The Effects of Education and Family Formation on Fertility in Ukraine

The Changing Effects of Education on Family Formation during a Period of Rapid Social Change

Brienna Perelli-Harris

Abstract

This study demonstrates how broad societal-level change not only alters the composition of individual-level characteristics in a population, but also affects the relationship between mechanisms and behavior. Focusing on post-Soviet Ukraine, this paper examines how massive economic, political, and social transformations changed individual-level childbearing decision-making. Specifically, I investigate how social change in Ukraine altered the effects of one institution – education - on the timing of first and second births and marriage. I find that whereas previously more highly educated women would have had higher first birth rates once school enrollment and marriage were controlled, after Independence women with higher education delayed childbearing. The rates of second births and marriage also declined after Independence. Explanations for the changing effects of education on family formation include the restructuring of theeducational system, shifting opportunity costs, and exposure to new ideas and values.

Migration and Union Dissolution in Russia

Migration and union dissolution in changing socio-economic context: The case of Russia
Magdalena Muszynska1 and Hill Kulu

Abstract

Previous studies show that family migration is usually to the benefit of the man’s professional career and that it has a negative impact on the woman’s economic wellbeing and employment. This study extends previous research by examining the effect of family migration on union dissolution. We use the event-history data of two retrospective surveys from Russia and apply hazard regression. The analysis shows that couples who move frequently over long distances have a significantly higher risk of union dissolution than couples who do not move or move only once. Our further analysis reveals that the risk of disruption for frequent movers is high when the migrant woman has a job. Frequent migrants had a high risk of union dissolution during the Soviet period but they faced no such risk during the post-Soviet socio-economic transition. We argue that frequent moving increases union instability through a variety of mechanisms, the effect of which may vary across socio-economic contexts.

Migration and Fertility in Kyrgyzstan

Migration and first-time parenthood: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan
Lesia Nedoluzhko and Gunnar Andersson

Abstract

This article investigates the reproductive behavior of young women and men in the post-Soviet Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan, focusing on the link between migration and fertility. We employ event-history techniques to retrospective data from the ‘Marriage, Fertility, and Migration’ survey conducted in Northern Kyrgyzstan in 2005 to study patterns in first-time parenthood. We demonstrate the extent to which internal migration is related to family formation and to the patterns of becoming a parent after resettlement. We gain deeper insights into demographic behavior by considering information on factors such as the geographical destination of migration and retrospectively stated motives for reported moves. In addition, our study reveals clear ethno-cultural differences in the timing of entry into parenthood in Kyrgyzstan.


In Kyrgyzstan, between 1990 and 2005 total fertility decreased by some thirty percent. Nevertheless, together with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, it still remains a pronounced high-fertility country, with a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in 2005 of around 2.6 children per woman, a feature that rather makes it belong to a group of countries that are in their very first demographic transition. There are differences in fertility among population subgroups, however. While the native Kyrgyz generally have a high fertility, the population of European origin has a fertility that is below replacement level. Significant differences in fertility also exist across regions and different types of settlements. The TFR is higher in rural areas than it is in urban areas: 2.9 versus 2.2.

Model 3 of Table 2 reveals that migration caused by marriage increases the first birth propensity past migration (which should come as no surprise) and that thi tendency entirely explains the elevated fertility that is observed during the first twoyears following migration (see Model 2).

Our analysis indicates that the ‘russified’ group of Asians is significantly different from the other two ethno-cultural groups of our study as concerns their first-birth behavior, thus the group does not occupy an intermediate position between the other two (see Table 2). They have the lowest risk of entry into parenthood: about 30 percent lower than among the ‘Europeans’ and 50 percent lower than among the ‘non-russified Asians’, i.e., they tend to exhibit a reproductive strategy that often entails postponed parenthood. An interaction between age and ethnicity (not shown; p-value = 0.009) reveals that the first-birth risks of Europeans peak at lower ages than for Asians. This finding contradicts the assumption (based on observed differences in total fertility) that early family formation dominates among Asians in general in Kyrgyzstan. However, the finding is supported by census data, these show that Russian women indeed have a lower age at first birth than the aggregated group of Kyrgyz women (23.4 versus 23.7 years). A similar pattern of persistently early entry into parenthood in a population with very low fertility has been observed for Ukraine (cf. Perelli-Harris 2005).


Similar general duration-specific effects of migration on first-birth fertility have been observed for many different types of migrants (cf. Andersson 2004, Toulemon and Mazuy 2004, Kulu 2006, Kulu and Vikat 2007). This suggests that there indeed are strong behavioral regularities in how people tend to locate their family-demographic vital events relative to that of a migration, with childbearing being much more common shortly after a migration than at preparation of such activity. It also calls for a critical stand to various accounts of high fertility of different groups of migrants: Crude statistics on elevated migrant fertility may be more likely to reflect the interrelation between migration and family formation than any real high-fertility behavior.

Geert Hofestede and Intercultural Communication

Gerard Hendrik Hofstede (born 2 October 1928, Haarlem) is an influential Dutch writer on the interactions between national cultures and organizational cultures, and is an author of several books including Culture's Consequences (2nd, fully revised edition, 2001) and Cultures and Organizations, Software of the Mind (2nd, revised edition 2005, with his son Gert Jan Hofstede).

Hofstede's study demonstrated that there are national and regional cultural groupings that affect the behaviour of societies and organizations, and that are very persistent across time.

The Power Distance Index (PDI) is one of the five intercultural dimensions developed by Hofstede. In short this cultural dimension looks at how much a culture does or does not value hierarchical relationships and respect for authority.

Examples of cultures with high PDI scores include Arabic speaking countries, Russia, India and China. Those with low scores include Japan, Australia and Canada. See a world map of power distance index scores.

So how does this manifest in a culture or country?

In a high power distance cultures the following may be observed:

. Those in authority openly demonstrate their rank.
. Subordinates are not given important work and expect clear guidance from above.
. Subordinates are expected to take the blame for things going wrong.
. The relationship between boss and subordinate is rarely close/personal.
. Politics is prone to totalitarianism.
. Class divisions within society are accepted.

In a low power distance culture:

. Superiors treat subordinates with respect and do not pull rank.
. Subordinates are entrusted with important assignments.
. Blame is either shared or very often accepted by the superior due to it being their responsibility to manage.
. Managers may often socialise with subordinates.
. Liberal democracies are the norm.
. Societies lean more towards egalitarianism




Hofstede's four dimensions are:

Power Distance

This dimension relates to the degree of equality/inequality between people in a particular society.

A country with a high Power Distance score both accepts and perpetuates inequalities between people. An example of such a society would be one that follows a caste system and in which upward mobility is very limited.

A low Power Distance indicates that a society does not emphasise differences in people?s status, power or wealth. Equality is seen as the collective aim of society and upward mobility is common.

Read more on Power Distance or Have a look at the world map of power distance scores.


Individualism

This dimension focuses on the degree to which a society reinforces individual or collective achievement and interpersonal relationships.

If a country has a high Individualism score, this indicates that individuality and individual rights are dominant. Individuals in these societies tend to form relationships with larger numbers of people, but with the relationships being weak.

A low Individualism score points to a society that is more collectivist in nature. In such countries the ties between individuals are very strong and the family is given much more weight. In such societies members lean towards collective responsibility.

Read more on Individualism or Have a look at the world map of individualism scores.

Uncertainty Avoidance

This dimension concerns the level of acceptance for uncertainty and ambiguity within a society.

A country with a high Uncertainty Avoidance score will have a low tolerance towards uncertainty and ambiguity. As a result it is usually a very rule-orientated society and follows well defined and established laws, regulations and controls.

A low Uncertainty Avoidance score points to a society that is less concerned about ambiguity and uncertainty and has more tolerance towards variety and experimentation. Such a society is less rule-orientated, readily accepts change and is willing to take risks.

Read more on Uncertainty Avoidance or Have a look at the world map of uncertainty avoidance scores.

Masculinity

This dimension pertains to the degree societies reinforce, or do not reinforce, the traditional masculine work role model of male achievement, control, and power.

A high Masculinity score indicates that a country experiences a higher degree of gender differentiation. In such cultures, males tend to dominate a significant portion of the society and power structure.

A low Masculinity score means a society has a lower level of differentiation and inequity between genders. In these cultures, females are treated equally to males in all aspects of the society.

Read more on Masculinity or Have a look at the world map of masculinity scores

The Hajnal Line

The Hajnal line links Saint Petersburg, Russia and Trieste, Italy. In 1965, John Hajnal discovered it divides Europe into two areas characterized by a different levels of nuptiality.

West of this line, the average age of women at first marriage was 24 or more, men 26, spouses were relatively close in age, and 10% or more of adults never married. East of the line, the mean age of both sexes at marriage was earlier, spousal age disparity was greater and marriage more nearly universal. Subsequent research has amply confirmed Hajnal's continental divide, and what has come to be known as the 'Western European marriage pattern', although historical demographers have also noted that there are significant variations within the region.

The Western European pattern of late and non-universal marriage restricted fertility massively, especially when it was coupled with very low levels of childbirth out of wedlock. Birth control took place by delaying marriage more than suppressing fertility within it. Women's life-phase from menarche to first birth was unusually long, averaging ten to twelve years.

The region's late marriage pattern has received considerable scholarly attention in part because it appears to be unique; it has not been found in any other part of the world prior to the Twentieth Century. The origins of the late marriage system are a matter of conjecture prior to the 16th Century when the demographic evidence from family reconstitution studies makes the prevalence of the pattern clear. Many historians have wondered whether this unique conjugal regime might explain, in part, why capitalism first took root in Northwestern Europe, contributing to the region's relatively low mortality rates, hastening the fragmentation of the peasantry and the precocious formation of a mobile class of landless wage-earners. Others have highlighted the significance of the late marriage pattern for gender relations, for the relative strength of women's position within marriage, the centrality of widows in village land inheritance, and the vitality of women's community networks.

Unemployment and 15 to 24 Participation in Italy

Well lets start by looking at the story so far, at least as far as Italy goes. Fortunately we do have a number of key stylised facts at our disposal. First off, unemployment has been steadily - I could say relentlessly - dropping in Italy over the last two or three years:

But then if we take a look at one of the younger age groups for a minute, the 15 to 24 one, we can see some important changes.. As is well known this group is now in historic decline as a proportion of the total Italian population. The decline has been very rapid, with a drop of around one third (from 15% to 10% of the population) since 1990.

What this means, logically enough, is that there are steadily less and less people in this age group to fill places in the labour market. To this numerical decline we need to add theongoing secular decline in economic activity rates among this group, as more and more of Italy's - now scarce resource - young people delay entry and seek to improve their education, their human capital rating and hence their future earning capacity.



Thus the proportion of this group which is economically active has been declining steadily, as have the absolute numbers of those who are active, and the numbers of those who are actually employed. It is perhaps worth noting that the absolute size of this age group has been virtually stationary over the last 3 or 4 years (a statistical effect), but it is now set to fall steadily.



So if new employees will be hard to come by in this age group as we move forward, where can employment growth come from? Well basically there are two evident potential sources of labour, immigration and older workers. It is hard to envisage any large increase in employment in the 25 to 34 or the 35 to 54 age groups since - as can be seen from the chart below - activity rates among these groups are already fairly high, and even the slight fall-off which can be seen to have taken place recently in the 25 to 34 age group seems to be the result of a decline in female activity rates, and this is almost to be hoped for if Italy is to do one thing which is very important for its long term future, and that is have more children. Squeezing this particular lemon too hard at this point in time is only likely to obtain short term benefit in return for substantial negative long term outcomes.

Fertility in France the US Germany and Italy Compared

Europe's Porous Borders?

EU migration policy seem to be in a bit of a muddle right now. While some member states are positively "raining immigrants" like never before (Spain, the UK, Ireland, Greece) others are losing population at a more or less similar rate (Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania) while yet others have more or less moderate flows (Italy, Portugal, Sweden, the Czech Republic) and others (France, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Estonia) are waking up to the fact that they might be missing out on something.

Over in Brussels EU justice and security commissioner Franco Frattini is aware that something is amiss, but the real issue is how to put together a policy which is acceptable to the differing needs and perspectives of 27 different member states (including, of course, Malta). When you have diversity and division on your hands, there is no simpler solution I suppose, then to look for the problem which unites everyone:

People smugglers are turning the European Union’s south-east frontiers into a hotspot for illegal migration, the EU’s security chief has warned. The Mediterranean is the most visible route for unlawful entry to the union, with thousands of Africans undertaking risky sea crossings each year in an attempt to reach southern Europe. But Mr Frattini warned that undocumented entry through the east was a further worry. “The illegal migrants coming from the east are very often victims of sexual exploitation, trafficking and forced labour,” he told the Financial Times. His comments highlight the challenge confronting the EU over migration, with a fractious debate about whether it can manage entry while also filling labour market gaps. About 500,000 undocumented migrants are thought to arrive each year.

Well, nearly everyone, there is, of course, as I have said, also Malta to think about:

The EU’s fledgling border control agency, Frontex, is running operations in southern coastal waters this summer as part of efforts to control migration from Africa. Mr Frattini said the patrols were having an effect, despite some member states failing to meet commitments to provide equipment. The operations were likely to become permanent there, he added. Since Frontex missions began in the Mediterranean in June, flows of illegal migrants had dropped by 40 per cent. People smugglers were worried about the agency’s patrols, he said. But critics question whether the operations simply push would-be entrants to try other routes. They also say that on the patrol near Malta, anyone rescued by Frontex would be taken to Europe for humanitarian reasons in any case.


And of course, what the FT fails to mention is that the part of Europe which Frontex would most likely have to take them would be Spain, since some other people seem to be so reluctant to accept their humanitarian responsibilities.

But as I say, this issue is reasonably easy to unite people on. All good people and true want to reduce the volume of migrant trafficing, and reduce to a minimum the human tragedy which is currently taking place almost daily off Europe's southernmost shores.

Yes, but how, that is the problem.

Two measures have been proposed. Firstly the Portuguese Presidency is proposing to hold an Africa-EU summit. This would be an initiative somewhat similar the the already existing EuroMed process (Although just one more time Nicolas Sarkozy seems to have his own idea about how to move this latter one forward).


Under the German presidency, efforts from 2006 were continued to strengthen economic development aid to African nations. By increasing the standard of living in Africa, most migrants will find incentive to remain. Many have stated that they do not particularly wish to come to Europe, but they see few other options.

Additionally, agreements have been made, with more on the way, between the European Union, individual EU nations and several African countries on a number of points. Portuguese Prime Minister, José Sócrates, who took over the rotating EU council presidency from Germany, inherits a number of these agreements and now must make further progress.

Fundamentally, in exchange for economic development aid, schools, security training, increased attention toward legal migration routes and job centers, African nations must agree to accept back their nationals who are deported from Europe, increase their own border security to reduce illegal travel, and take on the crime and corruption that is aiding the illegal migration trade.

A very significant step was made toward these goals last month by a delegation of Spanish business executives, with the cooperation and blessing of the Spanish government. They traveled to Senegal in a recruitment drive to establish training centers and to provide job contracts and visas for African nationals to work in Spain.

Babies Booming in Dusseldorf?

A couple of weeks back Bertrand Benoit of the Financial Times Frankfurt Office had an article on what appeared to be a resurgence in natality in Germany:

A pregnant woman is a rare sight on German city streets. But sit at a café terrace on Düsseldorf’s Königsallee, the city’s main shopping artery, and you will probably spot several swollen bellies. Statisticians in this prosperous city have been scratching their heads lately over figures that suggest Germans, among the most barren of western Europeans, are rediscovering the joys of procreation. In the first quarter of 2007, nearly 15 per cent more babies were born in Düsseldorf than in the same period last year. The Kaiserwerther Diakonie, one of the city’s three large hospitals, reported a rise of more than 16 per cent in births in the first half of the year. This and increases seen in other large cities from affluent Munich to down-at-heel Berlin have triggered ecstatic reports, with newspaper Die Welt predicting “a new baby boom”.

I see. Well I'm not sure what exactly has been happening in Dusseldorf, but I think it is pretty clear that Die Welt (and by implication Bertrand Benoit) have been rather too quick of the mark here. So much so that the German Federal Statistics office had to explicity deny the press account when it recently published its Q1 2007 birth data:

WIESBADEN – As reported by the Federal Statistical Office on the basis of provisional results, the number of live births in the first quarter of 2007 (149,300 children) rose just slightly (+0.4%) on the same quarter of 2006 (148,700). The number of boys born was 76,700, that of girls 72,600. The high rates of increase as reported by some media were hence not achieved.

So the press pumped it up, and the statistical office then had to pump it down. In fairmess of course Benoit only talks about Dusseldorf (and there may of course have been, for reasons yet to be determined, a lot of extra births in Dusseldorf early this year. And, indeed, Benoit was not alone here, nor was Die Welt, this news even made it out to Australia.

What is strange about all this is how our thinking is so asymmetrical on the topic, we cast all kind and manner of doubt on assertions from demographers when they suggest that something new, and more or less unprecedented is happening (and if you don't believe this, just take a look at the data I put together earlier in the week on what has been going on in Ukraine in the last decade or so), but then, at the first sight of a little piece of what seems to be good news (even if in fact the news in question is based on misinformation) we quickly let ourselves come to the "there, I told you so" conclusion.

Even with or without an 0.4% increase in live births at the start of this year, what stands out about the German birth numbers is how they are enormously down on the volume of children being born even as recently as the mid 1990s.

Here's the Federal Statistics Office release for 2006 births:

In 2006, 673,000 live births were registered, that was 13,000 or 1.9% less than in 2005. The number of births has been declining since 1991, with the exception of 1996 and 1997. The number of deaths had fallen continuously from 1994 to 2001, before it increased in 2002, 2003 and 2005. In 2006, there were 822,000 deaths, which was a decrease by 8,000 or 1% on the previous year. This means that in 2006, there was an excess of deaths over births of about 149,000. In the previous year, the deficit of births was by about 5,000 persons smaller. On 31 December 2006, Germany had about 82,315,000 inhabitants. That was 123,000 or 0.1% less than at the end of 2005 (82,438,000)


The thing is, none of this is exactly a new phenomenon, as the graph for the Old East and West German fertility shown below makes clear:



But this doesn't seem to hold our Bertrand back:

"Demography experts warn that it could take months, even years, to determine whether the current uptick in childbirth is a statistical anomaly or if something more fundamental is happening. Yet this has not prevented them from speculating about the factors behind the surge."

In truth it would not seem to be the demographers who need to be prevented about speculating - since by and large they are pretty accustomed to this kind of phenomenon, and are normally by nature cautious people - but rather Benoit himself.


To give you some idea in 1990 - and remember that Germany was already on aggregate below replacement fertility already at that point, 904,930 children were born, so the 630,000 odd last year is about a 30% drop in roughly a decade and a half. At this rate by 2020 Germany would be having about 450,000 childen annually, that would be a drop of 50% in 30 years, or one current generation. Now this isn't bad if you think that German is overpopulated, people need more space, Germans consume too much energy etc. But you do need to start to think about where is the money is going to come from to keep all those older people in pensions. Where it won't be coming from is from the honest sweat of Ukranian migrants, since quite simply there won't be sufficient Ukranians left to come. What is it they say already in Serbia, will the last one out turn the lights off :).

And then I have to ask myself, are the only two possible responses to all of this either superficial haymaking, or dreadful gloom and doom. Well Bertrand Benoit, at least, seems to think so:

"Germany’s demographics have spawned their own branch of non-fiction literature specialising in doomsday predictions about the collapse of the country’s welfare state and medical system. Opinion polls show few young people think they can survive in old age on the basic state pension."

Now all of this is a pity, since in the second part of the article Benoit does take the trouble to give us a run around of a lot of the most interesting and influential ideas which are knocking around in the area of low fertility and its attendant problems. Low fertility trap theorist Wolfgang Lutz gets a look in:

“German-speaking countries are unique in having a full generation that has come of age seeing childbearing as abnormal,” says Wolfgang Lutz, the director of the Vienna Institute of Demography. “This has affected the psychology, with a third of young men now saying they never want to have children.”

As does US cohort driven fertility theorist Richard Easterlin:

One popular explanation lies in the country’s powerful economic recovery. The link between income expectation and fertility has been generally accepted since the 1980s, when Richard Easterlin, an economist at the University of Southern California, first highlighted the correlation.


Now much as Easterlin cohort work is of some interest in explaining what you could call the "proximate causes" of fertility outcomes (like bad economic conditions in the 1930s producing the first signs of below replacement fertility while improved prospects post-WWII saw the arrival of the baby booms) it is hard pressed to explain the long term structural drivers of the enduring low fertility we are now seeing increasingly spreading across the globe.

We also get a mention of Elterngelt, which may of course have been a factor in some timing decisions in the urban areas:

"Then there is Elterngeld, a new parental allowance. Introduced nationwide in January and modelled on Scandinavian policies, the benefit entitles every new parent to a state allowance worth 67 per cent of their salary if they stop working for a year after having a child."

So my beef here, yet one more time, is not that there aren't some sensible and interesting points in the article, it is that, just as in the case of the Economist, one or two unjustifiable statements are thrown out which then condition the context of everything else which follows. Yet when you look through the piece carefully, it is often hard to see what exactly is being said, or what conclusions we are actually left to draw. Like:

“Ask young mothers now and most will tell you they want to work part-time,” he says. “The ideology has gone now and we have a consensus that mothers – and fathers – should be given the choice as to how best to raise their children.

Doubtless again there is some truth in this, although it would be nice to see some evidence for the assertion. However, whether part time (or temporary Zeitarbeit) is what they want, it is increasingly what they are likely to find. As we will see in my next installment of the great Bertrand Benoit searching for a solid idea wild goose chase.

German Births Q1 2007

From the German Statistical Office:

1st quarter of 2007: Births rising just slightly

WIESBADEN – As reported by the Federal Statistical Office on the basis of provisional results, the number of live births in the first quarter of 2007 (149,300 children) rose just slightly (+0.4%) on the same quarter of 2006 (148,700). The number of boys born was 76,700, that of girls 72,600. The high rates of increase as reported by some media were hence not achieved.

Is There a Deadline for Parenthood?

Is There a Deadline for Parenthood?
An Example from Poland

Monika Mynarska

Abstract
The postponement of childbearing is occurring across Europe and the USA, but the paths of this trend differ profoundly from country to country. In Poland, as in other Central and Eastern European countries, most women have their first child at a relatively young age. This paper asks about the role of age norms in sustaining the pattern of early motherhood. We investigate young adults’ perceptions of age in relation to their fertility choices. We find that age is indeed a salient dimension that structures and regulates individual childbearing plans. The qualitative approach of our study allows for gaining insights into how age norms are explained, argued about and sanctioned. We also reconstruct the mechanisms of the normative influence of age limits (deadlines) on fertility behavior. Thus, the study not only improves our understanding of the timing of childbearing but also contributes to the general discussion on age norms.

Family Benefits in Germany

This file is useful.

The family allowance is paid for all children up to the age of eighteen. From 1st January, 2007, the period during which the family allowance is paid has been prolonged up to the age of 25 for children undergoing training, and up to age 21 for children without a job. For children undergoing training, who reach the age of 26 and 27 years (birth years 1980-1981), the period during which the family allowance is paid will be continued up to the age of 27; for children undergoing training, who turn 25 in 2007 (birth year 1982), it will be paid until the age of 26 years. Should military or civilian service (which suspend the payment of family allowance) be undertaken by the child during this period, the maximum age-limit is adjusted correspondingly. There is no age-limit for handicapped children who are unable to earn their living.

As is this whole thread.

Polish Migrants and the Scottish Birth Rate

From the Scotsman:

Polish immigrants swell Scotland's new baby boom

IMMIGRANTS from eastern Europe have helped trigger a baby boom in Scotland this year, new official figures have revealed.

There were 646 more babies born in the first quarter of 2007. Of that number, one in five were born to mothers from Eastern Europe.

It is the first time the General Register Office for Scotland has broken down its statistics to uncover the extent of the impact on Scotland's population of mass immigration from Eastern Europe.

A spokesman said: "Births in Scotland went up by 646 as a whole compared with the first quarter of 2006.

"One in five of those babies were born to parents from the EU accession states.

"Of that number, the majority of babies were born to Polish parents, followed by parents from Latvia."

In the past four years, about 600,000 eastern European immigrants have arrived in the UK from the eight nations that have recently joined the EU, including Poland, which joined in 2004, and Romania and Bulgaria, which joined this year.

The Executive believes there are about 40,000 Poles living in Scotland, while the Polish Council believes there are about 50,000. The true figure could be as high as 100,000.

The figures released yesterday showed that while the birth rate in Scotland has continued to grow this year, it was outweighed by the number of deaths.

The first three months of 2007 saw 14,214 babies born, an increase of 4.8 per cent on the same period the previous year.

It continues a five-year trend and is the highest number during the first quarter of the year since 1997.

However, deaths increased by 6.3 per cent from 14,876 to 15,818, the highest total since the same period in 2000.

While the number of deaths from cancer fell by 0.6 per cent, deaths from coronary heart disease increased by 2.4 per cent and deaths from stroke by 1.9 per cent.

The figures give Scotland an estimated population of 5,116,900.

The Registrar General for Scotland, Duncan Macniven, said: "The increase in the number of deaths was disappointing, though it was partly a reflection of the unprecedentedly small number of deaths in the first quarter of 2006.

"The increase was relatively small and it is too early to suggest a change in the trend of a falling death rate."

The figures also showed that the number of marriages dropped, by 4.6 per cent from 3,493 to 3,333, and - as had been expected - the number of same-sex civil partnerships also fell.

Robert Whelan, of the Civitas think tank, said: "We have to bear in mind with immigration that we are not just looking at the numbers of adults coming into the country, but at large numbers of children being born.

"It will make a growing difference to the balance of the population because birth rates among the existing population are low. Immigrant groups have higher birth rates than the existing population."

• THE most popular names for Polish children are quite different from Jack and Sophie - the names most often chosen by parents of Scottish children.

The most popular name for a Polish baby boy is Jan, with Anna being the favourite name for a girl.

Following Jan, the names most commonly picked by Polish parents for boys are: Andrzej, Piotr, Krzysztof, Stanislaw, Tomasz, Pawel, Józef, Marcin and Marek.

For girls, the next most popular after Anna are: Maria, Katarzyna, Malgorzata, Agnieszka, Krystyna, Barbara, Ewa, Elzbieta and Zofia.

Latvians Abroad

EU Business has this:

Outgoing Latvian leader hopes migrants will return to boost homeland


RIGA) - In a farewell address to Latvians Saturday, outgoing President Vaira Vike-Freiberga said she hoped the thousands of citizens who now work in Ireland would someday return home to boost the Baltic country.

Vike-Freiberga, who is stepping down after two four-year terms as head of state of the former Soviet-ruled republic, helped steer Latvia into the European Union and NATO in 2004.

In a televised speech, Vike-Freiberga recalled that she had forecast how freedom of movement within the EU would "lure the most energetic and able of our people abroad."

"Latvia misses their absence painfully," she said.

"Every single person is needed by this country. We expect them back dearly. They will return with the capital of knowledge, wealth, experience."

Latvian authorities estimate that about 50,000 people from the Baltic country work in other EU countries, mainly in Britain and Ireland, which is now home to some 22,000 Latvians.

The departures have dented the labour force in Latvia, which has a population of just 2.3 million people.

However, Vike-Freiberga recalled a remark by her Irish counterpart, President Mary McAleese, that migration was "the opportunity for both sides to benefit."

"Ireland has not always been as affluent and successful as it is now," said Vike-Freiberga, adding that it "had to go through some very tough times."

Emigration from Latvia is driven in part by the fact that the minimum wage here -- 90 lats a month (129 euros, 176 dollars) -- is one of the lowest in the 27-nation EU.

In addition, breakneck growth is going hand in hand with rampant inflation, and there are increasing jitters about a "hard landing" for the Latvian economy.

"We will also get through these difficult times, maybe even faster than the Irish whom we so admire," said Vike-Freiberga.

Studies have shown that the gap in wealth between the richest and poorest Latvians is among the greatest in the EU, with the income of the top 20 percent a full 6.7 times higher than that of the bottom 20 percent in recent years.

"We have proportionally more millionaires than in some other more developed countries. Meanwhile, we have many people who live under the poverty line," said Vike-Freiberga.

"The task of the future is to narrow this gap, so that the rich sustain the country, given all the resources that a democracy provides them, and the less fortunate can move forward in society, so that we can create a stable middle class which is a guarantee of democracy," she added.

The highly popular Vike-Freiberga was first elected president in 1999 and won a second term in 2003.

Her successor, Valdis Zatlers, is due to be sworn in on Sunday.

EU 8 Health Worker Migrant Intentions

From:

Labour Mobility in the Enlarged European Union: International Migration from the EU8 countries it is possible to speculate that Polish emigrants substituted other destination countries for Germany with the new possibilities that arose upon accession to the EU (Fihel, 2006).