Trends In Partnership Behaviour in Japan From The Cohort Perspective
Conference Paper from the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Japan
Assumptions about the future age-specific fertility rates required for population projections can be obtained using the cohort fertility method. With this method, we predict the average completed family size of younger cohorts, based on the actual birth process of preceding cohorts. Since childbearing behaviour is affected by family formation and dissolution, it is essential to examine these processes for constructing and assessing the future fertility assumptions. Results we will show in this paper are based on the preliminary analyses for producing official population projections for Japan conducted by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR).
In this paper, we describe patterns of partnership formation and dissolution from the birth cohort perspective. Recognizing that declining exposure to marriage may place a strong structural restriction on childbearing, we then examine the extent to which these behavioural changes contribute to a fertility decline by cohort. In addition to marriage, divorce, bereavement and remarriage may also be significant factors for fertility.
Fertility assumptions for new population projections for Japan based on the 2005 census extremely low – in 2030, the medium variant TFR for Japanese women is assumed to be These prospects were led by drastic changes in the patterns of family formation and dissolution. Among the 1990 birth cohort, the mean age at first marriage is 28.2, the proportion never-married women at age 50 extends to 23.5%, and 36% of first-married women eventually experience divorce.
Counterfactual CTFRs with variant patterns of family formation and dissolution have allowed us to understand that over 70% of the CTFR decline is attributed to a decline in marriage rates, and if divorce behaviour has not changed since the 1955 birth cohort, CTFR will by 3% in the 1990 birth cohort.
Developed countries with relatively high fertility rates show relatively high levels of unmarried couples cohabiting and bearing children among the youth. The visibility of cohabitation and childbearing of unmarried couples is still low in Japan, but among the 1980s later birth cohorts, these new patterns of family formation have been increasing. Since these changes could lead to a rise in fertility rates for women in their 20s in the near future, we need to attention to these trends.
Monday, February 18, 2008
From the First to the Second Demographic Transition
From the First to the Second Demographic Transition: An Interpretation of the Spatial Continuity of Demographic Innovation in France, Belgium and Switzerland.
R. LESTHAEGHE AND K. NEELS
Abstract
This article links spatial indicators of two demographic innovation waves to historical and contemporary covariates of both a socio-economic and a cultural nature. The two waves of innovation correspond respectively to the so called “first” and “second” demographic transitions (FDT, SDT). A connection is made between the emergence of spatial demographic patterns and A.J. Coale’s three preconditions for innovation, i.e. “readiness”, “willingness” and “ability” (RWA-model) and to the influence of networks in shaping relatively stable regional subcultures. Since the RWA-model is of the “bottleneck” type, it is expected that the slowest moving or most resistant condition will largely determine the spatial outcome of the two demographic transitions. In the instances of French départements, Belgian arrondissements and Swiss cantons clear statistical associations emerge between indicators of both FDT and SDT and cultural indicators. This suggests that the “willingness” condition, as reflected in regional subcultures, has been the dominant bottleneck in both waves of demographic innovation. The Swiss evidence is, however, weaker than that for France and Belgium despite the fact that, here too, associations are in the expected direction.
R. LESTHAEGHE AND K. NEELS
Abstract
This article links spatial indicators of two demographic innovation waves to historical and contemporary covariates of both a socio-economic and a cultural nature. The two waves of innovation correspond respectively to the so called “first” and “second” demographic transitions (FDT, SDT). A connection is made between the emergence of spatial demographic patterns and A.J. Coale’s three preconditions for innovation, i.e. “readiness”, “willingness” and “ability” (RWA-model) and to the influence of networks in shaping relatively stable regional subcultures. Since the RWA-model is of the “bottleneck” type, it is expected that the slowest moving or most resistant condition will largely determine the spatial outcome of the two demographic transitions. In the instances of French départements, Belgian arrondissements and Swiss cantons clear statistical associations emerge between indicators of both FDT and SDT and cultural indicators. This suggests that the “willingness” condition, as reflected in regional subcultures, has been the dominant bottleneck in both waves of demographic innovation. The Swiss evidence is, however, weaker than that for France and Belgium despite the fact that, here too, associations are in the expected direction.
Saturday, February 09, 2008
Third Birth Developments by Language in Turkey
Completing the fertility transition:Third birth developments by language
groups in TurkeySutay Yavuz
Abstract
The purpose of the present study is to examine third birth dynamics by mother tongue group in Turkey, a country that has reached the advanced stage of its fertility transition. Third-birth intensities of Turkish speaking mothers are lower than Kurdish speaking mothers and the decline in fertility started much later for the latter group. Kurdish speaking women who cannot read and who live in more customary marriages have the highest third birth risk. We demonstrate that to understand contemporary fertility change in Turkey, it is necessary to consider a combination of individual socioeconomic and cultural factors.
groups in TurkeySutay Yavuz
Abstract
The purpose of the present study is to examine third birth dynamics by mother tongue group in Turkey, a country that has reached the advanced stage of its fertility transition. Third-birth intensities of Turkish speaking mothers are lower than Kurdish speaking mothers and the decline in fertility started much later for the latter group. Kurdish speaking women who cannot read and who live in more customary marriages have the highest third birth risk. We demonstrate that to understand contemporary fertility change in Turkey, it is necessary to consider a combination of individual socioeconomic and cultural factors.
Progression to third birth in Morocco in the context of fertility transition
Progression to third birth in Morocco in the context of fertility transition
Agata V. D’Addato
Abstract
Progression from second to third birth is a critical reproductive decision in contemporary Morocco. The study thus aims at analyzing the main determinants of third-birth intensities, applying an event-history analysis to the most recent Moroccan survey data. Differences among social groups still persist in the country. Nevertheless, in the background of current modernization and geared to promote women’s status, all segments of the population are rapidly changing their fertility behavior. This applies even to the most laggard group, such as illiterate women. The analysis also shows no significant or clear evidence of sex preference among Moroccan mothers in the progression to the third child.
Agata V. D’Addato
Abstract
Progression from second to third birth is a critical reproductive decision in contemporary Morocco. The study thus aims at analyzing the main determinants of third-birth intensities, applying an event-history analysis to the most recent Moroccan survey data. Differences among social groups still persist in the country. Nevertheless, in the background of current modernization and geared to promote women’s status, all segments of the population are rapidly changing their fertility behavior. This applies even to the most laggard group, such as illiterate women. The analysis also shows no significant or clear evidence of sex preference among Moroccan mothers in the progression to the third child.
Intergenerational family ties and the diffusion of cohabitation in Italy
Intergenerational family ties and the diffusion of cohabitation in Italy
Paola Di Giulio and Alessandro Rosina
Abstract
Cohabitation has been spreading in the population during the last thirty years, and this is one of the most striking aspects of wider social changes that have taken place throughout the industrialized world. However, this change did not take place uniformly across Europe. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the current debate around the compatibility of cohabitation experiences with the Italian cultural context. Using an individuallevel diffusion approach we obtain results that are consistent with the crucial role that family ties play in the choice of cohabitation in place of (or before) marriage.
Paola Di Giulio and Alessandro Rosina
Abstract
Cohabitation has been spreading in the population during the last thirty years, and this is one of the most striking aspects of wider social changes that have taken place throughout the industrialized world. However, this change did not take place uniformly across Europe. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the current debate around the compatibility of cohabitation experiences with the Italian cultural context. Using an individuallevel diffusion approach we obtain results that are consistent with the crucial role that family ties play in the choice of cohabitation in place of (or before) marriage.
Eastern Europe between emigration and immigration
Eastern Europe between emigration and immigration:causes, obstacles and implications of simultaneous migration flows
Artjoms Ivlevs
Abstract
Despite relatively high emigration rates from countries that joined the EU in 2004, immigration pressures in Central and Eastern Europe are rising. This paper discusses the factors that influence simultaneous migration flows in the region, highlighting economic, demographic, transit and ethnic determinants. In particular, the “new” EU States are likely to receive increasing numbers of immigrants because of the rapid economic development resulting in labour shortages in such sectors as construction and services, rapidly aging populations and the attractiveness of the region for transit migrants from ex-Soviet Union countries. Using the case of Latvia, we also show that individual’s ethnicity may be an important determinant of both emigration intentions and immigration preferences. Ethnic minorities in Latvia who themselves are Russian speaking second and third generation immigrants, one the one hand, have higher probability of emigration and, on the other, are more pro-immigrant compared to ethnic Latvians.
The 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU) has resulted in considerable outflows of labour from poorer regions of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in search of higher earnings in Western Europe. The issue is increasingly preoccupying both in migration receiving and sending countries. The populations of the former - “old” EU States - are worried about a possible negative impact of immigration on labour markets and welfare states, as well as problems related to the social and cultural integration of the new-comers. At the same time, immigrants in developed countries help coping with labour market shortages, thereby contributing to economic growth, and may alleviate population aging problems. On the contrary, in the “new” EU States, emigration of labour may hinder long-term economic growth and aggravate demographic situation, undermining the convergence to the living standards of the wealthy European economies. However, instantaneous benefits from higher earning possibilities for those who migrate and their families staying behind are substantial. Besides the traditional migration flows from the “new” to the “old” EU States, immigration pressures in Central and Eastern Europe are increasing. Almost all countries in the region are confronted with acute labour shortages in several sectors (in particular, services and construction). Shrinking labour force, both due to high emigration rates and natural decrease of the population, raises the question of how the sustainability of economic growth and pension.
Artjoms Ivlevs
Abstract
Despite relatively high emigration rates from countries that joined the EU in 2004, immigration pressures in Central and Eastern Europe are rising. This paper discusses the factors that influence simultaneous migration flows in the region, highlighting economic, demographic, transit and ethnic determinants. In particular, the “new” EU States are likely to receive increasing numbers of immigrants because of the rapid economic development resulting in labour shortages in such sectors as construction and services, rapidly aging populations and the attractiveness of the region for transit migrants from ex-Soviet Union countries. Using the case of Latvia, we also show that individual’s ethnicity may be an important determinant of both emigration intentions and immigration preferences. Ethnic minorities in Latvia who themselves are Russian speaking second and third generation immigrants, one the one hand, have higher probability of emigration and, on the other, are more pro-immigrant compared to ethnic Latvians.
The 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU) has resulted in considerable outflows of labour from poorer regions of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in search of higher earnings in Western Europe. The issue is increasingly preoccupying both in migration receiving and sending countries. The populations of the former - “old” EU States - are worried about a possible negative impact of immigration on labour markets and welfare states, as well as problems related to the social and cultural integration of the new-comers. At the same time, immigrants in developed countries help coping with labour market shortages, thereby contributing to economic growth, and may alleviate population aging problems. On the contrary, in the “new” EU States, emigration of labour may hinder long-term economic growth and aggravate demographic situation, undermining the convergence to the living standards of the wealthy European economies. However, instantaneous benefits from higher earning possibilities for those who migrate and their families staying behind are substantial. Besides the traditional migration flows from the “new” to the “old” EU States, immigration pressures in Central and Eastern Europe are increasing. Almost all countries in the region are confronted with acute labour shortages in several sectors (in particular, services and construction). Shrinking labour force, both due to high emigration rates and natural decrease of the population, raises the question of how the sustainability of economic growth and pension.
High fertility Gambians in low fertility Spain
High fertility Gambians in low fertility Spain:The dynamics of child accumulation across transnational space
Caroline Bledsoe, René Houle and Papa Sow
Abstract
Based on an analysis of the Spanish census and the January 1, 2005 municipal register and on exploratory fieldwork in Catalonia, this paper combines ethnography and demography, in conjunction with current Spanish reunification law, to examine the dynamics of what appears to be high fertility among Gambian immigrants living in Spain. We suggest that this high fertility rate reflects several things. One is the high costs of living in Spain for an unskilled, often-undocumented, but also relativelylongstanding SubSaharan group from a homeland with high rates of fertility: a homeland with which close ties remain vital for migrants in highly marginal conditions. Another is the replacement, in some cases, of older wives by younger ones from Africa, resulting in high rates of reproduction for short slices of time by a circulating pool of young women. We focus, however, on the role of Spanish and European policies themselves in shaping these numbers, particularly those policies that place restrictions on the free movement of people. We conclude that the most interesting demographic facet of this population may not be high fertility but rather the paradoxical dynamics of child accumulation in particular geographic regions as an artifact of Spanish law itself.
Caroline Bledsoe, René Houle and Papa Sow
Abstract
Based on an analysis of the Spanish census and the January 1, 2005 municipal register and on exploratory fieldwork in Catalonia, this paper combines ethnography and demography, in conjunction with current Spanish reunification law, to examine the dynamics of what appears to be high fertility among Gambian immigrants living in Spain. We suggest that this high fertility rate reflects several things. One is the high costs of living in Spain for an unskilled, often-undocumented, but also relativelylongstanding SubSaharan group from a homeland with high rates of fertility: a homeland with which close ties remain vital for migrants in highly marginal conditions. Another is the replacement, in some cases, of older wives by younger ones from Africa, resulting in high rates of reproduction for short slices of time by a circulating pool of young women. We focus, however, on the role of Spanish and European policies themselves in shaping these numbers, particularly those policies that place restrictions on the free movement of people. We conclude that the most interesting demographic facet of this population may not be high fertility but rather the paradoxical dynamics of child accumulation in particular geographic regions as an artifact of Spanish law itself.
Meanings and attitudes attached to cohabitation in Poland
Meanings and attitudes attached to cohabitation in Poland:Qualitative analyses of the slow diffusion of cohabitation among the young generation
by Monika Mynarska and Laura Bernardi
Abstract
This study contributes to the understanding of the low level of non-marital cohabitation in Poland at the beginning of the XXI century. We employ an interpretative analysis of semi-structured interviews in order to capture the meanings and attitudes associated to non-marital cohabitation by a selected sample of young Poles. The results indicate that although cohabitation has begun to be interpreted as a testing period leading to marriage, attitudes towards it are still very ambiguous. The idealization of marital commitment hinders the spread of informal unions. Understanding the determinants of low cohabitation in Poland enables us to advance grounded hypotheses on its evolution in the near future and, more generally, to illustrate the ways in which local culturesinfluence the diffusion of behaviors.
by Monika Mynarska and Laura Bernardi
Abstract
This study contributes to the understanding of the low level of non-marital cohabitation in Poland at the beginning of the XXI century. We employ an interpretative analysis of semi-structured interviews in order to capture the meanings and attitudes associated to non-marital cohabitation by a selected sample of young Poles. The results indicate that although cohabitation has begun to be interpreted as a testing period leading to marriage, attitudes towards it are still very ambiguous. The idealization of marital commitment hinders the spread of informal unions. Understanding the determinants of low cohabitation in Poland enables us to advance grounded hypotheses on its evolution in the near future and, more generally, to illustrate the ways in which local culturesinfluence the diffusion of behaviors.
First union formation in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
First union formation in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: Patterns across countries and gender
Kalev Katus, Allan Puur, Asta Põldma and Luule Sakkeus
Abstract
This article examines the changes in first union formation in the Baltic countries between the late 1960s and early 1990s, in the context of societal and family-level gender relations. The analyses are conducted using microdata from the European Family and Fertility Surveys program. Our results indicate that in Estonia and Latvia the shift from direct marriage to cohabitation started well before the fall of socialist regime. Event-history models provide support for a hypothesised association between union formation and gender systems, with Lithuania showing more traditional features in both respects, possibly due to long-standing cultural differences between the countries.
Kalev Katus, Allan Puur, Asta Põldma and Luule Sakkeus
Abstract
This article examines the changes in first union formation in the Baltic countries between the late 1960s and early 1990s, in the context of societal and family-level gender relations. The analyses are conducted using microdata from the European Family and Fertility Surveys program. Our results indicate that in Estonia and Latvia the shift from direct marriage to cohabitation started well before the fall of socialist regime. Event-history models provide support for a hypothesised association between union formation and gender systems, with Lithuania showing more traditional features in both respects, possibly due to long-standing cultural differences between the countries.
The Effects of Education and Family Formation on Fertility in Ukraine
The Changing Effects of Education on Family Formation during a Period of Rapid Social Change
Brienna Perelli-Harris
Abstract
This study demonstrates how broad societal-level change not only alters the composition of individual-level characteristics in a population, but also affects the relationship between mechanisms and behavior. Focusing on post-Soviet Ukraine, this paper examines how massive economic, political, and social transformations changed individual-level childbearing decision-making. Specifically, I investigate how social change in Ukraine altered the effects of one institution – education - on the timing of first and second births and marriage. I find that whereas previously more highly educated women would have had higher first birth rates once school enrollment and marriage were controlled, after Independence women with higher education delayed childbearing. The rates of second births and marriage also declined after Independence. Explanations for the changing effects of education on family formation include the restructuring of theeducational system, shifting opportunity costs, and exposure to new ideas and values.
Brienna Perelli-Harris
Abstract
This study demonstrates how broad societal-level change not only alters the composition of individual-level characteristics in a population, but also affects the relationship between mechanisms and behavior. Focusing on post-Soviet Ukraine, this paper examines how massive economic, political, and social transformations changed individual-level childbearing decision-making. Specifically, I investigate how social change in Ukraine altered the effects of one institution – education - on the timing of first and second births and marriage. I find that whereas previously more highly educated women would have had higher first birth rates once school enrollment and marriage were controlled, after Independence women with higher education delayed childbearing. The rates of second births and marriage also declined after Independence. Explanations for the changing effects of education on family formation include the restructuring of theeducational system, shifting opportunity costs, and exposure to new ideas and values.
Migration and Union Dissolution in Russia
Migration and union dissolution in changing socio-economic context: The case of Russia
Magdalena Muszynska1 and Hill Kulu
Abstract
Previous studies show that family migration is usually to the benefit of the man’s professional career and that it has a negative impact on the woman’s economic wellbeing and employment. This study extends previous research by examining the effect of family migration on union dissolution. We use the event-history data of two retrospective surveys from Russia and apply hazard regression. The analysis shows that couples who move frequently over long distances have a significantly higher risk of union dissolution than couples who do not move or move only once. Our further analysis reveals that the risk of disruption for frequent movers is high when the migrant woman has a job. Frequent migrants had a high risk of union dissolution during the Soviet period but they faced no such risk during the post-Soviet socio-economic transition. We argue that frequent moving increases union instability through a variety of mechanisms, the effect of which may vary across socio-economic contexts.
Magdalena Muszynska1 and Hill Kulu
Abstract
Previous studies show that family migration is usually to the benefit of the man’s professional career and that it has a negative impact on the woman’s economic wellbeing and employment. This study extends previous research by examining the effect of family migration on union dissolution. We use the event-history data of two retrospective surveys from Russia and apply hazard regression. The analysis shows that couples who move frequently over long distances have a significantly higher risk of union dissolution than couples who do not move or move only once. Our further analysis reveals that the risk of disruption for frequent movers is high when the migrant woman has a job. Frequent migrants had a high risk of union dissolution during the Soviet period but they faced no such risk during the post-Soviet socio-economic transition. We argue that frequent moving increases union instability through a variety of mechanisms, the effect of which may vary across socio-economic contexts.
Migration and Fertility in Kyrgyzstan
Migration and first-time parenthood: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan
Lesia Nedoluzhko and Gunnar Andersson
Abstract
This article investigates the reproductive behavior of young women and men in the post-Soviet Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan, focusing on the link between migration and fertility. We employ event-history techniques to retrospective data from the ‘Marriage, Fertility, and Migration’ survey conducted in Northern Kyrgyzstan in 2005 to study patterns in first-time parenthood. We demonstrate the extent to which internal migration is related to family formation and to the patterns of becoming a parent after resettlement. We gain deeper insights into demographic behavior by considering information on factors such as the geographical destination of migration and retrospectively stated motives for reported moves. In addition, our study reveals clear ethno-cultural differences in the timing of entry into parenthood in Kyrgyzstan.
In Kyrgyzstan, between 1990 and 2005 total fertility decreased by some thirty percent. Nevertheless, together with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, it still remains a pronounced high-fertility country, with a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in 2005 of around 2.6 children per woman, a feature that rather makes it belong to a group of countries that are in their very first demographic transition. There are differences in fertility among population subgroups, however. While the native Kyrgyz generally have a high fertility, the population of European origin has a fertility that is below replacement level. Significant differences in fertility also exist across regions and different types of settlements. The TFR is higher in rural areas than it is in urban areas: 2.9 versus 2.2.
Model 3 of Table 2 reveals that migration caused by marriage increases the first birth propensity past migration (which should come as no surprise) and that thi tendency entirely explains the elevated fertility that is observed during the first twoyears following migration (see Model 2).
Our analysis indicates that the ‘russified’ group of Asians is significantly different from the other two ethno-cultural groups of our study as concerns their first-birth behavior, thus the group does not occupy an intermediate position between the other two (see Table 2). They have the lowest risk of entry into parenthood: about 30 percent lower than among the ‘Europeans’ and 50 percent lower than among the ‘non-russified Asians’, i.e., they tend to exhibit a reproductive strategy that often entails postponed parenthood. An interaction between age and ethnicity (not shown; p-value = 0.009) reveals that the first-birth risks of Europeans peak at lower ages than for Asians. This finding contradicts the assumption (based on observed differences in total fertility) that early family formation dominates among Asians in general in Kyrgyzstan. However, the finding is supported by census data, these show that Russian women indeed have a lower age at first birth than the aggregated group of Kyrgyz women (23.4 versus 23.7 years). A similar pattern of persistently early entry into parenthood in a population with very low fertility has been observed for Ukraine (cf. Perelli-Harris 2005).
Similar general duration-specific effects of migration on first-birth fertility have been observed for many different types of migrants (cf. Andersson 2004, Toulemon and Mazuy 2004, Kulu 2006, Kulu and Vikat 2007). This suggests that there indeed are strong behavioral regularities in how people tend to locate their family-demographic vital events relative to that of a migration, with childbearing being much more common shortly after a migration than at preparation of such activity. It also calls for a critical stand to various accounts of high fertility of different groups of migrants: Crude statistics on elevated migrant fertility may be more likely to reflect the interrelation between migration and family formation than any real high-fertility behavior.
Lesia Nedoluzhko and Gunnar Andersson
Abstract
This article investigates the reproductive behavior of young women and men in the post-Soviet Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan, focusing on the link between migration and fertility. We employ event-history techniques to retrospective data from the ‘Marriage, Fertility, and Migration’ survey conducted in Northern Kyrgyzstan in 2005 to study patterns in first-time parenthood. We demonstrate the extent to which internal migration is related to family formation and to the patterns of becoming a parent after resettlement. We gain deeper insights into demographic behavior by considering information on factors such as the geographical destination of migration and retrospectively stated motives for reported moves. In addition, our study reveals clear ethno-cultural differences in the timing of entry into parenthood in Kyrgyzstan.
In Kyrgyzstan, between 1990 and 2005 total fertility decreased by some thirty percent. Nevertheless, together with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, it still remains a pronounced high-fertility country, with a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in 2005 of around 2.6 children per woman, a feature that rather makes it belong to a group of countries that are in their very first demographic transition. There are differences in fertility among population subgroups, however. While the native Kyrgyz generally have a high fertility, the population of European origin has a fertility that is below replacement level. Significant differences in fertility also exist across regions and different types of settlements. The TFR is higher in rural areas than it is in urban areas: 2.9 versus 2.2.
Model 3 of Table 2 reveals that migration caused by marriage increases the first birth propensity past migration (which should come as no surprise) and that thi tendency entirely explains the elevated fertility that is observed during the first twoyears following migration (see Model 2).
Our analysis indicates that the ‘russified’ group of Asians is significantly different from the other two ethno-cultural groups of our study as concerns their first-birth behavior, thus the group does not occupy an intermediate position between the other two (see Table 2). They have the lowest risk of entry into parenthood: about 30 percent lower than among the ‘Europeans’ and 50 percent lower than among the ‘non-russified Asians’, i.e., they tend to exhibit a reproductive strategy that often entails postponed parenthood. An interaction between age and ethnicity (not shown; p-value = 0.009) reveals that the first-birth risks of Europeans peak at lower ages than for Asians. This finding contradicts the assumption (based on observed differences in total fertility) that early family formation dominates among Asians in general in Kyrgyzstan. However, the finding is supported by census data, these show that Russian women indeed have a lower age at first birth than the aggregated group of Kyrgyz women (23.4 versus 23.7 years). A similar pattern of persistently early entry into parenthood in a population with very low fertility has been observed for Ukraine (cf. Perelli-Harris 2005).
Similar general duration-specific effects of migration on first-birth fertility have been observed for many different types of migrants (cf. Andersson 2004, Toulemon and Mazuy 2004, Kulu 2006, Kulu and Vikat 2007). This suggests that there indeed are strong behavioral regularities in how people tend to locate their family-demographic vital events relative to that of a migration, with childbearing being much more common shortly after a migration than at preparation of such activity. It also calls for a critical stand to various accounts of high fertility of different groups of migrants: Crude statistics on elevated migrant fertility may be more likely to reflect the interrelation between migration and family formation than any real high-fertility behavior.
Monday, January 28, 2008
Geert Hofestede and Intercultural Communication
Gerard Hendrik Hofstede (born 2 October 1928, Haarlem) is an influential Dutch writer on the interactions between national cultures and organizational cultures, and is an author of several books including Culture's Consequences (2nd, fully revised edition, 2001) and Cultures and Organizations, Software of the Mind (2nd, revised edition 2005, with his son Gert Jan Hofstede).
Hofstede's study demonstrated that there are national and regional cultural groupings that affect the behaviour of societies and organizations, and that are very persistent across time.
The Power Distance Index (PDI) is one of the five intercultural dimensions developed by Hofstede. In short this cultural dimension looks at how much a culture does or does not value hierarchical relationships and respect for authority.
Examples of cultures with high PDI scores include Arabic speaking countries, Russia, India and China. Those with low scores include Japan, Australia and Canada. See a world map of power distance index scores.
So how does this manifest in a culture or country?
In a high power distance cultures the following may be observed:
. Those in authority openly demonstrate their rank.
. Subordinates are not given important work and expect clear guidance from above.
. Subordinates are expected to take the blame for things going wrong.
. The relationship between boss and subordinate is rarely close/personal.
. Politics is prone to totalitarianism.
. Class divisions within society are accepted.
In a low power distance culture:
. Superiors treat subordinates with respect and do not pull rank.
. Subordinates are entrusted with important assignments.
. Blame is either shared or very often accepted by the superior due to it being their responsibility to manage.
. Managers may often socialise with subordinates.
. Liberal democracies are the norm.
. Societies lean more towards egalitarianism
Hofstede's four dimensions are:
Power Distance
This dimension relates to the degree of equality/inequality between people in a particular society.
A country with a high Power Distance score both accepts and perpetuates inequalities between people. An example of such a society would be one that follows a caste system and in which upward mobility is very limited.
A low Power Distance indicates that a society does not emphasise differences in people?s status, power or wealth. Equality is seen as the collective aim of society and upward mobility is common.
Read more on Power Distance or Have a look at the world map of power distance scores.
Individualism
This dimension focuses on the degree to which a society reinforces individual or collective achievement and interpersonal relationships.
If a country has a high Individualism score, this indicates that individuality and individual rights are dominant. Individuals in these societies tend to form relationships with larger numbers of people, but with the relationships being weak.
A low Individualism score points to a society that is more collectivist in nature. In such countries the ties between individuals are very strong and the family is given much more weight. In such societies members lean towards collective responsibility.
Read more on Individualism or Have a look at the world map of individualism scores.
Uncertainty Avoidance
This dimension concerns the level of acceptance for uncertainty and ambiguity within a society.
A country with a high Uncertainty Avoidance score will have a low tolerance towards uncertainty and ambiguity. As a result it is usually a very rule-orientated society and follows well defined and established laws, regulations and controls.
A low Uncertainty Avoidance score points to a society that is less concerned about ambiguity and uncertainty and has more tolerance towards variety and experimentation. Such a society is less rule-orientated, readily accepts change and is willing to take risks.
Read more on Uncertainty Avoidance or Have a look at the world map of uncertainty avoidance scores.
Masculinity
This dimension pertains to the degree societies reinforce, or do not reinforce, the traditional masculine work role model of male achievement, control, and power.
A high Masculinity score indicates that a country experiences a higher degree of gender differentiation. In such cultures, males tend to dominate a significant portion of the society and power structure.
A low Masculinity score means a society has a lower level of differentiation and inequity between genders. In these cultures, females are treated equally to males in all aspects of the society.
Read more on Masculinity or Have a look at the world map of masculinity scores
Hofstede's study demonstrated that there are national and regional cultural groupings that affect the behaviour of societies and organizations, and that are very persistent across time.
The Power Distance Index (PDI) is one of the five intercultural dimensions developed by Hofstede. In short this cultural dimension looks at how much a culture does or does not value hierarchical relationships and respect for authority.
Examples of cultures with high PDI scores include Arabic speaking countries, Russia, India and China. Those with low scores include Japan, Australia and Canada. See a world map of power distance index scores.
So how does this manifest in a culture or country?
In a high power distance cultures the following may be observed:
. Those in authority openly demonstrate their rank.
. Subordinates are not given important work and expect clear guidance from above.
. Subordinates are expected to take the blame for things going wrong.
. The relationship between boss and subordinate is rarely close/personal.
. Politics is prone to totalitarianism.
. Class divisions within society are accepted.
In a low power distance culture:
. Superiors treat subordinates with respect and do not pull rank.
. Subordinates are entrusted with important assignments.
. Blame is either shared or very often accepted by the superior due to it being their responsibility to manage.
. Managers may often socialise with subordinates.
. Liberal democracies are the norm.
. Societies lean more towards egalitarianism
Hofstede's four dimensions are:
Power Distance
This dimension relates to the degree of equality/inequality between people in a particular society.
A country with a high Power Distance score both accepts and perpetuates inequalities between people. An example of such a society would be one that follows a caste system and in which upward mobility is very limited.
A low Power Distance indicates that a society does not emphasise differences in people?s status, power or wealth. Equality is seen as the collective aim of society and upward mobility is common.
Read more on Power Distance or Have a look at the world map of power distance scores.
Individualism
This dimension focuses on the degree to which a society reinforces individual or collective achievement and interpersonal relationships.
If a country has a high Individualism score, this indicates that individuality and individual rights are dominant. Individuals in these societies tend to form relationships with larger numbers of people, but with the relationships being weak.
A low Individualism score points to a society that is more collectivist in nature. In such countries the ties between individuals are very strong and the family is given much more weight. In such societies members lean towards collective responsibility.
Read more on Individualism or Have a look at the world map of individualism scores.
Uncertainty Avoidance
This dimension concerns the level of acceptance for uncertainty and ambiguity within a society.
A country with a high Uncertainty Avoidance score will have a low tolerance towards uncertainty and ambiguity. As a result it is usually a very rule-orientated society and follows well defined and established laws, regulations and controls.
A low Uncertainty Avoidance score points to a society that is less concerned about ambiguity and uncertainty and has more tolerance towards variety and experimentation. Such a society is less rule-orientated, readily accepts change and is willing to take risks.
Read more on Uncertainty Avoidance or Have a look at the world map of uncertainty avoidance scores.
Masculinity
This dimension pertains to the degree societies reinforce, or do not reinforce, the traditional masculine work role model of male achievement, control, and power.
A high Masculinity score indicates that a country experiences a higher degree of gender differentiation. In such cultures, males tend to dominate a significant portion of the society and power structure.
A low Masculinity score means a society has a lower level of differentiation and inequity between genders. In these cultures, females are treated equally to males in all aspects of the society.
Read more on Masculinity or Have a look at the world map of masculinity scores
Saturday, January 26, 2008
The Hajnal Line
The Hajnal line links Saint Petersburg, Russia and Trieste, Italy. In 1965, John Hajnal discovered it divides Europe into two areas characterized by a different levels of nuptiality.
West of this line, the average age of women at first marriage was 24 or more, men 26, spouses were relatively close in age, and 10% or more of adults never married. East of the line, the mean age of both sexes at marriage was earlier, spousal age disparity was greater and marriage more nearly universal. Subsequent research has amply confirmed Hajnal's continental divide, and what has come to be known as the 'Western European marriage pattern', although historical demographers have also noted that there are significant variations within the region.
The Western European pattern of late and non-universal marriage restricted fertility massively, especially when it was coupled with very low levels of childbirth out of wedlock. Birth control took place by delaying marriage more than suppressing fertility within it. Women's life-phase from menarche to first birth was unusually long, averaging ten to twelve years.
The region's late marriage pattern has received considerable scholarly attention in part because it appears to be unique; it has not been found in any other part of the world prior to the Twentieth Century. The origins of the late marriage system are a matter of conjecture prior to the 16th Century when the demographic evidence from family reconstitution studies makes the prevalence of the pattern clear. Many historians have wondered whether this unique conjugal regime might explain, in part, why capitalism first took root in Northwestern Europe, contributing to the region's relatively low mortality rates, hastening the fragmentation of the peasantry and the precocious formation of a mobile class of landless wage-earners. Others have highlighted the significance of the late marriage pattern for gender relations, for the relative strength of women's position within marriage, the centrality of widows in village land inheritance, and the vitality of women's community networks.
Friday, January 25, 2008
Unemployment and 15 to 24 Participation in Italy
Well lets start by looking at the story so far, at least as far as Italy goes. Fortunately we do have a number of key stylised facts at our disposal. First off, unemployment has been steadily - I could say relentlessly - dropping in Italy over the last two or three years:
But then if we take a look at one of the younger age groups for a minute, the 15 to 24 one, we can see some important changes.. As is well known this group is now in historic decline as a proportion of the total Italian population. The decline has been very rapid, with a drop of around one third (from 15% to 10% of the population) since 1990.
What this means, logically enough, is that there are steadily less and less people in this age group to fill places in the labour market. To this numerical decline we need to add theongoing secular decline in economic activity rates among this group, as more and more of Italy's - now scarce resource - young people delay entry and seek to improve their education, their human capital rating and hence their future earning capacity.
Thus the proportion of this group which is economically active has been declining steadily, as have the absolute numbers of those who are active, and the numbers of those who are actually employed. It is perhaps worth noting that the absolute size of this age group has been virtually stationary over the last 3 or 4 years (a statistical effect), but it is now set to fall steadily.
So if new employees will be hard to come by in this age group as we move forward, where can employment growth come from? Well basically there are two evident potential sources of labour, immigration and older workers. It is hard to envisage any large increase in employment in the 25 to 34 or the 35 to 54 age groups since - as can be seen from the chart below - activity rates among these groups are already fairly high, and even the slight fall-off which can be seen to have taken place recently in the 25 to 34 age group seems to be the result of a decline in female activity rates, and this is almost to be hoped for if Italy is to do one thing which is very important for its long term future, and that is have more children. Squeezing this particular lemon too hard at this point in time is only likely to obtain short term benefit in return for substantial negative long term outcomes.
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