 19 years. Subtracting these women only resulted in a decrease in MAM to 15.9 years for the pre-1949 cohort. Findings suggest a similar MAM for Anhui province as for China as a whole.

Menarche Belgium

2006-06-03T14:43:00.000+02:00

The secular trend of height and menarche in Belgium: are there any signs of a future stop?

M. Vercauteren and C. Susanne

Abstract Changes such as an increase in stature, in weight and an earlier physical and sexual maturation have been observed since the 19th century in Belgium as in most industrialized countries.

In this paper, we consider the secular trend in height, weight and puberty (especially menarche) over the last 20 years in Brussels. During the period 1980–1982, 4177 subjects, from the Belgian population of Brussels, aged 3–26 years, have been measured and compared with Belgian subjects living in Brussels in 1960.
In our sample, we observe a statistically significant increase in height (and weight), but this trend is less rapid than the increases noticed before in Belgium.
Status quo data on menarche from 1048 girls from this sample were analysed by centiles and the probit method. For the first time in Belgium, it seems that the median age is stabilized at 13.0 years. However, the number of late menarches is still evolving.

Menarche Portugal

2006-06-03T14:31:00.000+02:00

Age at menarche in Coimbra (Portugal) school girls: a note on the secular changes
C. Padez and M. A. Rocha

Summary. The age at menarche and several menstrual symptoms were reported by 516 Portuguese school girls who took part in a cross-sectional anthropometric study in Coimbra, Portugal. The mean ages of menarche calculated using the recall method and also using probit analysis were 12.53 1.27 and 12.03 1.26 years, respectively. Parents’ educational level, place of residence and size of the family did not have any signiﬁcant eﬀect on the mean age at menarche in this sample of adolescents. The order of birth was the only variable that indicated a signiﬁcative effect: the ﬁrstborns reported a lower mean age at menarche (12.34 years) than the later borns (12.6 years). In this sample, 47% of the girls had a cycle length of 529 days, 23.4% had irregular cycles, 59% reported that the duration of bleeding was 3–5 days and the majority, 49%, did not report any pain during the bleeding days. However, 14.3% and 24.45% reported severe and medium pain. The age at menarche has declined from 15.0 (girls born in 1880–1890) to 12.03 (girls born in 1970–1980) years in the Portuguese population. This decrease in age, and also the lack of inﬂuence of the family characteristics, appear as a result of the great improvements in the social and economic living conditions that occurred in Portugal, especially after the 1970s. These improvements are mainly related to better nutrition and better health care along with many other environmental factors.

France Menarche

2006-06-03T14:17:00.000+02:00

"This study compares all calculable means of a new 1974 sample of
3,355 French women ages 17 to 21 with earlier available results, which
indicates a decrease in age at menarche in France and at the same time
a decrease in variance since the last centruy. Plotting all samples
available, the results of equations of linear regression indicate a
decreasing age in France at the rate of -.175 years/decade. ...
Although the rate in France of -.175 seems slower than reported, in
general, .3 years/decade, it is noted that the mean age in France in
the middle of the last century, reported to be 16 or 17, was less than
ages reported in Northern Europe. "

Ducros, A. The trend toward earlier menarche in France. Journal of
Human Evolution. 1981;10(8):623-25.

Evolution of age at menarche and at onset of regular cycling in a large cohort of French women F. Clavel-Chapelon,1 the E3N-EPIC group

Human Reproduction, Vol. 17, No. 1, 228-232, January 2002

BACKGROUND: Early exposure to ovarian hormones is considered to increase breast cancer incidence. The age at which the ovaries become functional is thus important. METHODS: We explored the evolution of age at first menstruation and at onset of regular cycling in 86 031 women participating in the E3N-EPIC cohort study, part of the European Prospective Investigation into Cancer. RESULTS: We observed an increase in mean age at menarche among women born between 1925 and 1930, followed by a steady decrease in the youngest birth cohorts. In contrast, age at onset of regular cycling increased gradually from 1925 onwards. There was thus a steady increase in the interval between age at menarche and at onset of regular cycling, mainly due to an increase in the percentage of women in whom regular cycling started at least 5 years after menarche (from 9.0% among women born in 1925–1929 to 20.8% in those born in 1945–1950). The increase in the interval between menarche and onset of regular cycling was even greater among women with a late menarche. CONCLUSIONS: This increase might be due to a change in dietary intake and/or physical exercise aimed at achieving the slim silhouette desired by the younger generations.

Norway Menarche

2006-06-03T14:05:00.000+02:00

"age at menarche fell from just above 16 years for women born around
1830 to just above 13 years for those born around 1960"

Rosenberg M. Menarcheal age for Norwegian women born 1830-1960. Ann
Hum Biol. 1991 May-Jun;18(3):207-19.

Menarcheal age for Norwegian women born 1830-1960.

Data from birth records from the maternity hospitals in the three main cities in Norway have been used to study the trend in menarcheal age for women born from about 1830 to about 1960. The investigation is based on a sample of 200-300 records around every 10th year from each of the three clinics in partly overlapping time periods relating to a total of 9152 women. The recollected age at menarche fell from just above 16 years for women born around 1830 to just above 13 years for those born around 1960, the decrease being not totally linear. These results correspond closely with a previously published investigation from Oslo from about the same period of time (Brudevoll, Liestol and Walloe, 1979), but our results, which cover more of Norway, show a more linearily shaped curve than the results covering only Oslo. We have also analysed the relationships of several independent variables to menarcheal age, using multivariate linear regression methods. Besides the woman's year of birth, which was the most important variable throughout the whole period of time, various geographical variables were found to be of moderate importance. Being born in the countryside and in towns other than Oslo and Bergen led to a slightly higher age at menarche. No significant difference between Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim was detected except for the period up to about 1880 where the Bergen women had about 2.6 months earlier menarche than the Oslo women. Married women amongst the sample had experienced menarche a little earlier than the unmarried, and among married women there was an association between occupation and menarcheal age, women from the lowest social classes having the latest ages at menarche. The importance of these socially related parameters declined with time, and for women born after 1945 the difference seemed to have disappeared. The age at menarche was found to be positively related to a woman's age at first birth; the further back in time the stronger the relation. In addition, delayed age at menarche was also found to be associated with irregularities in the menstrual cycles in later life.

Puberty and Adolesence

2006-06-03T13:08:00.000+02:00

This power point presentation is fascinating. At least someone is thinking!

Japan Menarché

2006-06-03T12:52:00.000+02:00

There is this early article from 1981:

Secular trend of the age at menarche of Japanese girls with special regard to the secular acceleration of the age at peak height velocity.

Hoshi H, Kouchi M, Hum Biol. 1981 Dec;53(4):593-8.

PIP: An attempt is made to clarify the special characteristics of the secular trend of the menarchial age in Japan. The relationships with the precocious appearance of the age at peak high velocity, another exemplification of the maturity acceleration, is also reviewed. This research on menarche was conducted in 1979-1980 on 284 school girls born between 1961 and 1966. The girls were healthy, of middle socioeconomic class, and grew up and lived in Tokyo and its outskirts. A questionnaire was given to each subject who was requested to answer after referring to her diary, mother's or sister's records, or any other writing about her menarche. If none of these was available, they were asked to provide an event which occurred soon before or after the menarche. The arithmetic mean of the age at menarche was 12.40 years with a range of 9.63 to 15.44 years. In 1958 research was conducted on the menarche of 309 girls in the same school, and the mean menarchial age was reported to be 13.27 years with a range of 10.83 to 16.92 years. The rate of acceleration during these 21 years was 4.4 months/decade. Mean menarchial ages obtained in 157 studies ever reported in Japan were plotted against the year of publication. No definite tendency was apparent until a gradual change toward earlier menstruation began in about 1920. In the next 20 years the average decreased from 15.0 to 14.2 years of age. The rate of decrease during the 1920-1940 period was about 4 months/decade. Due to World War 2, a retardation of menarche began in 1941 and reached a peak of about 15.0 years of age in 1950-1952, after which the trend changed into one of rapid acceleration. It is believed that the age at peak height velocity (PHV) is highly correlated with menarche age. The correlation coefficient is reported to be 0.71 by Nicholson and Hanly (1953), 0.93 by Deming (1957) and 0.77 by the author's of this study based on the present subjects. Thus it can be reasonably assumed that the secular trend of menarche must be associated with a similar trend for PHV age.

Menarche in S Korea

2006-06-03T08:17:00.000+02:00

"South Korean women born between 1920 and 1986... Mean menarcheal age
decreased from 16.8 to 12.7 years during the past 67 years."

Hwang JY, Shin C, Frongillo EA, Shin KR, Jo I. Secular trend in age at menarche for South Korean women born between 1920 and 1986: the Ansan Study.Ann Hum Biol. 2003 Jul-Aug;30(4):434-42.

BACKGROUND: There is strong evidence of a downward secular trend in age at menarche in Europe and the USA during the last century and in Japan and China during the past few decades. However, no study on this trend in age at menarche has been reported in South Korea. AIM: To measure the trend in age at menarche in South Korea during the past few decades and the association of height with this trend. SUBJECTS AND METHODS: A total of 1061 South Korean women born between 1920 and 1986 were randomly recruited from Ansan Cohort Study samples and separate school girl samples, and subjected to this analysis. The data on age at menarche were collected by the retrospective method. Height was measured at time studied and assumed to be relatively constant since age at menarche. Women were grouped with respect to decade of birth and mean age at menarche was determined. The secular trends in annual age at menarche and in height were analysed by the 3-year moving average. RESULTS: Mean menarcheal age decreased from 16.8 to 12.7 years during the past 67 years, corresponding to -0.64 years per decade. Height increased from 149.23 to 161.75 cm during the same period, showing an inverse relationship in the change of trend between height and mean age at menarche. CONCLUSION: Our data suggest that the downward secular trend in age at menarche may reflect the secular change in physical growth in South Korean women during the past 67 years.

Edward Frongillo at Cornell

Menarche in Brazil

2006-06-03T07:49:00.000+02:00

Family socio-economic background modified secular trends in age at menarche: evidence from the Pro-Saude Study (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil).
Junqueira Do Lago M, Faerstein E, De Souza Lopes C, Werneck GL; Pro-Saude Study (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)
Ann Hum Biol. 2003 May-Jun;30(3):347-52

Abstract

BACKGROUND: Since age at menarche has been associated with socio-economic status, its downward secular trend might vary according to the different socio-economic status levels of the family in which women lived during their childhood. AIM: This study seeks to describe secular trends in age at menarche for Brazilian women whose fathers had different levels of educational attainment. SUBJECTS AND METHODS: A self-administered questionnaire was applied to 2053 women born between 1931 and 1977. Multiple linear regression models were employed to estimate trends in age at menarche according to categories of educational level of the participants' father. RESULTS: The age at first menstruation varied from 7 to 19 years, with a mean age of 12.3 years (+/- 1.64 SD). The reduction in age at menarche was 2.4 months per decade for all women. Among daughters of fathers with less than 8 years of schooling this reduction was 3.6 months per decade, and among daughters of fathers with 8 years or more of study it was 1.2 months per decade. CONCLUSION: Improvements in living conditions in Brazil over the last decades seem to have had a stronger effect on the reduction of the age at menarche among women who lived their childhood in worse socio-economic standards.

The aggregate data (with a mean reduction of 2.4 months per decade) reveal little difference from the 1 year per 45 years for the developed world, the faster rate for poorer families (3.6 months per decade, which is nearer 1.5 years per 45, could be significant. It depends.

Leptin and Age at Menarché

2006-05-30T15:51:00.000+02:00

Leptin Is Inversely Related to Age at Menarche in Human Females, Velimir Matkovic, Jasminka Z. Ilich, Mario Skugor, Nancy E. Badenhop, Prem Goel, Albert Clairmont, Dino Klisovic, Ramzi W. Nahhas and John D. Landoll

Over the last century there has been a trend toward an earlier onset of menarche attributed to better nutrition and body fatness. With the discovery of the obesity gene and its product, leptin, we reexamined this hypothesis from a new perspective. As delayed menarche and leanness are considered risk factors for osteoporosis, we also evaluated the relation between leptin and bone mass......

A critical blood leptin level is necessary to trigger reproductive ability in women, suggesting a threshold effect. Leptin is a mediator between adipose tissue and the gonads. Leptin may also mediate the effect of obesity on bone mass by influencing the periosteal envelope. This may have implications for the development of osteoporosis and osteoarthritis.

THE AGE AT which women develop menarche is an important factor in determining population size, breast cancer, and osteoporosis, all of which are of enormous present-day concern (1, 2, 3). Therefore, understanding all potential factors responsible for early menarche is of considerable interest. Over the last century there has been a trend toward earlier onset of puberty and menarche in affluent societies, attributed primarily to the improvement in nutritional status and general health of younger generations of women (4, 5). The onset of menarche was closely related with the achievement of a certain body weight (6) or percent body fat (7, 8). The only explanation given for this association was the influence of an unknown mediator on the hypothalamic-pituitary-gonadal axis.

With the recent discovery of the obesity gene (ob) and its product, leptin (11), it is possible to reexamine the relationship between body fatness and the timing of menarche from a new perspective. In support of this are recent discoveries in ob/ob mice treated with leptin showing signs of early onset of ovarian maturation and reproductive function (12, 13, 14). Similar data for humans do not exist.

According to our knowledge this is the first study to examine longitudinally the influence of body fatness and serum leptin on the timing of menarche in human females. In addition, this is the first study to evaluate, either cross-sectionally or longitudinally, the relationship between leptin and body fat in children. Serum leptin is strongly associated with body fat and indexes of body fatness (percent body fat and BMI) as well as with the change in body fat over time. As leptin is encoded by the ob gene and produced only in the fat cells, its serum concentration indirectly reflects body fat stores (11, 20). The above data are in agreement with the results obtained in a small group of teenage females who participated in a diurnal variation study of leptin (21) and also with the data obtained in adults (22)

It is anticipated, therefore, that leptin deficiency is a primary reason for delayed puberty and menarche in individuals and in populations accustomed to absolute or relative dietary energy deficiency. In menstruating women, a negative energy balance caused by either fasting and/or exercise could cause secondary amenorrhea (24, 25, 26), presumably due to low levels of circulating leptin. Low serum leptin levels were found in young amenorrheic athletes (27) and in women suffering from anorexia nervosa (28). A decrease in the serum leptin concentration was documented in older women in response to exercise.

Prenatal undernutrition, postnatal environments

2006-05-30T13:38:00.000+02:00

Prenatal undernutrition, postnatal environments, and antibody response to vaccination in adolescence, Thomas W McDade, Melinda A Beck, Christopher Kuzawa, and Linda S Adair

ABSTRACT

Background: Recently, researchers have considered the fetal and infant origins of several adult cardiovascular and metabolic diseases, but the implications of early events for immune function and infectious disease are unclear.

Objective: We investigated the association between prenatal undernutrition and immunocompetence in adolescence and hypothesized that intrauterine growth retardation is associated with a lower likelihood of mounting an adequate antibody response later in life.

Design: A subsample of one hundred three 14–15-y-olds was recruited from an ongoing longitudinal study in which data collection began while participants were in utero. A typhoid vaccine was given, and anti-typhoid antibodies were measured 2 wk and 3 mo later as a functional marker of immunocompetence. The likelihood of mounting an adequate antibody response was compared for adolescents who were small for gestational age or appropriate for gestational age at birth while controlling for a
range of postnatal exposures.

Results: The predicted probability of mounting a positive antibody response for adolescents who were prenatally and currently undernourished was 0.32, compared with probabilities of 0.49–0.70 for adequately nourished adolescents (P = 0.023). Diarrhea in the first year of life (P = 0.009) and fast weight gain during the first 6 mo (P = 0.003) were also associated with a higher probability of response.

Conclusions: These findings extend the concept of fetal and early infant programming of adult diseases to the immune system and suggest that early environments may have long-term implications for immunocompetence and infectious disease risk, particularly in developing countries. Am J Clin Nutr 2001;74:543–8.

Early Origins of Immune Function

2006-05-30T13:25:00.000+02:00

Life History, Maintenance, and the Early Origins of Immune Function, THOMAS W. MCDADE

ABSTRACT There is compelling evidence to suggest that early environments are important determinants of immune function over the life course. While current research focuses on proximate mechanisms and clinical implications, an adaptationist perspective may contribute a theoretical basis for explaining, rather than merely describing, the long-term impact of early environments. Life history theory in particular, with its emphasis on the life cycle and investment in maintenance effort—of which immune function is a central component—provides a predictive framework for identifying prenatal and early postnatal factors that are likely to shape immunity. Key life history issues at these stages include avoiding death from infectious disease, investing in immune defenses that are appropriate for the local disease ecology, and optimizing competing demands for investment in immune function and growth. A series of hypotheses derived from these issues are proposed and evaluated with data from ongoing research in the Philippines and Bolivia. Ecologically-informed research on immunity is in its earliest stages, and life history theory has the potential to make important contributions to our understanding of the development and function of this critical physiological system.

Predictors of C-Reactive Protein

2006-05-30T13:12:00.000+02:00

Predictors of C-Reactive Protein in Tsimane’ 2 to 15 Year-Olds in Lowland Bolivia

ABSTRACT Infectious disease is a major global determinant of child morbidity and mortality, and energetic investment in immune defenses (even in the absence of overt disease) is an important life-history variable, with implications for human growth and development.

This study uses a biomarker of immune activation (C-reactive protein) to investigate an important aspect of child health among the Tsimane’, a relatively isolated
Amerindian population in lowland Bolivia. Our objectives are twofold: 1) to describe the distribution of CRP by age and gender in a cross-sectional sample of 536
2–15-year-olds; and 2) to explore multiple measures of pathogen exposure, economic resources, and acculturation as predictors of increased CRP. The median bloodspot
CRP concentration was 0.73 mg/l, with 12.9% of the sample having concentrations greater than 5 mg/L, indicating a relatively high degree of immune activation in
this population. Age was the strongest predictor of CRP, with the highest concentrations found among younger individuals. Increased CRP was also associated with higher pathogen exposure, lower household economic resources, and increased maternal education and literacy.

The measurement of CRP offers a direct, objective indicator of immune activation, and provides insights into a potentially important pathway through which environmental quality may shape child growth and health. Am J Phys Anthropol 127:000–000, 2005.

The Ecologies of Human Immune Function

2006-05-30T13:08:00.000+02:00

The Ecologies of Human Immune Function Thomas W. McDade

Abstract

Immune function is notoriously complex, and current biomedical research elaborates this complexity by focusing on the cellular and molecular mechanisms that characterize immune defenses. However, the human immune system is a product of natural selection that develops and functions in whole organisms that are integral parts of their surrounding environments. A population-level, cross-cultural, adaptationist perspective is therefore a necessary complement to the micro levels of analysis currently favored by biomedical immunology.

Prior ﬁeld-based research on human immunity is reviewed to demonstrate the relevance of cultural ecological factors, with an emphasis on the ecologies of nutrition, infectious disease, reproduction, and psychosocial stress. Common themes and anthropological contributions are identiﬁed in an attempt to promote future research in human ecological immunology that integrates theory and method for a more contextualized understanding of this important physiological system.

Life History Theory and the Immune System

2006-05-30T12:57:00.000+02:00

Ok, after a short, unavoidable, absence I am now back at work. Kaplan argues that the two most energy intense components of the human body are the brain and the immune system. This paper addresses some of the implications of immune system demands in the presence of nutritional constraints:

Life History Theory and the Immune System: Steps Toward a Human Ecological Immunology
Thomas W. MCDade

ABSTRACT Within anthropology and human biology, there is growing interest in immune function and its importance to the ecology of human health and development. Biomedical research currently dominates our understanding of immunology, and this paper seeks to highlight the potential contribution of a population-based, ecological
approach to the study of human immune function. Concepts from life-history theory are applied to highlight the major challenges and demands that are likely to shape
immune function in a range of ecological contexts. Immune function is a major component of maintenance effort, and since resources are limited, trade-offs are expected between investment in maintenance and other critical life-history functions involving growth and reproduction.

An adaptationist, life-history perspective helps make sense of the unusual developmental trajectory of immune tissues, and emphasizes that this complex system is designed to incorporate information from the surrounding ecology to guide its development. As a result, there is substantial population variation in immune development and function that is not considered by current biomedical approaches. In an attempt to construct a framework for understanding this variation, immune development is considered in relation to the competing life-history demands
that deﬁne gestation, infancy, childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. Each life stage poses a unique set of adaptive challenges, and a series of hypotheses is proposed
regarding their implications for immune development and function. Research in human ecological immunology is in its earliest stages, but this is a promising area
of exploration, and one in which anthropology is wellpositioned to make important contributions. Yrbk Phys Anthropol 46:100–125, 2003. © 2003 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

'Natural' Fertility

2006-05-15T12:29:00.000+02:00

Between natural fertility and intentional control: evidence from the African Demographic and Health Surveys, Jennifer Johnson-Hanks

This article examines patterns of marital fertility in age and time (AFMFR and AIBI by parity) from 18 African Demographic and Health Surveys, and compares them to the patterns found in North America and Europe in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries. On the basis of such birth spacing and timing data, demographers have long made inferences about reproductive intentions and reproductive behavior (e.g. Coale 1973, 1986; Knodel 1977, 1987). In the DHS data, however, we have information about both intentions and reproductive practice on the one hand, and birth spacing and timing on the other. Thus, it is possible to compare inferences about intentional states from population rates to selfreported intentional states themselves. The article demonstrates that the shape of age-specific marital fertility rates and the patterns of interbirth intervals among women in 18 African countries who assert that they have no intention to limit fertility and have never used contraception differ quite substantially from that of 19th century Europe and North America. On the basis of this and related data, the article argues against the widely assumed indexical relationship between specific population-level reproductive patterns and individual intentions. As the social organization of reproduction in contemporary Africa differs fundamentally from that of historical Europe, the quantitative methods
developed in that context are inapplicable to Africa.

Department of Wow

2006-05-15T10:48:00.000+02:00

I have obviously been reading too much evolutionary biology lately. Reading through this very interesting paper by John Hobcraft I came across this intriguing paragraph:

Our emotions play an important part in any long-term relationship. A ‘good’ partnership can successfully meet many of our basic needs for sex, for nurture, and for intimacy (Panksepp, 1998). On the other hand intimate partnerships are too often associated with emotions of fear, disgust, or anger (Fiske 2004). Demographers need to engage with neuroscience and gain a better understanding of the role of emotions in relationships (see also Massey 2002). Moreover, we need to pay attention to some emergent suggestions that pair-bonding and love generate lasting changes in brain structure (Young 2003). In other words, the key importance of feedback loops in relationship formation and breakdown need to be included in our consideration.

"emergent suggestions that pair-bonding and love generate lasting changes in brain structure" hmmm, I thought. So I dug out the reference and went looking for Young:

Young, L.J. 2003. The neural basis of pair bonding in a monogamous species: a model for understanding the biological basis of human behavior, in K.W. Wachter and R.A. Bulatao (eds.) Offspring: Human Fertility Behavior in Biodemographic Perspective. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press.

where I found:

Studies of voles have produced an exciting hypothesis that suggests pair bond formation is regulated by the same brain regions involved in the actions of drugs of abuse. These so-called reward circuits are regions of the brain that regulate feelings of pleasure and reward. These regions are activated by a neurotransmitter called dopamine, which is increased in the brain after taking cocaine and amphetamines. Those experiencing love of-ten report feelings of euphoria when intimate with their partners, and these feelings are often reported as being similar to being “high.” There is some scientific evidence that these reward circuits may in fact be involved in the psychobiology of love. One study examined brain activation in people while viewing photographs of someone to whom the subject reported being deeply in love. Brain activity was also determined while these same subjects viewed photographs of other familiar individuals. The authors reported that viewing photographs of their lovers elicited brain activation that was remarkably similar to that seen in other studies after drug consumption (Bartels and Zeki, 2000). This suggests that perhaps similar neural circuits are used to facilitate pair bonding in voles and humans. Perhaps the saying “love is an addiction” has biological support.

The biological basis of the pair bond in humans may change with time. In the early years of a relationship, love is experienced as an incredibly intense sensation that often drives the behavior of the individual. People experience a euphoria that may be similar to that experienced by drugs of addiction, and this experience undoubtedly has a specific neurochemistry underlying it. The individuals in these relationships are consumed by thoughts of being with their partner, often at the expense of other relationships. However, often in later years of a marriage, the nature of this bond changes and becomes less visceral and more a relationship of codependence. Perhaps for our primitive ancestors, the transition between these two types of love, which would occur after the offspring of the relationship are less dependent on the mother, would mark the dissolution of the relationship.

Hmmm, hmmmm